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Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts
I. INTRODUCTION
ASS tort litigation' has grown dramatically in the past several
decades, 2 facilitated by changes in social, industrial, economic,
and legal conditions, practices, and structures.3 Perhaps the
most critical factor accounting for the rise of mass tort litigation is the
enormity of the financial rewards in the form of contingency fees availa-
ble to lawyers who successfully initiate or otherwise participate in such
actions.4 Mass tort claims sharing similar factual issues and causation can
be litigated individually or aggregated into class actions or large consoli-
dations.5 The paradigm mass tort personal injury litigation alleges that a
widespread injury was caused by exposure to, or use of, defectively pro-
duced products ingested, inhaled, or implanted into the body.6 The
1. The term "mass tort" refers to claims of injury by large numbers of persons alleg-
edly caused by the ingestion, inhalation, or implantation of a particular product or sub-
stance into the body which is harmful. The injuries suffered may be latent and not
manifest for years or decades after the contact with the product or substance. See generally
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007).
2. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic
Torts, 26 REV. LiG. 883 (2007) (listing of the mass toxic tort cases over the past forty
years); Karen A. Geduldig, Note, Casey at the Bat: Judicial Treatment of Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 310 (2000) ("By 1990, [mass tort claims] encompassed sev-
enty-five percent of all new federal product liability filings," and that "in some
jurisdictions, mass tort claims stemming from exposure to products or toxins 'accounted for
over twenty-five percent of the entire civil caseload.' In fact, mass tort litigation has
evolved into the single largest category of personal injury litigation in the United States
today."). See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON
MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION (Feb. 15, 1999),
reprinted in 187 F.R.D. 293, at 298 (1999).
3. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1013-14 (1993). Among these
trends are increases in product marketing that have led to mass consumption of goods and
services and therefore greater exposure to their potentially dangerous effects, advances in
medical technology that enable medical experts to connect injury with exposure to prod-
ucts or chemical substances, epidemiological studies, and increased mass media reporting
of potentially dangerous products or circumstances, including the increased role of televi-
sion journalism shows-productions that are sometimes assisted by lawyers who are finan-
cially interested in sensationalizing coverage of an issue in order to affect public opinion or
generate a client base. See id. at 1013.
4. I have estimated that the fees in asbestos litigation are north of twenty billion
dollars. See John M. Wylie II, The $40 Billion Scam, READER'S DIGEST, Jan. 2007, at 77,
available at http://www.rd.com/your-america-inspiring-people-and-stories/32514/
article32514.html.
5. "[S]imilar factual issues and legal questions will arise in all claims in a mass tort
litigation, or at least in significant subsets of claims. The same injuries will involve similar
causation issues. Liability issues will be similar among claims alleging similar exposures to
a particular defendant's products." Hensler & Peterson, supra note 3, at 966. Mass tort
litigation is often in the form of a class action, mass consolidation, or other aggregative
form, but also may simply involve thousands of substantially similar individual claims. See
generally Howard Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000).
6. Other personal injury mass torts may be generated by a calamity, improperly de-
signed or constructed vehicles or components of vehicles, or improper design of materials
or structures. Some mass tort litigations allege only economic injury. Typically, for the
latter, the economic injury to each claimant is small, but in the aggregate, the loss alleged is
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"mass" in mass torts refers to the fact that thousands-even tens and
hundreds of thousands of persons-are alleged to have been injured by
contact with or use of the product, causing bodily injury which can, in
toto, amount to hundreds of millions, and even billions, of dollars and
contingency fees of a comparable magnitude.
The key to successfully initiating a mass tort litigation is gaining the
critical "mass."'7 Having identified a potential mass tort, plaintiffs' law-
yers must satisfy two burdens. First, they must present evidence that ex-
posure to a substance can cause a particular disease; and second, they
must produce additional evidence that an individual litigant's disease was
caused by a specific exposure of that type. The first requirement is re-
ferred to as "general causation" and the second as "specific causation." 8
In some cases, general causation is established by clear epidemiological
data, for example, that smoking causes lung cancer, or that exposure to
asbestos causes several diseases, including mesothelioma and asbestosis.
In some mass tort litigations, where at least initially there is no epidemiol-
ogy, plaintiffs rely on expert testimony based on scientifically untested or
invalid theories to establish general causation. A leading example is sili-
cone breast implant litigation where a cadre of scientific and medical ex-
perts testified that the silicone in breast implants entered the blood
stream and caused autoimmune diseases.9 Though this testimony was
later discredited and epidemiological evidence would show that women
with silicone breast implants had the same level of autoimmune disease as
women without such implants, 10 the litigation was highly successful. Ap-
proximately four to five billion dollars have been paid out to women
substantial. In actions based upon fraud, allegations are made that a bank, insurance com-
pany, credit issuer, airline, or other goods seller or service provider, in the course of selling
the service or product, defrauded thousands or even hundreds of thousands of consumers.
While such actions, if brought individually, would usually be denominated as breach of
contract suits and attempts to convert the claims into tort actions would usually be rejected
by courts, the sorcerer's elixir of class action aggregation magically transforms them into
tort claims replete with demands for punitive damages. For an account of several class
actions based upon economic injury, see DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION Di-
LEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 139-40 (2000). The Korein Tillery
firm has amassed over $1.8 billion in settlements of class actions based upon economic
injury, filed mostly in Madison County, Illinois against such companies as IBM, AT&T,
Ameritech, Xerox, MCI, GlaxoSmithKline, Allstate, and SBC, generating an estimated
$600 million in fees. See Braggin' Rights, THE (MADISON COUNTY) RECORD, Dec. 16,
2007, available at www.madisonrecord.com/arguments/205280-braggin-rights.
7. Increased litigation activity is facilitated by the following: widespread solicitation
of potential claimants through mass advertising by way of "800" phone numbers and web-
sites which are ostensibly for information purposes but which steer potential claimants to
the sponsoring law firm; formation of victim support groups that are underwritten by law-
yers; close association with union officials in a position to steer large numbers of claimants
to specific lawyers; the formation of networks of lawyers specialized to particular product
claims; rising corporate wealth; judicial decisions expanding the scope of insurance cover-
age; and procedural rules that facilitate litigation against manufacturers.
8. See Mary Sue Henifen, Howard M. Kipen & Susan R. Poulter, Reference Guide
On Medical Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 439, 444 (2d ed.
2000).
9. See infra Section VI.
10. See infra notes 201-04.
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claiming that silicone breast implants caused their alleged autoimmune
disease or an atypical form not identified in medical literature, of which
the lawyers' share is approximately one to two billion dollars.
Entrepreneurial experts are virtually always available to provide the
general causation testimony needed for a mass tort litigation to proceed.
However, that expert is subject to challenge in a Daubert proceeding. 1
While federal judges have excluded numerous scientific or medical ex-
perts who were to have testified in support of general causation,12 general
causation expert testimony that lacks scientific validity continues to be
advanced. 13 A modest insight into this phenomenon is provided in an
Appendix describing how mold litigation proceeds on the basis of testi-
mony of a small number of experts who have been paid millions of dollars
to advance theories that have been rejected by medical science.14
A substantial body of literature addresses the use of "junk science" in
expert testimony on general causation. Little has been written, however,
about medical records generated to support specific causation in toxic
tort litigation-records which are commoditized and sold in wholesale
quantities by a comparative handful of doctors who are not engaged in
good faith medical practice. In this Article, I address that subject in the
context of the entrepreneurial technique that plaintiffs' lawyers have de-
vised to generate largely specious evidence of specific causation on a
"mass" basis: the litigation screening.
In a litigation screening, potential litigants are solicited by lawyers or
their agents by use of mass mailings, television, and newspaper advertise-
ments providing "800" telephone numbers, and by use of websites pur-
porting to provide medical information about toxic exposures, drugs, or
specific diseases, but which are, in fact, "fronts" for law firms to whom
the website visitor is referred. 15 These solicitations may be reinforced by
11. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For discussion of the
Daubert criteria for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, see Lester Brick-
man, Disparities Between Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Litigation Screen-
ings and Clinical Studies, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 515 n.3 (2007) [hereinafter Brickman,
Disparities].
12. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997) (affirming exclu-
sion of physicians' opinions that PCB exposure can cause small cell lung cancer); Ruggiero
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2005) (excluding expert medical testimony
that the diabetes drug Rezulin was capable of causing or exacerbating cirrhosis of the
liver); see also David Klingsberg & Bert L. Slonin, Physicians' Differential Diagnoses as
Causation Proof Recent Case Law Holds the Line in Requiring Daubert Reliability, 33
PRODS. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 1129 (Nov. 14, 2005) (discussing courts' rejection of differen-
tial diagnoses as not satisfying the Daubert reliability requirement with regard to general
causation). In 1996, in an MDL proceeding, U.S. District Court Judge Robert E. Jones
appointed independent advisors for the court on scientific issues and, on the basis of their
reports, held that testimony of plaintiffs' experts that certain alleged diseases were caused
by silicone breast implants was not based on accepted scientific evidence and would there-
fore be excluded. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1406-07 (1996).
13. For example, see infra note 248, discussing the bogus theories advanced in the
silicone breast implant litigation.
14. See infra Appendix, Mold Litigation.
15. See CENTER FOR MEDICINE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INSTA-AMERICANS: THE
EMPOWERED (AND IMPERILED) HEALTH CARE CONSUMER IN THE AGE OF INTERNET
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lawyer-facilitated articles in news media or television journalism, alerting
the public to the danger posed by the product and by consumer advocacy
groups closely aligned with mass tort lawyers. 16 The potential litigants
are invited to a strip mall, motel room, union hall, or lawyer's office,
where a doctor or medical technician will administer tests and, in some
cases, perform a cursory physical examination for the purpose of generat-
ing medical evidence of the existence of an injury to be attributed to ex-
posure to or ingestion of the defendant's products.
To prepare the tens of thousands of medical reports required by this
wholesale massing of claimants, lawyers or the screening companies hire
doctors who are willing to mass produce mostly unreliable and arguably
fraudulent diagnoses for fees ranging into the millions of dollars. These
litigation doctors often provide thousands-even tens of thousands-of the
medical reports that are required to advance the scheme to mass produce
litigants.17
Litigation screenings, an "entrepreneurial" response to highly profita-
ble opportunities that arise in certain mass tort litigations, should not be
confused with medical screenings. Litigation screenings have no intended
health benefits. The sole objective of such screenings is to identify liti-
gants and generate the medical reports that will qualify the litigants for
compensation. To process the thousands of potential litigants that have
been attracted to attend, most screenings use an assembly line procedure
in which the tasks to be performed are divided into component parts. As
Judge Jack has noted, dividing the screening tasks among multiple provid-
ers can serve to insulate each from liability for fraud since no one thereby
takes full responsibility for the medical reports and each provider can
claim that he had no reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the work
of others that he had relied upon. 18 Each of the providers who profit
from the screening-paralegals, litigation doctors, medical technicians
(taking X-rays and administering echocardiograms or pulmonary function
tests), and the owners and employees of the screening companies are mo-
tivated by substantial, and even enormous, financial incentives. They are
MEDICINE 5-6 (2008) (reporting that a study of web sites providing medical information
showed that this "online real estate was dominated by Web sites paid for and sponsored by
either class action law firms or legal marketing sites searching for plaintiff referrals" and
that the information provided were often "overwhelmingly biased and misleading").
16. See, e.g., infra notes 342-344.
17. In asbestos litigation, approximately twenty-five doctors have accounted for the
majority of the hundreds of thousands of medical reports generated in the course of litiga-
tion screenings. CRMC Response to Amended Notice of Disposition Upon Written Ques-
tions, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) at Ex. D, MDL No. 875 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2,
2006) [hereinafter CRMC Response]. In welding fume litigation, a single doctor accounts
for the vast majority of diagnoses of disease allegedly caused by inhalation of welding
fumes. See infra note 339.
18. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 633-34
(S.D. Tex. 2005). "By dividing the diagnosing process among multiple people, most of
whom had no medical training and none of whom had full knowledge of the entire process,
no one was able to take full responsibility over the accuracy of the process. This is assem-
bly line diagnosing. And it is an ingenious method of grossly inflating the number of posi-
tive diagnoses." Id.
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acutely aware that if the screenings do not generate a sufficiently high
percentage of litigants, the lawyers, who have contracted for the screen-
ings, will simply hire others who can do the job more effectively. Indeed,
the market for litigation screenings is highly competitive and only those
doctors and screening companies that produce the "right" results can ex-
pect to have the volume of business that generates substantial fees.
U.S. District Court Judge Janis Jack, presiding over a multi-district liti-
gation involving 10,000 silicosis 19 claims that were all generated by
screenings, concluded on the basis of the testimony of the screening com-
pany principals, doctors who rendered the diagnoses upon which the
claims were based, and the lawyers for whom the screenings were done,
that "it is apparent that truth and justice have very little to do with these
diagnoses.... [Indeed] it is clear that the lawyers, doctors and screening
companies were all willing participants" in a scheme to "manufacture[ ]
... [diagnoses] for money."'20 Judge Jack's opinion sounds a clarion call
to examine the use of litigation screenings in mass tort litigations-a call
that to date has been consistently ignored by torts scholars. 21
The litigation screening was invented by Richard "Dickie" Scruggs,
who parlayed millions of dollars in asbestos litigation fees generated by
screenings into the tobacco litigation which netted him a reported one
billion dollars.2 2 Scruggs saw an opportunity to improve upon the tradi-
tional litigation model in which an injured person is diagnosed by his
treating doctor and then retains a lawyer to sue the company that pro-
duced the product that caused the harm. To replace this retail model,
Scruggs created a method to amass claims by the hundreds and later by
the thousands. He advertised that he was offering free X-rays and medi-
cal examinations by doctors to workers occupationally exposed to asbes-
tos; in return, those who tested positive agreed to retain him.23 Scruggs'
entrepreneurial approach hit pay dirt and attracted large numbers of po-
tential litigants who sought to claim a piece of the pie. Soon other law-
yers began hiring screening companies which sprang up to meet the
demand to mass-produce litigants with nonmalignant asbestos disease
claims.
In the 1988-2006 period, litigation screenings have been responsible for
generating at least ninety percent of the 585,000 claims of nonmalignant
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000). Silicosis is a scarring of the lungs ("pulmonary intersti-
tial fibrosis" or "fibrosis") caused by inhalation of crystalline silica (sand) dusts. See infra
note 50.
20. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
21. For ruminations on why the subject of mass tort fraud is studiously avoided by
most tort scholars, see Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litiga-
tion: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 166-70 (2004)
[hereinafter Brickman, Asbestos Litigation].
22. See, e.g., Frontline: Inside The Tobacco Deal (PBS television broadcast) http://
www.pbs.orglwgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/interviews/scruggs.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008) (interview with Richard Scruggs). Scruggs's core role in the welding fume
litigation is examined at infra note 395.
23. See Peter J. Boyer, The Bribe, NEW YORKER, May 19, 2008, at 46.
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asbestos-related disease filed with the Manville Trust.24 The enormous
profits realized from asbestos screenings have led lawyers to use screen-
ings in other mass tort litigations to manufacture diagnoses on a mass-
production basis. Screenings have been responsible for nearly 100% of
the 20,000 claims of silicosis filed mostly in state courts in Mississippi in
the 2002-2004 period.25 In addition, litigation screenings have also ac-
counted for the vast majority of the claims filed in the silicone breast
implant, fen-phen diet drug, and welding fume litigations.
I estimate that lawyers have spent at least $500 million, and perhaps as
much as $1 billion,26 to conduct litigation screenings that have generated
over 1,000,000 claimants, most of whose claims are specious, and contin-
gency fees well in excess of thirteen billion dollars.
In this Article, I examine the mechanics of litigation screenings and
review the evidence that litigation screenings in the asbestos, silica, sili-
cone breast implants, fen-phen, and welding fume litigations have been
designed to and did generate specious, if not fraudulent, claims. If litiga-
tion screenings do, in fact, generate tens of thousands of specious, if not
fraudulent, claims, one would expect that those who profit from this pro-
cess, most especially the doctors who have been paid hundreds of millions
of dollars for their medical reports and services, would face at least civil,
if not criminal, sanctions. With rare exception, this has not occurred.
Both the criminal and civil justice systems appear largely incapable of
detecting or deterring, let alone sanctioning, the actions of medical and
scientific experts who, in exchange for hundreds of millions of dollars in
24. "The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (Manville Trust) is the entity cre-
ated as a consequence of the bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville Corp. in 1982 to which all
claims against Johns-Manville relating to asbestos exposure were channeled." Brickman,
Disparities, supra note 11, at 519 n.12. For a fuller description of the Manville Trust, see
Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 54, 128-29.
25. No accurate count of the number of silicosis claims that were filed in state courts in
the 2002-2004 period exists in any published form. My rough estimate is based on conver-
sations with lawyers involved in silica litigation.
26. Lawyers' payments are mostly directed to the screening companies and to the doc-
tors who provide the X-ray and echocardiogram readings and diagnoses in support of the
claims generated by the screenings. N&M, Inc., a screening company that generated as
many as 50,000 claims of asbestosis and silicosis, had gross receipts of over twenty-five
million dollars between July 1996 and April 2005. Certain Defendants' First Amended
Supplemental Brief in Response to Plaintiff's Challenge to the Constitutionality of Flor-
ida's Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act at 4, No. 99-0869-Al (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 25, 2006) (citing to an N&M record, Income by Customer Summary). Dr. Jay Segarra,
one of the litigation doctors used frequently in asbestos and silica screenings, is reported to
have been paid ten million dollars for this work. Silicosis Ruling Could Revamp Legal
Landscape, All Things Considered, (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast Mar. 6, 2006).
For a description of fees charged by doctors in the fen-phen screenings, see infra note
176. One fen-phen screening company that administered echocardiograms grossed fifteen
million dollars in less than two years. See infra note 170. A lead counsel for Wyeth in the
fen-phen litigation estimated that lawyers spent $100 million dollars for fen-phen screen-
ings. See Contingent Fees in Mass Tort Litigation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 105,
162 (2006) (statement of Peter Zimroth). One of the doctors involved in the silicone breast
implant screenings stated that his income rose from about $300,000 in 1993 to $2 million in
1994 when he focused on breast implant screening diagnoses. See infra note 267. Some of
the screening doctors charged $6,000 per examination and tests, while diagnosing more
than ninety percent of the women as eligible for compensation. See infra notes 279-80.
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fees, provide specious, if not fraudulent, medical reports and testimony in
support of mass tort claims.27 Lawyers are even more insulated from
sanctions than are the experts they hire as part of a scheme to manufac-
ture diagnoses for money. In this Article, I will also examine the reasons
for the persistence of the phenomenon of what appears to be prosecu-
tion-less mass tort fraud.
II. CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO LITIGATION SCREENINGS
While most mass tort litigations have not involved the use of litigation
screenings, the impact of litigation screenings has nonetheless been con-
siderable. Trying to identify why litigation screenings are used in some
mass tort litigation but not others is a formidable task. Indeed, there
does not appear to be a single set of conditions that triggers their use.
Nonetheless, certain features or conditions which are present in the mass
torts which appear conducive to lawyers conducting litigation screenings
can be identified.
The first and foremost condition is that the lawyers who will fund the
screenings must conclude that they can generate substantial profits from
the venture. Profitability is a function of the cost of a screening which
can range from as little as $500 to upwards of $10,000 for each qualified
litigant versus the settlement value of the cases generated. In addition, it
must appear that there are at least thousands of potential litigants who
can be attracted to attend screenings.
The critical mass volume is not only necessary for the requisite profit
calculation, but also independently operates to assure the success of the
venture. The purpose of most screenings is to identify litigants and to
generate medical reports that will enable the claims to be profitably set-
tled, preferably en masse. A diligent defense can expose the fact that the
medical reports generated by screenings at least lack reliability. But liti-
gation screenings enable plaintiffs' lawyers to overwhelm defendants by
filing hundreds and thousands of suits, thus making it a practical impossi-
bility for the defendants to take any significant percentage of the cases to
trial and coercing defendants into entering large-scale settlements of, at
best, dubious claims.28 Adding to the pressure that screenings can gener-
27. I am limiting the scope of this statement to the mass production of medical reports
by doctors and technicians which are "manufactured for money," that is, specious, if not
fraudulent, claim generation on a wholesale basis. There have been instances of prosecu-
tion for alleged fraudulent conduct in a relatively small numbers of cases, usually involving
forged prescriptions or other records. For example, lawyers and others have been indicted
for allegedly participating in a scheme to create false prescriptions, pharmacy records, and
medical records in order to qualify for compensation in the fen-phen diet drug settlement.
See generally Jammie E. Gates, Vicksbury Attorney Indicted in Scam, CLARION-LEDGER,
May 27, 2006; see also infra note 157.
28. See infra note 478. The "clear motivation" for this scheme to mass manufacture
diagnoses is, as noted by Judge Jack:
to inflate the number of Plaintiffs and claims in order to overwhelm the De-
fendants and the judicial system. This is apparently done in hopes of ex-
tracting mass nuisance-value settlements because the Defendants and the
2008] 1229
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ate, is the availability of jurisdictions where judges and sometimes juries
have a strong disposition to favor the interests of litigants and their law-
yers and a track record of awarding substantial punitive damages.29
Adding further to the pressure is the legal regime that existed in two of
the most forum-shopped states, Mississippi and West Virginia, at the time
when tens of thousands of mass tort claims were generated by litigation
screenings. Both jurisdictions had liberal joinder rules allowing nearly
unlimited numbers of litigants to be joined to a litigation so long as there
was at least one properly venued plaintiff.30 Frequently, the one or more
properly venued litigants were selected because they had compelling
cases, such as a malignancy coupled with extensive occupational expo-
sure. The scores and even hundreds of others joined to that litigation
often, if not mostly, had specious diagnoses generated by screenings. De-
fendants virtually always settled the entire group of cases, including the
specious ones, because they feared that a local jury would award compen-
satory and punitive damages that would threaten the company's viability.
The threat level was further raised by the fact that a company could not
stay a massive judgment pending appeal unless it could post a bond in the
amount of the entire judgment. But few companies could immediately
come up with the hundreds of millions, and even billions of dollars, re-
quired to post such a bond. The only way to avoid a bet-the-company
scenario was to settle all of the cases. Thus, the mass production of claims
led to the mass settlement of claims.
If the basis for a mass tort litigation is the ingestion or inhalation of a
product, and it has been shown that that product does cause serious in-
jury, even death, as has been the case in the asbestos, silica, and fen-phen
litigations, and perhaps in some welding fume cases, then the purpose of
a litigation screening is to generate thousands of additional claimants who
can assert a colorable claim of injury. "Colorable" in the litigation
screening context does not mean that there is actual injury but only that a
doctor participating in the screening is willing to provide a medical report
attesting to the existence of an injury. Thus, in asbestos and silica litiga-
tion, litigation doctors find that the majority of the X-rays they read indi-
cate radiographic evidence of lung scarring (fibrosis) which can then be
attributed to the claimed exposure. Clinical studies indicate, however,
that litigation doctors' error rates are mostly in the ninety percent
range.31
judicial system are financially incapable of examining the merits of each indi-
vidual claim in the usual matter.
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
29. See Lester Brickman, Lawyers' Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New
World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 243, 259 n.50
(2001); see also, Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN.
SUR. AM. L. 525, 569 n.170 (2007).
30. See infra notes 348, 360.
31. Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 531-56.
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Based on data I have compiled, an average screening of 1,000 individu-
als occupationally exposed to asbestos will result in 500-600 being diag-
nosed with asbestosis; if these same individuals were examined in a
clinical setting, however, approximately 30-40 would be diagnosed with
asbestosis.32 The value of a nonmalignant claim in the 1988-2000 period
ranged mostly from $50,000 to $150,000. Thus, screenings coined money
as surely as if the lawyers had access to the government's printing press.
A circumstance that heightens the likelihood of lawyers' sponsoring lit-
igation screenings is a medical condition that, though pre-existing, can
nonetheless be attributed to the exposure or ingestion of the subject of
the mass tort. As already indicated, in asbestos and silica litigation, litiga-
tion doctors frequently attribute any scarring of the lungs, however mild
and whatever the cause, as resulting from asbestos or silica exposure. In
the fen-phen litigation, the fact that millions of persons were born with or
had developed a mild mitral valve regurgitation, once referred to by doc-
tors as a "murmur," provided fertile ground for litigation doctors to find
not only that the condition was more severe than in reality, that is, "mod-
erate" regurgitation instead of "mild" or trace, but also that the condition
was caused by ingestion of fen-phen.
Another condition associated with litigation screenings is a claim of
injury that is not capable of objective verification. Thus, in silicone breast
implant litigation, litigation doctors attributed women's unverifiable
claims of fibromyalgia, joint pain, and similar unmeasurable symptoms to
the silicone implants. Indeed, the more unverifiable, the greater the lee-
way afforded the doctors to make the "right" diagnoses and attributions.
In welding fume litigation, the screening diagnoses are based on "signs"
such as tremor (uncontrollable shaking) that are easily fabricated, and,
indeed in some instances, there is clear evidence of such fabrication.33
Even if objective medical tests may be required as a basis for a diagno-
sis of injury, litigation screenings can overcome this hurdle by using tech-
nicians with the requisite financial incentives to manipulate the tests to
produce outcomes which qualify the litigants for compensation. Thus, in
asbestos litigation, hundreds of thousands of pulmonary function tests
have been maladministered in order to show a lung function impairment
that increases the value of claims.34 In the fen-phen litigation, there is a
considerable body of evidence that medical technicians maladministered
thousands of echocardiograms in order to produce specious, if not fraud-
ulent, evidence of heart valve injury.35
One condition that is a sine qua non for litigation screenings is the
availability of a cadre of doctors willing to "manufacture diagnoses for
money"-that is, willing, for a fee, to provide whatever medical reports
are required to qualify a substantial percentage of those screened for
32. Id. at 562-63.
33. See infra notes 455-56.
34. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 111.
35. See infra notes 171-72, 182, 186-93.
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compensation from bankruptcy trusts or defendants in the tort system. A
mere handful or two of doctors willing to engage in this commerce, how-
ever, is sufficient since each of these doctors can produce hundreds,
thousands, and even tens of thousands of the requisite medical reports.
For example, in asbestos litigation, approximately twenty-five doctors ac-
count for hundreds of thousands of medical reports.36 In the welding
fume litigation, a single doctor accounts for the vast majority of claims
produced by the screenings.37 In the fen-phen litigation, a handful of car-
diologists are responsible for thousands of specious claims of heart valve
disease. 38
Finally, a condition that is especially conducive to the use of litigation
screenings is a large aggregate settlement of a mass tort, such as the set-
tlements in the fen-phen and silicone breast implant class actions, where
the medical and exposure criteria for qualification for payment are insuf-
ficiently rigorous. There, lawyers took advantage of this laxity in both
settlements to institute litigation screenings to generate medical reports
that qualified tens of thousands of potential litigants who attended the
screenings for payment though they had not been contemplated as poten-
tial claimants at the time of the settlements.
III. "ENTREPRENEURIAL" ASBESTOS
LITIGATION SCREENINGS
A. THE MECHANICS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION SCREENINGS
A year before Judge Jack issued her report in the silica MDL, I detailed
the existence of a similar, if not identical, process of specious generation
of hundreds of thousands of nonmalignant asbestos claims.39 I con-
cluded that an illegitimate "entrepreneurial" model had come into use to
generate massive numbers of specious nonmalignant asbestos claims.40
The core of the "entrepreneurial" model of nonmalignant asbestos litiga-
tion is an unprecedented-in-scale litigant recruitment effort: the litigation
screening. 41 Entrepreneurial screening companies are hired by lawyers to
seek out persons with occupational exposure to asbestos. Mobile X-ray
vans are brought to local union halls, motel rooms, or strip mall parking
lots where X-rays are taken on an assembly-line rate of one every five to
ten minutes. In addition to the X-rays, most screening companies also
administer pulmonary function tests ("PFTs") to determine the existence
36. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 521.
37. See infra note 339.
38. See infra note 176.
39. See generally Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21.
40. For discussion of the "entrepreneurial" model, see Lester Brickman, On The Ap-
plicability of the Silica MDL Proceeding To Asbestos Litigation, 12 CoNN. INS. L.J. 289(2006) [hereinafter Brickman, Silica/Asbestos Litigation]. For a review of the evidence that
hundreds of thousands of medical reports generated by asbestos and silica litigation screen-
ings have been "manufactured for money," see generally Brickman, Disparities, supra note
11.
41. For a more detailed description of litigation screenings for asbestos-related dis-
eases, see Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 62.
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and degree of any lung impairment since that can materially increase the
value of a nonmalignant claim.
42
The sole object of these screenings is to generate medical reports to be
used to support claims of asbestosis, a scarring of the lung tissue caused
by extensive exposure to asbestos.43 In the 1988-2006 period, approxi-
mately 700,000 potential litigants who had been occupationally exposed
to asbestos were screened. 44 These litigation screenings accounted for
more than ninety percent of the approximately 585,000 nonmalignant
claims for compensation filed with the Manville Trust in that period.
45
To read the hundreds of thousands of pulmonary X-rays generated by
the litigation screenings and to produce the massive numbers of medical
reports needed to advance the scheme, plaintiffs' lawyers and the screen-
ing companies have hired a comparative handful of doctors selected be-
cause of their apparent willingness to enter into business transactions
with the lawyers for the sale of tens of thousands of X-ray readings and
diagnoses in exchange for the payment of millions of dollars in fees. The
X-ray readers, usually radiologists and pulmonologists, have been certi-
42. See id. at 111 (describing pulmonary function tests); see also Brickman, Disparities,
supra note 11, at 574-575.
43. Prolonged exposure to scores of different dust particles which penetrate the lung's
forward line of defenses results in the accumulation of macrophages and inflammatory
cells in the alveoli (the air exchange sacks of the lung), which can lead to a scarring of lung
tissue. See generally Ken Donaldson & C. Lang Tran, Inflammation Caused by Particles
and Fibers, 14 INHALATION TOXICOLOGY 5 (2002). When that occurs, the condition is
termed interstitial or parenchymal fibrosis. If the fibrosis is the result of exposure to silica
(sand dust), the condition is termed "silicosis"; if it is the result of exposure to asbestos, it is
called "asbestosis." W. RAYMOND PARKES, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISORDER 285, 411 (3d
ed. 1994). Fibroses caused by exposure to different dusts encountered in occupational set-
tings, as well as by numerous other causes, may manifest differently on an X-ray. See infra
notes 80-84. While the determination of the cause of a fibrosis may have a medical pur-
pose, the principal reason for determining that the cause is asbestos exposure is a function
of the compensation system. Whereas a diagnosis of one cause of fibrosis may yield no
compensable claim, a diagnosis of asbestosis may enable the subject to be eligible for sub-
stantial compensation.
In its mildest form, asbestosis may cause no breathing impairment and is detectable only
by chest X-ray or high-resolution CAT scan. In more severe cases, significant fibrosis can
decrease the elasticity of the lungs and "interfere[ ] with the lung's ability to oxygenate the
blood." ABA COMM'N ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT To THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:
RECOMMENDATION 7 (2003), available at www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/
302.pdf [hereinafter ABA Report] ("Asbestotic lungs are characterized by reduced capac-
ity, i.e., they can process only a reduced volume of air compared to normal lungs. Workers
who suffer from significant asbestosis generally have shortness of breath on exertion."). In
its most severe form, asbestosis is progressive and debilitating and can lead to death.
44. See generally STEPHEN CARROLL, ASBESTOS LITIGATION xviii (2005), available at
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND MG162.pdf.
45. See supra note 24; CARROLL, supra note 44, at 76; Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues
In Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833, 834 (2005); Asbestos Litigation: Hearing
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 87-96 (2002) (statement of David T.
Austern, President of the Claims Resolution Management Corporation and General Coun-
sel of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust); see generally The Fairness in Asbes-
tos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003) (citing Hearing on Asbestos




fied by NIOSH as B Readers,46 which is an indication of special compe-
tence in reading chest X-rays and classifying them on the International
Labour Organization ("ILO") scale. 47 A comparative handful of B
Readers, ranging from four to six percent of all certified B Readers,48 are
regularly selected by plaintiffs' lawyers to read most of the hundreds of
thousands of X-ray films generated by screenings. These B Readers read
the majority of these X-rays as indicating pulmonary fibrosis graded as 1/
0 on the ILO scale and issue findings that the fibrosis is "consistent with
asbestosis." Along with a comparative handful of other doctors, they di-
agnose the vast majority of litigants thus found to have profusions of 1/0
or greater as having mild asbestosis49 (or silicosis, 50 if that is the purpose
46. "The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") awards B-Reader approvals to [indi-
viduals] who meet a specified level of proficiency in classifying chest X-rays according to
the ILO scale; these B-Readers must be re-certified at 4 year intervals," and are usually,
but not always, licensed doctors. In re Joint E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp.
2d 297, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); see also ABA Report, supra note 43, at 14.
47. The degree of fibrosis appearing on a chest X-ray is graded according to a classifi-
cation system developed by the International Labour Office ("ILO"). ILO, GUIDELINES
FOR THE USE OF ILO INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF RADIOGRAPHS OF PNEUMO-
CONIOSIS (rev. ed. 1980) [hereinafter ILO Guidelines]. The system uses a scale that was
developed to systematically record the radiographic abnormalities in the chest provoked
by the inhalation of dusts. Id. at 1, 2. According to the ILO: "The object of the Classifica-
tion is to codify the radiographic abnormalities of pneumoconiosis in a simple reproducible
manner. The Classification does not define pathological entities, nor take into account
working capacity. The Classification does not imply legal definitions of pneumoconiosis
for compensation purposes, nor set nor imply a level at which compensation is payable....
The Classification is based on a set of standard radiographs, a written text and a set of
notes. In some parts of the scheme the standard radiographs take precedence over the text
for the definitions; the text makes it clear when this is so." Id.
On the ILO scale, chest X-rays are classified, usually by B Readers, according to the
number of abnormalities (termed "opacities") in a given area of the chest film. A "zero"
corresponds to no abnormalities, "one" to slight, "two" to moderate, and "three" to se-
vere. "Since this process is to some degree inherently subjective, readers give two classifi-
cations, the category that they think most likely and next most likely. The result is a 12
point scale, with results ranging from 0/0 (normal [X-ray] appearance) to 3/3 (severe ab-
normalities)." In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d. at 308. The vast
majority of screening x-rays (for which asbestosis is claimed) are read as '1/0', which means
the x-ray on first impression is at the lowest level of abnormality ('1'), but may be normal('0'). ABA Report, supra note 43, at 9, 13. A reading of 1/1 "is a stronger finding than a 1/
0" and "means that the reader found clear evidence of lung irregularities." Id. For pur-
poses of identifying and locating opacities, the ILO form divides the lungs into six zones,
upper, middle, and lower, left and right. For a diagnosis of asbestosis, the opacities should
be found bilaterally in the lower zones. Nonetheless, a B Reader may assign a 1/0 grade
even if he finds irregular opacities in only one of the six zones.
48. As of December 15, 2005, NIOSH listed 387 B Readers on its website; on July 22,
2003, it listed 431; on April 25, 2002, it listed 535; and on February 20, 1998, NIOSH listed
627 B Readers. For a current list of B Readers, see http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/ches-
tradiography/breader-list.html.
49. A diagnosis of asbestosis, when done in a medical rather than a litigation setting, is
based on a chest X-ray, physical exam including a medical and occupational history, and a
measurement of lung function. American Thoracic Society, Diagnosis and Initial Manage-
ment of Nonmalignant Diseases Related to Asbestos, 170 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED.
691, 695-97 (2004).
50. Silicosis is a disease of the lung caused by the inhalation of silica dusts. Silica is the
common name for minerals containing a combination of the elements silicon and oxygen
and is one of the most common substances in the Earth. Extensive exposure to silica dusts
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of the screening, or both asbestosis and silicosis). This small number of B
Readers and other doctors have accounted for a dramatically dispropor-
tionate number of the total number of X-ray readings and medical re-
ports that have been submitted as evidence in support of nonmalignant
asbestos personal injury claims.51 Indeed, the reliance on a comparative
handful of B Readers and diagnosing doctors is a defining characteristic
of the "entrepreneurial" model. 52
B. A COMPARISON OF THE PREVALENCE OF FIBROSIS AND
DIAGNOSES OF ASBESTOsIs FOUND By ASBESTOS
LITIGATION SCREENINGS WITH THE RESULTS
OF A REVIEW OF CLINICAL STUDIES
1. Prevalence As Found By Litigation Screenings
My research indicates that the comparative handful of B Readers em-
ployed by screening companies and plaintiffs' lawyers find pulmonary fi-
brosis in fifty to ninety percent of the X-rays generated by litigation
screenings, grading them as 1/0 or higher, and issue findings that the
opacities on the X-rays are "consistent with asbestosis. ' 53 Because of the
economics of litigation screenings, X-rays not read as positive, that is, 1/0
or higher on the ILO scale, are typically sent, on multiple occasions if
can cause severe damage to the lung, even death, depending on the dose and duration of
exposure. See Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to Regulate: Silica
and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 272-73, 288-89
(2006). Historically the highest exposures to silica dust occurs among sandblasters working
in the construction, refinery and shipyard trades, foundry workers, industrial painters, and
miners. Gregory R. Wagner, Asbestosis and Silicosis, 349 LANCET 1311, 1311-12 (1997).
Exposure during mining operations is a function of (1) the quartz content of overlying rock
which is made respirable by drilling, (Quartz is a crystalline form of silica) and (2) the use
of dust-control equipment.
51. The Manville Trust has reported that of 119,533 claims it processed in the period
January 1, 2002, to June 30, 2004, just twenty B Readers accounted for sixty-two percent of
the total B Readings. See Power Point Presentation at 8, David T. Austern, President,
Claims Resolution Management Corporation, "2004 Asbestos Claim Filing Trends."
52. In the Silica MDL, Judge Jack noted that "the over 9,000 Plaintiffs who submitted
Fact Sheets were diagnosed with silicosis by only 12 doctors... affiliated with a handful of
law firms and mobile x-ray screening companies." In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 563, 580 (S.D. Tex. 2005). A study of a stratified sample of claims submitted to
Owens Corning before its bankruptcy filing indicated that just five B Readers (Drs. Ray-
mond Harron, Jay Segarra, Richard Keubler, Philip H. Lucas and James W. Ballard) had
read over eighty percent of the X-rays, with Dr. Harron alone accounting for forty-six
percent of the X-ray readings. GARY K. FRIEDMAN, OWENS CORNING IMPAIRED
NONMALIGNANT CLAIM SUBMISSIONS 1994-1999 (APPROX.), 11, 18-21 (2000). The Manville
Trust reported that of 119,533 claims it processed in the period January 1, 2002, to June 30,
2004, just twenty B Readers accounted for sixty-two percent of the total B Readings. See
Power Point Presentation, "2004 Asbestos Claim Filing Trends," supra note 51, at 8. The
Trust further reported that as of December 31, 2005, of the many hundreds of B readers in
its files, the top 25 who authored B reads in support of claims submitted to the Trust ac-
counted for 66% (89,092) of the 135,235 B reads in its records. CRMC Response, supra
note 17, at Ex. B. Of the thousands of doctors who submitted diagnoses, the top twenty-
five who were identified in the Trust's records as the primary diagnosing doctor accounted
for 46% (255,928) of the total of 552,045 claims that permitted such identification. Id. at
Ex. C.
53. Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 529.
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necessary, to other B Readers who similarly find a very high prevalence
of pulmonary fibrosis, for re-reading. 54 As a consequence, the actual per-
centage of positive X-ray readings of those screened is more likely well
above the low end of the fifty to ninety percent range.55 In addition, I
estimate that these same B Readers and other doctors regularly selected
diagnose approximately eighty percent or more of those whose X-rays
are graded 1/0 or higher with asbestosis "within a reasonable degree of
medical certainty."'56 Here too, a negative diagnosis for asbestosis-rep-
resenting a loss of potential revenue of $60,000-$100,000 in the 1990-2000
period and a lesser sum thereafter-also results in recirculation of the file
to another diagnosing doctor for re-diagnosis.5 7 Taking this practice into
account, I estimate that the diagnosis rate of asbestosis for those with X-
rays read as 1/0 or higher is well above eighty percent. Moreover, based
upon the data I have assembled, I conclude that there is a significant like-
lihood that each of these B Readers and diagnosing doctors, as well as the
screening companies that hire them, have a predetermined "signature"
percentage of positive X-ray readings and diagnoses in the fifty to ninety
percent range. 58 Indeed, the "product" that these doctors and screening
companies appear to be selling to lawyers is a high fixed percentage of
"positive" X-ray readings and diagnoses of silicosis and asbestosis.
2. Clinical Studies of the Prevalence of Fibrosis
There have been over eighty medical studies of workers occupationally
exposed to asbestos to determine the prevalence of fibrosis in these popu-
lations.59 A review of these clinical studies indicates a prevalence of fi-
brosis among a wide range of occupationally exposed workers of
11.56%.60
A simple comparison of the prevalence of fibrosis generated by asbes-
tos litigation screenings with the results of a review of clinical studies,
while providing compelling evidence of systemically erroneous, if not
fraudulent, medical report generation, understates the degree of dispar-
ity. This is so because most of the clinical studies fail to distinguish be-
tween different shapes and locations of the opacities that are determined
to be fibrosis, whereas the litigation B Readers always find that the opaci-
ties are "consistent with asbestosis." If the clinical studies were to have
limited their X-ray readings to only opacities of the shape and location
54. Id. at 531.
55. Id. at 530-32.
56. Id. at 529.
57. Id. at 530-31.
58. Id. at 530.
59. These studies are reviewed in Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 531-44.
60. See id. at 540-44. In this review, I have adjusted the results of five insulators'
studies because they have a substantial and disproportionate impact on the results of the
review and thus result in overstating the prevalence. If these studies are not adjusted, the
prevalence percentage is 14.18%. Id. For discussion of the five insulators' studies and why
an adjustment is proper, as well as discussion of all of the additional studies reviewed, see
id. at 531-43.
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that are "consistent with asbestosis," their findings of fibrosis would likely
have been appreciably reduced.61
Second, there are some conditions that manifest on pulmonary X-rays
which are not actually fibrosis but are sufficiently similar to fibrosis as to
be easily misinterpreted as fibrosis. 62 In addition, certain abnormalities
of the lung that are the result of aging and smoking and which are not due
to asbestos exposure are "indistinguishable from occupationally related
pulmonary fibrosis." '63
A third reason why a simple comparison may understate the disparity
is that there is a "background" prevalence of opacities graded as fibrosis
in unexposed populations. A review of eleven clinical studies indicates a
prevalence of fibrosis in the general population of approximately three
percent. 64 This background prevalence of fibrosis in the general popula-
tion may have resulted in elevated finding of fibrosis in the clinical stud-
ies of occupationally-exposed workers.
3. Clinical Re-readings of Litigation B Readers' Results
Beyond the results of the review of the clinical studies, there is addi-
tional evidence to support the conclusion that the B Readers most fre-
quently selected by plaintiffs' lawyers for litigation screenings are
manufacturing B readings for money. In eight clinical studies or their
equivalent, X-rays read as 1/0 or higher and "consistent with asbestosis"
were re-read by independent B Readers. These studies indicate that the
litigation B Readers' error rates range from sixty to ninety-seven percent,
with most in the ninety percent range. 65
In one of these studies in 1986, the United Rubber Workers' Interna-
tional Union ("URW") requested that NIOSH conduct an evaluation of
the occurrence of pneumoconiosis among tire workers to determine if the
union/industry-operated medical surveillance program, which failed to
detect any excess asbestosis or other pneumoconiotic conditions among
tire workers, had missed cases of asbestos-related disease.66 The basis for
this concern was a very high rate of pneumoconiosis generated by asbes-
61. Id. at 544-46.
62. Chest radiographic interpretations have been read as positive, when in fact they
were negative, with the misinterpretation resulting from "increased basilar linear markings
caused by emphysema or pleural changes that overlay the parenchyma." Arnold C. Fried-
man, Computed Tomography of Benign Pleural and Pulmonary Parenchymal Abnormali-
ties Related to Asbestos Exposure, 11 SEMINARS IN ULTRASOUND, CT, AND MRI 399, 399-
401 (1990). Prominent vessels, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchiectasis, scar-
ring from surgery, old tuberculosis, obscuration of the lung by plaques en face, and walls of
bullae (emphysema) have also been misread as parenchymal asbestosis. Arnold C. Fried-
man et al., Asbestos-Related Pleural Disease and Asbestosis: A Comparison of CT and
Chest Radiography, 150 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 269, 270-71 (1988).
63. John D. Meyer, Prevalence of Small Lung Opacities in Populations Unexposed to
Dusts: A Literature Analysis, 111 CHEST 404, 405 (1997).
64. Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 547-488.
65. Id. at 557.
66. See John Jankovic & Robert Reger, HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT, NI-
OSH Rep. No. HETA 87-017-1949 (Dep't Health & Human Servs. NIOSH, Feb. 1989).
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tos screenings. Information distributed to tire workers by plaintiffs' law-
yers stated that at one screening location, sixty-four percent of those
screened tested positive for asbestosis, and at a second screening location,
ninety-four percent tested positive for asbestosis.67 Focusing on workers
with the greatest potential for disease, NIOSH had an independent panel
evaluate 987 X-rays from the surveillance program of workers greater
than forty years of age. The NIOSH panel found that only two (0.2%)
showed physical changes consistent with the mildest form of asbestosis.68
In another one of these studies done in 1990, four medical professors
and radiologists reexamined the X-rays of 439 tire workers who filed suit
after a mass screening, and found that realistically, at most, only eleven of
the claimants (2.5%) had lung conditions consistent with asbestos expo-
sure-a 97.5% error rate. 69
In a third study done in 2004, 492 X-rays read by litigation B Readers
that were used to support asbestos lawsuits were re-read by a panel of six
consultant B Readers.70 The consultant B Readers were blinded to the
source of payments, source of X-rays, the attorneys involved, the status of
films in litigation, the identity of the B Readers, the individuals' names,
and the results of their cumulative findings. All of the films originally
came from plaintiffs' counsels and had been filed in support of plaintiffs'
asbestos lawsuits.71
While plaintiffs' B Readers had found 95.9% of the 492 X-rays to be
"consistent with asbestosis" and have a profusion of 1/0 or higher on the
ILO scale, the six consultant readers found that only 4.5% of the same X-
rays had a profusion of 1/0 or higher. Even these readings did not mean
that 4.5% of the 492 had asbestosis. Rather, the re-readings only indi-
cated that 4.5% of the X-rays had small opacities of 1/0 or greater. These
opacities could have been the result of old age, obesity, smoking, or more
than 100 other causes other than exposure to asbestos.
67. See Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014K, 1990 WL 72588, at *10 (D.
Kan. May 30, 1990).
68. Jankovic & Reger, supra note 66, at 12-14.
69. Robert B. Reger, Cases of Alleged Asbestos-Related Diseases: A Radiologic Re-
Evaluation, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1088, 1089 (1990).
70. The study was designed and conducted by Dr. Joseph N. Gitlin, an associate pro-
fessor at Johns Hopkins, who designed and directed the National X-ray Exposure Studies
in the United States for the U.S. Public Health Service, and his co-author Mr. Otha Linton,
a senior executive of the American College of Radiology where he managed the Task
Force on Pneumoconiosis for NIOSH and was involved in the development of the B
Reader program. See Joseph N. Gitlin, Comparison of "B" Readers' Interpretations of
Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes, 11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 843 (2004) [here-
inafter Gitlin Study].
71. Joseph N. Gitlin, Response to Letters on B-readers Study, 11 ACAD. RADIOLOGY
1402 (2004). The B Readers on the panel included one who had consulted primarily for
plaintiffs, two who consulted for plaintiffs and defendants, two who consulted primarily for
defendants, and two who had no previous participation in reading films for litigation. The
total is seven because one of the consultant B Readers died during the course of the study
and was replaced. For a response to criticisms of this study, see Lester Brickman, A Re-
sponse to Bryan 0. Blevins, Jr. (Dec. 20, 2006), www.LesterBrickman.com (follow "Publi-
cations" hyperlink).
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Another study, done in 2006, confirmed the results of the 2004 study.72
Using a randomized sample and a control group, the 2006 study reviewed
471 X-rays previously read by plaintiffs' B Readers who found that 383
(81.31%) had a profusion of 1/0 or greater on the ILO scale. 73 Upon re-
reading by a panel of three B Readers who were blinded as to the source
of the X-rays, the purpose of the study and the identity of the entity on
whose behalf the readings were being done,74 only thirty-three X-rays
(seven percent) were found to evidence such profusions. 75 The overall
error rate found for the litigation doctors of ninety-one percent was virtu-
ally identical to the error rate found in the 2004 study.76
Finally, 1,795 X-rays taken in a hospital and read by one of fifty differ-
ent hospital radiologists in the normal course of reading X-rays adminis-
tered in the hospital were also read by a litigation doctor in the 2003-2005
period. Using the hospital radiologists' readings as a standard, the litiga-
tion doctor had an eighty-nine percent error rate in reading the X-rays
for interstitial fibrosis. 77
4. The Disparity Between Clinical Diagnoses of Asbestosis and Those
Generated by Screenings
Approximately eighty percent or more of litigants whose screening-
generated X-rays are graded as 1/0 or higher are then diagnosed with
asbestosis "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty" by the litiga-
tion doctors. 78 Only a few of the clinical studies include a diagnosis of the
cause of the fibrosis identified in the studies. Two studies that did, and a
clinical-study equivalent, found that the prevalence of asbestosis among
occupationally-exposed workers whose X-rays were graded as 1/0 or
higher was 15%, 18.5%, and 23.2%. 79
A principal reason why seventy-seven to eighty-five percent of those
workers whose X-rays were read as 1/0 or higher in the clinical studies
were not diagnosed with asbestosis is that there are well over 100 possible
72. Expert Report of Dr. Daniel Henry, In re W.R. Grace & Co., No. 01-1139 (JFK)
(Bankr. D. Del. June 11, 2007) [hereinafter Henry Report]. This unpublished study was
undertaken by W.R. Grace, the debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding, and was of a cohort of
claimants who alleged a non-mesothelioma malignancy caused by W.R. Grace exposure
and who were relying on X-ray evidence to support the attribution of their cancer to asbes-
tos exposure. Id. at 6. For a more complete description of the study, see Brickman, Dis-
parities, supra note 11, at 554-56.
73. Henry Report, supra note 72, at Ex. C 5-6.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 8.
76. See Gitlin Study, supra note 70.
77. See infra note 604.
78. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 529.
79. Id. at 561-62.
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causes of fibrosis besides asbestos exposure, 80 including aging,81 smoking,
obesity, and the use of certain medications.82 In addition, a condition
called idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis,83 that is, fibrosis with no known
cause, is indistinguishable on radiographs from the fibrosis caused by as-
bestos exposure and has been misread as asbestosis.84
Accordingly, it is probable that the substantial disparity between the X-
ray readings of the litigation doctors and the results of the medical studies
would be exceeded by the disparity between the diagnoses of asbestosis
by the litigation doctors and the results that medical studies would have
produced had they, as did two clinical studies referenced,85 also under-
taken to provide diagnoses.
C. THE NUMBER OF ANNUAL HOSPITALIZATIONS
DUE TO AsBESTOSIS
Further evidence of the lack of reliability of the hundreds of thousands
of medical reports produced by litigation screenings is provided by data
on the number of hospitalizations for asbestosis. In the period 1990-2004,
approximately 470,000 claims were filed with the Manville Trust alleging
a nonmalignant disease caused by asbestos exposure. 86 The majority of
these claims, 376,000, alleged asbestosis and included medical diagno-
80. Marvin I. Schwartz, Approach to the Understanding, Diagnosis and Management of
Interstitial Lung Disease, in INTERSTITIAL LUNG DISEASE 1, 4-5 tbl.1-1 (Marvin I. Schwartz
& Talmadge E. King eds., 1998).
81. "Age and smoking habits have been postulated to produce radiographic
parenchymal abnormalities in unexposed populations indistinguishable from occupation-
ally related pulmonary fibrosis." Meyer, supra note 63, at 405.
82. In addition to aging, "commonly found conditions/diseases not related to asbesto-
sis which appear as interstitial lung disease on x-ray include ... smoking history, obesity,
lupus, silicosis, or numerous other medical conditions." Aff. of Dr. Robert Steiner at 3, In
re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL No. 875 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Pulmonary fibro-
sis is also known to be caused by certain medications; radiation; connective tissue or colla-
gen diseases; sarcoidosis, a disease characterized by the formation of granulomas (areas of
inflammatory cells) which frequently affects the lungs; Farmer's Lung, an allergic reaction
to some organic substances such as moldy hay, various environmental exposures, and
sometimes genetic/familial history. American Lung Association, Interstitial Lung Disease
and Pulmonary Fibrosis: Known Causes of Pulmonary Fibrosis, http://www.lungusa.org/
site/c.dvLUK9O0E/b.4061173/apps/s/content.asp?ct=3052333#known (last visited Oct. 16,
2008). Some of the conditions that must be excluded as possible causes of fibrosis before a
diagnosis of asbestosis can be made are collagen-vascular disease, sarcoid, cholesterol
pneumonitis, parenchymal Hodgkin's disease, rheumatoid lung, as well as others. Fried-
man, supra note 62, at 399-401; see also H.S. VanOrdstrand, Pneumoconiosis and Their
Masqueraders, 19 J. OccuP. MED. 747, 753 (1977).
83. Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, also known as cryptogenic fibrosing alveolitis, is a
"chronic lung condition of uncertain aetiology ... characterized histologically by the pres-
ence of usual interstitial pneumonia, and often has typical radiological appearances." O.J.
Dempsey et al., Idiopathic Pulmonary Fibrosis: An Update, 99 Q.J. MED. 643, 644 (2006).
See also Tatsuji Enomoto, Diabetes Mellitus May Increase Risk for Idiopathic Pulmonary
Fibrosis, 123 CHEST 2007 (2003) (discussing the correlation between prevalence of idio-
pathic pulmonary fibrosis and age, smoking history, and lifestyle-related diseases, such as
obesity and diabetes mellitus).
84. Friedman, supra note 62, at 399-400.
85. See supra note 79.
86. See Manville Trust, 2004-2006 Historical Injury Mix, provided to author by CRMC,
Jan. 16, 2007 (on file with author).
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ses.87 Given the pandemic proportions of claims of asbestosis, one would
expect that patients hospitalized in that time frame would reflect, at least
in some measure, the asbestosis claim pandemic. In fact, however, the
hospitalization data does not support the existence of asbestosis in the
prevalence proportions indicated by asbestos litigation screenings. The
National Center for Health Statistics conducts an annual survey of ap-
proximately 500 hospitals, randomly sampling the hospital records of ap-
proximately 300,000 persons discharged annually. 88 Based on these
hospital records, using ICD-9 codes, the NCHS identifies the disease pri-
marily responsible for each patient's hospitalization as well as up to six
additional disease conditions that the hospital record reflects. 89 In the
fifteen year period 1990-2004, approximately 4,500,000 hospital records
(15 years x 300,000 records) were surveyed. 90 Of these, there were a total
of 57 hospitalizations where the primary cause for the hospitalization was
asbestosis.91
D. PULMONARY FUNCTION TESTS
Most screening companies also administer a battery of pulmonary func-
tion tests92 ("PFTs") to determine whether there is any lung impairment
and, if so, to what degree. A finding of impairment materially increases
the value of a nonmalignant claim.93 The screening companies that ad-
87. Id.
88. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 566-68.
89. Id. at 568.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 567. Each discharged patient included in the survey can be assigned up to
seven diagnoses. The first listed diagnosis is the primary cause of the hospitalization. In
the same fifteen year period, asbestosis was listed as one of seven diagnoses per patient asfew as fifty-three times in a year to a maximum of 158 times. Projections based on this raw
data, however, are of low validity. See id. at 570.
92. Pulmonary function is determined by a series of tests comparing an individual's
measurements to a set of predicted values for that individual based on age and other physi-
cal characteristics. These tests include spirometry which measures the total expiratory vol-
ume of the lung and forced expiratory volume during the first second of expiration, totallung capacity, and diffusing capacity of the lung. For more detail on PFTs, see Brickman,Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 111-14. In asbestos litigation, a person is usually
considered impaired if his test values fall below eighty percent of the predicted value.
However, the more appropriate medical impairment assessment, used by the American
Medical Association for example, involves a statistical determination of the lower limits of
normal (based on ninety-five percent confidence interval). AMERICAN MEDICAL ASsOCIA-
TION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT 87 (Linda Cocehiarella
& Gunnar B.J. Anderson eds., 5th ed. 2001).
93. See Manville Trust 2002 Trust Distribution Process, http://www.claimsres.com/
DocumentsMT.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2008) (indicating that the scheduled value for an
asbestosis claim with lung impairment (Level III) is about two and a half times as great as
an asbestosis claim without any lung impairment (Level II)). The PI Settlement TDP ofArmstrong World Industries provides that the scheduled value for a bilateral asbestos-
related nonmalignant disease with impairment was more than two and a half times the
scheduled value for a bilateral asbestos-related nonmalignant disease without impairment.
Exhibit 1.24: Form of Armstrong World Industries, Inc. Asbestos Personal Injury Settle-
ment Trust Distribution Procedures, In re Armstrong World Industries Inc., Case No. 00-
4471 (RJN) (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). A typical Settlement Agreement with Owens Corning
and its subsidiary, the Fibreboard Corporation, indicates that a non-malignant claimant
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minister PFTs find that a substantial proportion of those tested, probably
a majority, have lung impairment-findings which are inconsistent with
medical science. 94 Indeed, the evidence that screening companies which
administer PFTs, generate false findings of impairment, 95 is at least as
compelling as is the evidence that the X-ray readings and diagnoses of the
litigation doctors are being "manufactured for money."
IV. THE SILICA MDL 96
My conclusions regarding the elements of the illegitimate "en-
trepreneurial" model of litigation screenings were substantially corrobo-
rated by Judge Jack's findings in the silica MDL. To be sure, Judge Jack's
findings were based on claims of silicosis-a fibrosis caused by exposure
to crystalline silica.97 However, she was examining the identical "en-
trepreneurial" claim generation process, including some of the same
screening enterprises and the same doctors who had engaged in the iden-
tical practices with regard to the generation of claims of asbestosis and
the production of medical evidence in support of those claims.
Judge Jack found the "epidemic" of silicosis as manifested by filings of
upwards of 20,000 claims in the 2002-2004 period, mostly in state courts in
Mississippi and Texas, was, in fact, a "phantom epidemic" from the point
of view of public health-one which was confined to a small number of
state courts. 98 Among the evidence that Judge Jack considered was the
revelation that sixty to seventy percent of the 10,000 silica claimants that
were in the MDL had previously filed claims of asbestosis. 99 However,
the clinical experience of pulmonologists is that having dual diseases-
both asbestosis and silicosis-is exceedingly rare and virtually never
encountered. 100
When confronted with the implications of having filed dual disease
claims, one of the lead plaintiffs' counsels in the silica MDL sought exon-
who was impaired was scheduled to receive compensation of $10,000. No compensation,
however, was provided for a non-malignant claimant without impairment. See, e.g., Settle-
ment Agreement with Owens Corning and Fibreboard Corporation with the law firm
Climaco, Climaco, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A. (Dec. 9, 1998) (on file with the au-
thor). See also, David M. Setter & Jeanette S. Eirich, Medical Criteria Legislation: A Re-
sponse to Screening Scandals, 21 MEALEY'S LrTIG. REP.: ASBESTOs 7 (2006).
94. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 574-77.
95. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 117-28 (describing a "scheme
to generate false medical test results" that resulted in false PFT results); Brickman, Dispar-
ities, supra note 11, at 576-77 (analyzing the results of tens of thousands of PFTs adminis-
tered by the N&M screening company).
96. For a more detailed analysis of the silica MDL and the evidence in support of the
statements in this Article, see generally Brickman, Silica/Asbestos Litigation, supra note 40.
97. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
98. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 572 (S.D. Tex. 2005). For a
discussion of the reasons for this outbreak of silicosis filings, see Brickman, Disparities,
supra note 11, at 577-78.
99. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 628.
100. Id. at 594-96. Judge Jack noted that most of the silica claims that were part of the
"phantom epidemic" of silicosis, see supra note 98, "were filed just prior to the effective
dates of a series of recent legislative 'tort reform' measures in Mississippi." Id. at 620.
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eration by arguing to Judge Jack that the previous diagnoses of asbestosis
rendered for his clients were "wrong" and that his firm did not file asbes-
tosis claims and was therefore not culpable. A careful examination of the
record, however, reveals that the firm had formed an affiliate firm which
did file asbestosis claims and then shared any fees generated with the
parent firm.' 0 ' In screenings sponsored by the firm, a litigation doctor
would make a diagnosis of silicosis which was forwarded to the firm and,
at the same time and for the same litigant, make a diagnosis of asbestosis
and forward that to the affiliate firm.102
The evidence that Judge Jack reviewed, including the testimony by doc-
tors and screening companies and the records produced in response to
subpoenas enforced by threats of contempt, led her to conclude that "it
[was] apparent that truth and justice had very little to do with these diag-
noses . . . [Indeed] it [was] clear that the lawyers, doctors and screening
companies were all willing participants" in a scheme to "manufacture...
[diagnoses] for money."'01 3 "Each lawyer had to know that he or she was
filing at least some claims that falsely alleged silicosis."'1 04
V. FEN-PHEN LITIGATION
A. DIET DRUG USE AND HEART VALVE REGURGITATION
The practice of using "entrepreneurial" screenings to generate specious
medical evidence for use in asbestos and silica litigation have been repli-
cated in another mass tort litigation based on the use of a tandem of diet
drugs: Pondimin (fenfluramine) and Redux (dexfenfluramine), a chemi-
cally similar drug. These drugs were sold to approximately six million
users, mostly middle aged women, by American Home Products, which in
March 2002, changed its corporate name to Wyeth. 10 5 Sales of Pondimin
took off after it was reported that significant appetite suppression was
realized when it was taken in tandem with another prescribed drug,
phentermine, (the "phen" in what became known as "fen-phen").
Redux, however, was taken alone. 106 While it was known at the time of
FDA approval that Pondimin and Redux raised the risk of pulmonary
101. A full recitation of the facts is set forth in Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at
581-83.
102. Id. at 584.
103. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 635. Referring specifically to Dr.
Ray Harron, who has done over 80,000 B-reads for asbestos litigation, Judge Jack found
that with regard to his silicosis diagnoses, "Dr. Harron [found] evidence of the disease he
was currently being paid to find." Id. at 638.
104. Id. at 636.
105. See Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Company History, http://www.wyeth.com/aboutwyeth/
history (last visited Oct. 16, 2008). All further references to the drugs' seller will refer to
Wyeth.
106. See Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 1415, Brown v. Am. Home Prods. (In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.), MDL No. 1203, 2000 WL 1222042, at *1 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 28,
2000) [hereinafter PTO 1415]. See also, DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 39-1.1 (2002). Redux was taken by approximately 2,000,000 users and was
usually not combined with phentermine. PTO 1415, supra, at 2.
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artery hypertension in a small number of users,107 data accumulated after
widespread use of the drugs indicated that, for an indeterminate number
of users, 108 fen-phen use raised the risk of an injury to heart valves that
allowed blood to flow back-regurgitate-into the chamber from which it
was pumped. 10 9 This condition can lead to deterioration of heart func-
107. Pulmonary arterial hypertension ("PAH") (also known as "PPH") is continuous
high blood pressure in the pulmonary artery. Three types of changes may occur in the
pulmonary arteries in individuals diagnosed with PAH. These changes include: (1) the
muscles within the walls of the arteries may tighten up, making the inside of the arteries
narrower; (2) the walls of the arteries may thicken and scar tissue may form in the walls of
the arteries-this causes the arteries to become increasingly narrow; or (3) small blood
clots might form within the smaller arteries, which causes blockages. The narrowing of the
arteries causes the right side of the heart to work harder to pump blood through the lungs.
This weakens the heart muscle and causes the heart muscle to lose its ability to pump a
sufficient amount of blood to support the body's requirements. This condition is known as
right heart failure, and is the most common cause of death in persons diagnosed with PAH.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Heart Lung and Blood Insti-
tute, What is Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension?, (Aug. 2006), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/
health/dci/Diseases/pah/pah what.html. A relatively small number of lawsuits against Wy-
eth alleged PAH. See Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello, The $22 Billion Gold Rush,
FORBES, Apr. 10, 2006, at 86, 90.
108. Two investigative reporters stated that several thousand fen-phen users suffered
serious heart-valve injuries requiring surgery in 1205 cases as of February 2005. They re-
ported that the drugs may have killed several hundred people and that 88,000 users had
claimed to have had serious heart valve injury. See id., at 92. A review of published litera-
ture indicates little data that provides a sound basis for concluding the number of serious
injuries. The discrepancy between the number of persons claiming serious heart valve dis-
ease and the number that had surgical intervention may be accounted for by the effects of
litigation screenings, discussed infra at notes 168 et seq.
109. The vast majority of the fen-phen cases allege heart valve injury. Heart valves
keep blood flowing in a forward direction through the heart. Heart valve disease is a con-
dition in which some of the blood being pumped flows backward into the chamber from
which it was pumped and most commonly affects the mitral and the aortic valves, both of
which are located on the left side of the heart. Mitral regurgitation occurs as the heart's
left ventricle contracts and expels blood into the aorta. During this process, blood leaks
backward or regurgitates through a defective mitral value into the left atrium. As a result
of this reverse flow, the heart must work harder to pump the needed blood throughout the
heart and into the body. Aortic regurgitation is a similar process that occurs when blood
flows backward from the aorta into the left ventricle through the aortic valve. See Ameri-
can Heart Association, Aortic Regurgitation, http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.
jhtml?identifier=4448 (last visited Oct. 16, 2008); Mayo Clinic, Mitral Valve Regurgitation,
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/mitral-valve-regurgitation/DS00 4 2 1 (last visited Oct. 16,
2008).
There are four levels of mitral valve regurgitation. Trace and slight mitral valve
regurgitation generally cause few, if any, problems. Indeed, many persons with trace or
mild-to-moderate chronic mitral valve regurgitate never develop symptoms of any sort and
thus are unaware of having this condition. Those with moderate-to-severe mitral valve
regurgitation may not experience symptoms for decades. For those with more severe mi-
tral valve regurgitation, such as acute mitral valve regurgitation, symptoms develop speed-
ily, and cause patients to be critically ill. See Eugene Mark, Fatal Pulmonary Hypertension
Associated with Short-Term Use of Fenfluramine and Phentermine, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED.
602, 602 (1997), available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/337/9/602.pdf; see also Mi-
tral Heart Valve Disease-Overview, (Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.webmd.com/
heart-disease/tc/Mitral-Valve-Regurgitation-Overview (last visited Oct. 16, 2008).
Regurgitation must be distinguished from artifacts, phantom jets, and backflow. Back-
flow is a "[b]ackward displacement of blood into the left atrium that is due to the closure
of the valve leaflets." ARTHER E. WEYMAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF ECHOCARDI-
OGRAPHY 431 (2d ed. 1994). This is a "normal phenomenon that exists in virtually every-
one" and is "of no medical concern." See Pretrial Order No. 2640, at 12 , In re Diet Drugs
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tion.1 1 The initial data and subsequent studies have predominantly
shown that while there is an increased risk for fen-phen users of mild
mitral valve regurgitation and aortic insufficiency,"1 there is little in-
creased risk of moderate or severe mitral valve regurgitation.1 12 To de-
termine the extent of a heart valve injury,113 medical technicians called
"sonographers" administer echocardiograms, basically sonograms of the
heart, which are then interpreted by cardiologists.
In September 1997, Wyeth decided to withdraw the drugs in response
to a request from the FDA for such action,1 1 4 based, in part, on an article
published in a medical journal reporting the Mayo Clinic's observation of
an association between use of the diet drugs and valvular heart disease. 115
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Order No. 2640].
"Backflow is not mitral regurgitation. It does not result from any leakage through the
valve. Instead, it is the normal movement of blood that is behind the mitral valve in the
left atrium when the valve snaps shut." See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law of the AHP Settlement Trust, Wyeth, and Class Counsel Concerning the Law
Firms of Hariton & D'Angelo, LLP and Napoli, Kaiser, Bern & Associates, LLP, at 12, In
re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter
Joint Proposed Findings of Fact] (Mitral regurgitation has greater velocity and lasts longer
than backflow).
There are several causes of heart valve disease. In the past, rheumatic fever-an inflam-
matory condition that often starts with strep throat-was a common cause of heart valve
disease, but this disease is uncommon today. Infective endocarditis, an infection of the
endocardiogram (the lining that covers the inner walls of the heart's chambers and valves)
is another cause. In elderly people, common causes of heart valve disease include myxo-
matous degeneration, a condition which generally affects the mitral valve that connects the
left atrium and ventricle, and calcific degeneration, a condition in which calcium deposits
build up on the valve. Other causes include congenital abnormalities (that is, problems
that are present at birth, such as a misshapen aortic valve, or malformation of the mitral
valve). Heart valve disease may also result from other heart disease, specifically coronary
artery disease or a heart attack. JEFFREY R. BENDER, Heart Valve Disease, in YALE UNI-
VERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE HEART BOOK (Zaret et al. eds., 1992). Additionally, the
mitral valve can deteriorate with age or a mitral valve prolapse may occur. Mitral Valve
Regurgitation, supra note 109.
110. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *11.
111. The phrase "aortic insufficiency" refers to mild or greater aortic valve regurgita-
tion. See Kip A. Petroff & M. Raphael Levy, Fen-Phen: A Primer For The Second Round,
5 MEALEY'S LrnG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX 7 (2002).
112. Clinical studies do not show an increased risk of moderate or severe mitral valve
regurgitation for fen-phen, but rather only an increased risk of mild mitral valve regurgita-
tion and only if used for three to six months or more. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at
*35-36. It is generally accepted that valvular heart disease from causes other than diet
drugs is potentially progressive in nature; once a significant valvular regurgitation exists, it
tends to become more severe over time. Mild forms of regurgitation tend not to progress,
while moderate and severe regurgitation do tend to progress. For fen-phen users, studies
have also indicated that heart valve injury may improve after cessation of the drugs and
echocardiograms may then indicate normal valve function. See infra note 119.
113. To diagnose heart valve disease, doctors can choose to have a chest x-ray adminis-
tered, an electrocardiogram, or an echocardiogram. Sometimes doctors may perform an
extra procedure known as a cardiac catheterization if the aforementioned tests have not
provided sufficient information about the valve disease or if surgery is being planned as
treatment. See http://www.pdrhealth.com, (last visited Oct. 16, 2008); supra note 109.
114. See Rushing To Judgment on Fen-phen and Redux: Were the FDA, Drug Manufac-
turers, and Doctors Too Quick to Respond to Americans' Infatuation With a Cure-All Diet
Pill for Weight Loss?, 9 ALB. L.J. SCi. & TECH. 77, 78 (1998).
115. The 1997 Mayo Clinic report involved clinical observations of twenty-four patients
who had taken the fen-phen drug combination for approximately one year. The patients'
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Subsequent studies, however, have raised doubts about some of the initial
conclusions drawn from the FDA and Mayo Clinic reports as to the rela-
tionship between fen-phen use and heart valve disease. One set of stud-
ies found that fen-phen users had an increased risk relative to control
groups of elevated levels of severe mitral valve regurgitation and aortic
insufficiency, which was related to the duration of use of the diet drugs.' 1 6
Other studies have found that while fen-phen use is associated with an
increase in aortic regurgitation if the drugs were taken for a "threshold
duration" of three to six months, diet drug use is not associated with an
increased prevalence of moderate or greater mitral valve regurgitation
regardless of the duration of use. 1 7 Moreover, a number of studies de-
symptoms were found to be related to valvular insufficiency, and five of the patients re-
quired valve replacement or repair (four patients had mitral valve surgery, while one pa-
tient had combined mitral, aortic, and tricuspid valve surgery). See Richard W. Asinger,
The Fen-Phen Controversy: Is Regression Another Piece of the Puzzle?, 74 MAYO CLINIC
PROCEEDINGS 1302-04 (1999), available at http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.comin-
side.asp?AID=2792&UID=#bibl. The Mayo Clinic report can also be found in H.M. Con-
nolly et al., Valvular Heart Disease Associated With Fenfluramine-Phentermine, 377 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 581-88 (1997) (published correction in 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1783 (1997)).
See also Chari Y. Teramae, Diet Drug-Related Cardiac Valve Disease: The Mayo Clinic
Echocardiographic Laboratory Experience, 75 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 456-61 (2000).
116. See Julius M. Gardin, Valvular Abnormalities and Cardiovascular Status Following
Exposure to Dexfenfluramine or Phentermine/Fenfluramine, 283 JAMA 1703 (2000) (find-
ing that patients who took the diet drug for 30 days continuously were two to three times
more likely to have mild or greater aortic insufficiency than the control group and that
patients who took the drugs for periods exceeding three months experienced higher rates
of aortic regurgitation); Hershel Jick, A Population-based Study of the Appetite-suppressant
Drugs and the Risk of Cardiac-valve Regurgitation, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 719 (1998)
(finding that those patients who took diet drugs for periods exceeding four months exper-
ienced the greatest risk for valvular heart disease relative to both unexposed patients and
those who had taken phentermine); James G. Jollis, Fenfluramine and Phentermine and
Cardiovascular Findings: Effects of Treatment Duration on Prevalence of Valve Abnormali-
ties, 101 CIRCULATION 2071 (2000) (finding that, relative to a control group, patients taking
the diet drugs for 90-180 days experienced an insignificant increase in risk for mild or
greater aortic regurgitation but those who took drugs for a longer period of time (180-360
days) were significantly more likely to demonstrate mild or greater aortic regurgitation);
Mahmood A. Kahn, The Prevalence of Cardiac Valvular Insufficiency Assessed by Trans-
thoracic Echocardiography in Obese Patients Treated with Appetite-Suppressant Drugs, 339
NEW ENG. J. MED. 713 (1998) (noting that 23% of 233 patients who took the diet drug for
an average duration of 20.5 months were diagnosed with mild or greater aortic insuffi-
ciency or moderate or greater mitral valve regurgitation as compared with 1.3% of the
control group); Petroff & Levy, supra note 111; D.H. Ryan, Serial Echocardiographic and
Clinical Evaluation of Valvular Regurgitation Before, During, and After Treatment with
Fenfluramine or Dexfenfluramine and Mazindol or Phentermine, 7 OBESITY RES. 313
(1999) (concluding that patients on the diet drugs for periods exceeding six months exper-
ienced significantly higher risk for developing valvular heart disease).
117. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *14-15. Studies On Valve Disease, Pulmonary
Hypertension in Anorectic Drug Users Presented At ACC Seminar, 2 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDuX 5 (1999) (discussing Dahl et al., The Prevalence of Significant
Valvular Regurgitation and Pulmonary Hypertension 1 753 Patients Who Took Fenfluramine
and Phentermine in a Community Setting and concluding that, while the prevalence of sig-
nificant valvular regurgitation (referring primarily to moderate regurgitation) and PPH in
individuals who had previously taken fen-phen is higher than reported for the general pop-
ulation, severe valvular regurgitation and severe pulmonary hypertension are both rare in
fen-phen users, and that aortic insufficiency is the most common abnormality observed as a
result of the drug use); Study Links Diet Drugs To Aortic, But Not Mitral, Valve Damage,
Serious Events, 3 MEALEY'S LrIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN[REDuX 6 (2000) (discussing Julis M.
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termined that those who took the diet drugs for less than three months do
not have a significantly increased risk of significant valvular regurgita-
tion.118 Finally, studies of the effects of fen-phen use, including a follow-
up of the Mayo Clinic study, indicate that at least some fen-phen users
with valvular regurgitation not only do not get progressively worse after
cessation of use of the drugs but their condition actually improves to the
point where their echocardiograms are normal.11 9
Gardin, Valvular Abnormalities and Cardiovascular Status Following Exposure to Dexfen-fluramine or Phentermine/Fenfluramine, and concluding that Redux and fen-phen "are as-
sociated with an increase in aortic regurgitation. .. but not with an increased prevalence of
mitral valve regurgitation, 'or with serious cardiac events."' This study was supported by a
grant from Wyeth; two of the authors reported that they were consultants to Wyeth in 1997
during the planning phase of the study.); Andrew J. Burger, Low Prevalence of Valvular
Heart Disease in 226 Phetermine-Fenfluramine Protocol Subjects Prospectively Followed for
up to 30 Months, 34 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 1153 (1999), available at http://con-
tent.onlinejacc.org/cgi/reprint/34/4/1153 (finding that "[f]en-phen therapy is associated with
a low prevalence of significant valvular regurgitation. Valvular regurgitation in our sub-jects may reflect age-related degenerative changes." It concluded that "[tihese findings
question the contribution of fen-phen . . . as an independent risk factor for valvular
regurgitation.").
Some researchers have found that there is no significant relationship between Redux use
and valvular heart disease. See, e.g., Neil J. Weissman et al., An Assessment of Heart-valve
Abnormalities in Obese Patients Taking Dexfenfluramine, Sustained-release Dexfen-fluramine, or Placebo, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 725 (1998) (finding that the risk of mitral
regurgitation was small, relative to the placebo group).
118. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *14.
119. Three 1999 studies found that heart valve damage resulting from the use of the
diet drug combination did not worsen after stoppage of the drugs; to the contrary, the
heart valve injury regressed. See 3 New Medical Studies Indicate Valve Damage May Re-
gress Or Not Worsen, 3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDuX 2 (Dec. 1999) (discuss-
ing Hensrud et al., Echocardiographic Improvement Over Time After Cessation of Use of
Fenfluramine and Phentermine, 74 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 1191 (1999)). In a follow-
up to their 1997 study regarding the potential health risks resulting from the use of the fen-
phen diet drug combination, researchers at the Mayo Clinic (including Dr. Heidi M. Con-
nolly, the lead author of the 1997 study) conducted a study of five obese patients who had
ingested fen-phen for a period ranging from eight to seventy-three weeks, all of whom had
developed mild aortic heart valve regurgitation (one of the patients had also developed
pulmonary hypertension). Id. The researchers found that six months after the patients had
stopped ingesting the drugs, each of their echocardiograms had improved, and none met
the standard for drug-related valvular disease. Id. The pulmonary artery pressure in the
patient who had been diagnosed with pulmonary hypertension decreased to levels that
were close to normal. Id. The researchers concluded that (1) valvular heart disease did not
appear to progress after stoppage of the use of fen-phen, and (2) the patients' echocardi-
ograms appeared to improve over time. Id. The Mayo researchers also reasoned that "if
the improvement of mild valvular disease noted in this study is indicative of the course of
valvular disease in other patients who took fenfluramine and phentermine, the burden of
disease may be less than expected from the number of people who were prescribed these
drugs." See Hensrud, supra, at 1196-97. (The Mayo study was supported in part by a grant
from Gates Pharmaceuticals.).
Other studies have also found evidence of regression after discontinuation of patients'
use of the diet drugs. A 1999 study concluded that regurgitation related to dexfen-
fluramine may regress after stoppage of use of the diet drugs. Indeed, the researchers
pointed out that "[t]he decline in the frequency of regurgitation over time after drug dis-
continuation may indicate the potential for regression of valvulopathy associated with
dexfenfluramine." Bruce K. Shively, Prevalence and Determinants of Valvulopathy in Pa-
tients Treated With Dexfenfluramine, 100 CIRCULATION 2161, 2166 (1999) (This study was
supported by a grant from Interneuron Pharmaceuticals Inc., which licensed dexfen-
fluramine.). The researchers noted that although the presence of abnormal regurgitation
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B. THE ONSET OF LITIGATION
While a few lawsuits had been filed prior to 1997,120 Wyeth's with-
drawal of the drugs precipitated an onslaught of claim filings. 121 In De-
cember 1997, federal court fen-phen cases were consolidated into an
MDL proceeding in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 12 2 In the pe-
riod September 1997 to November 1999, 18,000 lawsuits were filed
against Wyeth.123
What gave the fen-phen litigation longer "legs" was the fact that mil-
lions of people have some degree of valve regurgitation. 124 The Mayo
Clinic, for example, states that "as many as one in five people over age 55
has some degree of mitral valve regurgitation."' 125 Furthermore, the ma-
jority of healthy people have an even more minimal level of mitral
regurgitation called "trace" regurgitation. 126 In addition, a much smaller
linked to the use of dexfenfluramine is estimated to be 5.5%, factors other then dexfen-
fluramine are independently linked with significant valve regurgitation in obese patients.
Id.
Another study concluded that the small increase in minor degrees of mitral and aortic
regurgitation in patients who had ingested dexfenfluramine for a period of two to three
months had disappeared three to five months after the patients had discontinued use of the
drugs. See generally Neil J. Weissman, Prevalence of Valvular-Regurgitation Associated
With Dexfenfluramine Three to Five Months After Discontinuation of Treatment, 34 J. AM.
COLL. CARDIOLOGY 2088 (1999) (The study was sponsored by the Wyeth-Ayerst Research
Division of Wyeth Laboratories.). The researchers pointed out that the data suggests that
the degree of regurgitation observed in patients who used Dexfen (dexfenfluramine) for a
relatively short duration does not progress over time. Id. The researchers suggested that
progression of either mitral or aortic regurgitation is unlikely with respect to patients who
had ingested dexfenfluramine for three months or less, noting that after such patients had
discontinued treatment for three to five months, there was no difference in prevalence of
either aortic regurgitation or mitral regurgitation of any severity between treated and con-
trol patients. Id.
120. See AHP Settlement Trust, History of the Settlement, http://www.settlementdiet-
drugs.com/index.asp?page=dsp-history, (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
121. Alison Frankel, The Fen-Phen Follies: Mistaken Assumptions, Greedy Lawyers and
Suggestions of Fraud Have Made Fen-phen a Disaster of a Mass Tort, 27 THE AM. LAWYER
92, 94 (2005).
122. Id. As of 1999, more than 1,000 cases were transferred as part of MDL 1203.
Memorandum & Pretrial Order No. 884, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 1999 WL
782560, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1999).
123. Francis E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV.
1809, 1813 (2006).
124. See Northshore University Health System, Device Repairs Leaky Heart Valves
Without Surgery, Mar. 10, 2004, available at http://www.northshore.org/aboutus/press/arti-
cle.aspx?id=2310&lid=141 (noting that mitral valve regurgitation is the most common type
of heart valve insufficiency and that it "affects about 4 million people in the United
States," and "250,000 people develop significant mitral valve regurgitation" each year.); see
also Repairing Leaky Hearts, www.wchsfv.com/newsroom/heealthyforlife/2502.shtml (last
visited Oct. 17, 2008); Gold Rush, supra note 107, at 89 (indicating that heart valve leakage
occurs naturally in two percent of the population). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
noted that the FDA has observed that "minimal degrees of regurgitation (i.e. trace [or]
mild mitral regurgitation or trace aortic regurgitation) are relatively common in the gen-
eral population and are not generally considered abnormal." PTO 1415, supra note 106, at
*25.
125. See Mitral Valve Regurgitation, supra note 109.
126. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 109, at 10. Approximately ninety
percent of the general population has at least trace regurgitation. See id. (citing J.P. Singh,
Prevalence of Clinical Determinants of Mitral, Tricuspid and Aortic Regurgitation (The
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but still substantial number of persons have aortic regurgitation. 127 In-
deed, valvular "regurgitation occurs to varying degrees in the majority of
entirely healthy individuals. ' 128 Though valvular regurgitation is wide-
spread, especially mild and trace mitral valve regurgitation, unless the
regurgitation is substantial, it poses no health risk. The FDA has deter-
mined that the only levels of valvular regurgitation that pose a health risk
are moderate or greater mitral valve or mild or greater aortic valve
regurgitation. 129 These levels of regurgitation have become known as
FDA Positive. 130
1. Medical Monitoring Class Actions
In addition to the individual lawsuits that were filed based on a claim of
injury from use of the diet drugs, Wyeth was also faced with more than a
hundred filings seeking class action certification including a substantial
number that sought medical monitoring relief.1 3 1 In these cases, plaintiffs
Framingham Heart Study), 83 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 897, W-89 tbls.IIa, Ilb (1999));
Frederick Helmcke et al., Color Doppler Assessment of Mitral Regurgitation with Orthogo-
nal Planes, 75 CIRCULATION 175 (1987). There is little or no clinical difference between
having no, trace or mild mitral regurgitation. See Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, supra
note 109, at 10.
127. Approximately five out of every ten thousand people have aortic insufficiency. It is
most common in men between the ages of thirty and sixty. See Medline Plus, Aortic Insuf-
ficiency, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/O00179.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2008).
128. PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *9.
129. Id. at *9-10.
130. The term "FDA Positive" refers to individuals who are diagnosed with moderate
or greater mitral valve regurgitation or mild or greater aortic valve regurgitation. The
FDA has observed that "minimal degrees of regurgitation (i.e. trace mild mitral regurgita-
tion or trace aortic regurgitation) are relatively common in the general population and are
not generally considered abnormal. Thus, only mild or greater aortic regurgitation and
moderate or greater mitral regurgitation are referred to as 'FDA Positive regurgitation.'"
See In re Diet Drug (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 226
F.R.D. 498, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, "[a]ll of the
experts who testified at the Settlement Agreement Fairness Hearing agreed that the FDA
case definition, or 'FDA Positive,' is the appropriate way to define medically relevant val-
vular regurgitation and that the lesser degrees of regurgitation have no medical signifi-
cance." Id. at 501.
131. Plaintiffs in tort actions for "medical monitoring," which is also sometimes called
"medical surveillance," seek "post-exposure, pre-symptom recovery for the expense of pe-
riodic medical examinations to detect the onset of physical harm." See Victor E. Schwartz
et al., Medical Monitoring-Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1057,
1058 (1999). A medical monetary claimant need not show any present physical injury nor
even a substantial likelihood that he will sustain such an injury in the future as a conse-
quence of the inhalation, ingestion, or exposure to an alleged harmful substance. In theory,
hundreds of millions of consumers could therefore be aggregated into class actions claim-
ing billions of dollars in reimbursement for medical testing with commensurable contin-
gency fees paid to the lawyers. While some courts have permitted recovery for medical
monitoring, others have rejected such claims. See id. (discussing the leading cases in which
courts have permitted recovery for medical monitoring, and the cases in which courts have
rejected such claims). See also Medical Monitoring And Asbestos Litigation-A Discussion
With Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 3 (2002)
(discussing the controversial nature of medical monitoring, and recounting its origins as a
response to some of the challenges that plaintiffs face in meeting all of the requirements
for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Viivi
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would not need to prove that they had been injured by use of the diet
drugs but only that they had been exposed to an unreasonable risk justi-
fying the relief of annual medical testing to determine whether they had
contracted the illness in question.
The threat level posed by these class action filings was elevated when
several national and statewide medical monitoring classes were certified
or conditionally certified and were proceeding to trial.132 If these suits
succeeded and the relief granted was that Wyeth would have to pay for
three years of annual echocardiograms read by a cardiologist at a cost of
about $1000 for each check-up, then assuming that the class size approxi-
mated 6,000,000 fen-phen users, Wyeth was facing a potential cost of up
to eighteen billion dollars.
C. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
In April 1999, Wyeth began negotiating for a global resolution of the
litigation. During the course of the negotiations, Wyeth was faced with a
jury verdict in Texas that proved damaging to its position;133 multiple
Vanderslice, Note, Viability of a Nationwide Fen-Phen/Redux Class Action Lawsuit in Light
of Amchem v. Windsor, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 199, 218-19 (1999) (discussing the advantages
to plaintiffs' lawyers of medical monitoring classes over class actions that seek damages,
including the ability to avoid many causation and damages issues unique to individual
plaintiffs).
132. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *34. These medical monitoring classes included:
In re Diet Drug Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1203 (nationwide medical monitor-
ing class); West Virginia (Burch et al. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 97-C-204(1-11))
(statewide personal injury and medical monitoring class); Illinois (Rhyne v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 98 CH 4099) (statewide refund and monitoring reimbursement class); New
Jersey (Vadino v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. MID-L-425-98) (statewide Unfair and De-
ceptive Acts and Practices and medical monitoring class); New York (New York Diet Drug
Litigation, Index No. 700000/98) (statewide medical monitoring class); Pennsylvania
(Pennsylvania Diet Drug Litigation, Master Docket No. 9709-3162 C.C.P. Phila.) (state-
wide medical monitoring class); Texas (Earthman v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 97-10-
03970 CV, Dist. Ct. Montgomery Co. Texas) (statewide medical monitoring class); and
Washington (St. John v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 97-2-06368-4) (statewide medical moni-
toring class). See also Preamble, Settlement Agreement, infra note 139.
133. See Lovett v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 97-00665, 294th Texas Dist., Van Zandt
Co. "On August 6, 1999, the [Texas] jury hearing the case of Lovett v. Wyeth ... returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the Company for $3.3 million in compensatory
damages and $20 million in punitive damages." WYETH -WYE Quarterly Report (10-Q)
Item 1. Legal Proceedings (Nov. 15, 1999), available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/1999/11/
15/10/0000005187-99-000018/Section9.asp. See also, SEC Info-Wyeth-10-Q-For 06/30/
99 (June 30, 1999), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d52c.6u.htm#Dates. In September
1999, prior to consideration of the Company's post-trial motions to reduce the award or
overturn the verdict, the Lovett case was settled for less than ten percent of the amounts
awarded in the verdict." Lovett Case Settles For Less Than $2.3 Million, 2 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX 12 (1999); Captran, Pre-Settlement Funding: Financing Justice,
Fen-Phen, http://www.captran.com/fenphen.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
At the trial, Ms. Lovett's attorneys argued that Wyeth had attempted to minimize the
possible risks of the diet drug by trying to limit the warnings on side effects. Robert Lan-
greth, American Home Is Ordered to Pay $23.6 million in Diet-Drug Suit, WALL ST. J., Aug.
9, 1999, at A4. The jury award was regarded by Ms. Lovett, whose symptoms were limited
to shortness of breath and fatigue, and her counsel as indicating "anger at the company,
not sympathy" for Ms. Lovett. Id. This view is accentuated by the fact that Ms. Lovett's
own cardiologist had testified that her heart problems preceded her use of fen-phen. See
Jim Yardley, $23 Million Awarded in Suit Against Maker of Diet Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
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medical monitoring class actions that were proceeding through discovery
and one such action in New Jersey that had commenced trial; individual
cases that were poised for remand for trial in the MDL 1203 proceed-
ings; 134 and thousands of personal injury suits that were underway. 135
Faced with this litigation environment, 136 on October 7, 1999, Wyeth
agreed to enter into a Rule 23 (b)(3) settlement ("Settlement") of a na-
tional class action with all of the medical monitoring class actions sub-
sumed into the Settlement. 137 Under its terms, a trust ("Trust") was
created consisting of two separate funds, which together were capped at
$3.75 billion.138 Fund A consisted of $1 billion to pay smaller cash bene-
fits or provide medical services including medical monitoring for fen-
phen users who had either not suffered valve damage or had less than
FDA Positive regurgitation. Fund B totaled $2.55 billion and was the
compensatory trust for claimants who qualified for one of the four pay-
ment matrixes. 139 Any money not paid out by the Trust to satisfy claims
1999, at A7. After the Lovett verdict, "[s]everal Wall Street analysts expressed surprise at
the verdict and predicted it would encourage more lawsuits against the company, particu-
larly since American Home Products [(Wyeth)] had appeared to have solid evidence that
Ms. Lovett's heart condition existed before her use of the diet drugs." Id.
In addition to the Lovett case, two plaintiffs received a $29.2 million verdict in 2000,
which was then settled for an undisclosed amount. The jury verdict came down after the
settlement was entered into by the parties, but prior to the court's approval. See Oregon
Case Settled for Undisclosed Amount, 3 MEALEY'S L1TIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX 10
(2000) (citing Baston v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 99-0306, and Wirt v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., No. 99-0307, both in the Oregon Circuit Court of Coos County).
134. PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *4, *45.
135. Id. at *45. The number of lawsuits filed during the period of negotiation that
lasted from April to October 1999 when a settlement was agreed to grew from a total of
3,100 to a number estimated to exceed 10,000. Yardley, supra note 133, at A7.
136. Professor Richard A. Nagareda concluded that the principle threat to Wyeth was
the possibility of multiple punitive damages awards. NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 137.
However, there is little evidence to support the contention that the threat of multiple puni-
tive damage awards loomed larger to Wyeth than the one posed by medical monitoring
class actions.
Other consideration may have also played a role in Wyeth's decision to enter into the
Settlement Agreement. Prior to the Settlement Agreement, a news article reported: "[Wy-
eth] may also be interested in reaching a settlement because its strategic position has
eroded in recent weeks. For one thing, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun, in a
preliminary way, to look into Redux's 1996 approval by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion; any new revelations could hurt [Wyeth's] defenses in civil trials." Laura Johannes and
Robert Langreth, Fen-Phen Defense: Marketer of Redux, Mulling Settlement, Sees Plain-
tiffs' Hand-Those Suing American Home Assail Way It Monitored Diet Drugs' Side Ef-
fects-The 'Flood of Red Folders, WALL ST. J. (Eastern edition), Sept. 28, 1999, at Al.
137. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *5. This settlement was approved on August 28,
2000. The Settlement Trust was established on September 1, 2000. After a number of
appeals, final judicial approval for the settlement came in January 2002. See Official Notice
of Final Judicial Approval, available at http://www.settlementdietdrugs.com/pdfs/no-
ticefja.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
138. See $3.75 Billion Global Settlement Approved in Diet Drug MDL, 16 ANDREWS
PHARM. LrIG. REP. 3 (2000). In 2004, by the terms of the Seventh Amendment to the
Settlement Agreement, $1.275 billion was added to the Trust. See MDL Court Denies Mo-
tion To Find Settlement Void Because Of Changes In Terms, 9 MEALEY'S LrrIG. REP.: FEN-
PHEN[REDuX 6 (2006).
139. See Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement with American Home Prod-
ucts Corporation (As Amended), In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593 (E.D.




To obtain the Settlement, Wyeth made significant concessions including
that claimants would not need to establish causation,'140 that Wyeth
waived any statute of limitations defense,' 41 and that those who did not
exercise their initial Federal Rule 23 opt out right could opt out at a later
time and pursue a remedy in the tort system; however, if they exercised
this later or "downstream" opt out right, they could not bring claims for
punitive damages, consumer fraud damages, or medical monitoring. 42 In
2008) (follow "Settlement Documents" hyperlink) (nationwide class action settlement
agreement with Wyeth) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]. Fund A, capped at one bil-
lion dollars, provided limited benefits to those class members who ingested Pondimin and/
or Redux for sixty days or less and who did not meet the FDA Positive standard. It also
provided three primary benefits to those class members who ingested Pondimin and/or
Redux for sixty-one or more days and did not meet the FDA Positive levels of valvular
regurgitation: (1) echocardiogram screening; (2) an option between receiving valve-related
medical services up to $10,000 in value or $6000 in cash; and (3) reimbursement for the cost
of diet drug prescriptions ($30 per month of use for Pondimin, $60 per month of use for
Redux), subject to a maximum of $500 per class member. Id. at 32-33. A maximum of
twenty-five million dollars of the money placed into Fund A could be used to finance
education and medical research pertaining to heart disease. Id. at 34-35.
Fund B, capped at $2.55 billion, provided compensatory benefits to those diagnosed as
FDA Positive, or with mild mitral regurgitation as of the end of the screening period in the
event that, within 14 years from final approval of the settlement (but not later than Decem-
ber 31, 2015), those class members developed serious heart valve disease. Four payment
matrices (A-i, A-2, B-i, and B-2) were established under Fund B. Id. at 37-55. In addition,
Fund B also established five levels of injury, Levels 1-5 (5 being the most severe), in each
matrix. Id. Matrix A-1 was designed for those who used fen-phen for 61 or more days and
in the case of the most severe level of injury, depending on age, would pay upwards of
$1.485 million. Id. at 48. Matrix B-i, which provided twenty percent of the compensation
amount stated in Matrix A-i, was established for individuals who had taken the drug for
less than two months, had mild mitral valve regurgitation regardless of duration of diet
drug use, or had alternative medical explanations (such as a pre-existing injury to the heart
valve at issue, which had required surgery) for their injuries. Id. at 48-51. Matrix A-2 and
B-2 applied to derivative claimants. Id. at 51-53. See also PTO 1415, supra note 106, at
*50.
In order to receive matrix compensation benefits, a "Green Form" had to be submitted.
The Green Form contained the result of the echocardiogram, medical history and physical
exam information of the individual, a copy of the video or disk of the echocardiogram, a
declaration under penalty of perjury from the individual that to the best of his knowledge,
such condition was not present prior to usage of the diet drug(s), and declarations by a
cardiologist stating that the individual qualifies for a particular matrix payment. In addi-
tion to the Green Form, documentary proof had to be submitted of the period of time
during which the individual used the diet drug(s). See Settlement Agreement, supra, at 90.
140. See Alison Frankel, Still Ticking, THE AM. LAWYER, Mar. 2005, at 95 ("Wyeth gave
diet drug users a very good reason to stay in the class: It conceded the fight over causation.
Claimants who stayed in the class wouldn't have to prove, as they would in court, that
Pondimin or Redux had caused their heart valve damage, only that they had heart valve
damage and had taken the drugs.").
141. Since Wyeth had withdrawn the drugs in 1997, and many statutes of limitations on
tort claims require suit within one to two years, this defense that Wyeth waived could have
proved formidable in the state tort systems. See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *18.
142. Class members who did not exercise an initial opt out right could later choose to
file a claim in the tort system. As set forth below, under the terms of the Settlement, class
members had the right to exercise an intermediate opt out or a back-end opt out, collec-
tively referred to as "downstream opt outs." See PTO 1415, supra note 106, at *21.
Class members had the "right to opt out of the settlement within a prescribed time frame
and to pursue a claim for compensatory damages in the tort system without meeting the
bar of the statute of limitations or a defense of splitting of causes of action and without
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exchange, Wyeth obtained terms that it believed would confine both its
liability and the time frame in which the extent of its liability would be
established. 143 In particular, it believed that it had substantially con-
tained the problem it faced in the tort system-where large numbers of
litigants who had pre-existing mild mitral value regurgitation attributed
that condition to short term fen-phen use-by requiring that in order to
receive matrix level compensation from the Trust, claimants had to pre-
sent documentary proof of the duration of use of the drugs, a diagnosis
based on an echocardiogram reading of FDA Positive and a cardiologist's
signature on the "Green Form" attesting to a compensatory medical con-
dition. 144 In addition, Wyeth undoubtedly expected that the results of
ongoing clinical studies-including ones that would vindicate Wyeth's po-
sition that even if fen-phen users had an increased risk of valvular
regurgitation,1 45 any such injury regressed after cessation of the drug 146
-would be reflected in reductions in claiming activity against the Trust
and in the number of downstream opt out cases brought in the tort
system. 14 7
relying on any prior verdicts or judgment against [Wyeth] under the doctrines of collateral
estoppel, res judicata, or other doctrine of issue or claim preclusion. This 'intermediate
opt-out' right [was] in addition to the initial opt-out right of all class members." See PTO
1415, supra note 106, at *21.
If class members with FDA Positive levels of regurgitation progress to serious levels of
VHD by the year 2015, they have the right to receive compensation pursuant to the terms
of the settlement matrices or to exercise a "back-end opt-out" and pursue their claim for
compensatory damages (but not punitive damages) in the tort system without any time bar
or other defense arising from a statute of limitations, a statute of repose or the like. Id.
The Settlement Agreement explicitly excluded those individuals with a more serious
PPH, allowing them to sue Wyeth in the state tort system. The settlement did not include
any recovery for plaintiffs alleging a variety of conditions, including neurotoxicity and ele-
vated pulmonary hypertension because the district court found that the evidence did not
support a connection between the use of diet drugs and these conditions. See Clark v.
Wyeth, 431 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Settlement also included a "financial insecurity opt out right," whereby if a condi-
tion of "financial insecurity" arose with respect to Wyeth's obligations under the Settle-
ment Agreement, all diet drug users who had been previously diagnosed as either FDA
Positive or having mild mitral regurgitation and who had registered for settlement benefits
by the deadline could opt out of the Settlement Agreement. Additionally, there was also a
Sixth Amendment opt out right created, which was available to those class members who
otherwise qualified for the back-end opt out right, who claimed matrix benefits on or
before May 3, 2003, and who qualified for Matrix Compensation Benefits but had not
received such benefits or payment of any settlement funds from Wyeth. See In re Diet
Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498,
503 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
143. See NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing Wyeth's strategy with respect to
confining "within a modest time period the uncertainty surrounding its ultimate liability for
such relief."). Containing the litigation took on added importance because Wyeth was
attempting to merge with Warner-Lambert, which owned the rights to Lipitor. This sev-
enty billion dollar merger failed; Pfizer won the race to merge. Jeffery H. Dyer et al.,
When to Ally and When to Acquire, HARV. Bus. REV. at 108, 113-14 (July-Aug. 2004).
144. In re Diet Drugs, 226 F.R.D. at 504. Wyeth no doubt expected that these terms
would limit those with pre-existing, mild mitral valve regurgitation to the matrix B-1 level.
145. See supra notes 112, 117.
146. See supra note 119.
147. An issue in the fen-phen litigation and settlement was whether fen-phen use re-
sulted in latent injury which would manifest at some future time. A finding by the court
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D. THE POST-SETT-LEMENT CLAIMING PROCESS
Three claiming streams flowed from the Settlement. First, a substantial
number of class members exercised their Rule 23 right to opt out of the
Settlement ("initial opt outs") and pursue their claims in the tort system.
Second, another substantial number of class members who chose not to
exercise an initial opt out and had the required documentary evidence
sought compensation from the Trust. Third, a substantial number of
these class members subsequently exercised a downstream opt out right
that allowed them to seek compensation in the tort system albeit with the
limitations set forth in the Settlement. 148
1. Initial opt outs
Upon approval of the Settlement, 50,000 plaintiffs exercised their opt
out right under Rule 23(b)(3), and proceeded in the tort system. 149 As
part of their calculus, it is likely that these class members (or at least their
lawyers) variously concluded that meeting the FDA Positive standard, as
required by the Settlement, would be problematic whereas, in the tort
system, they could take their chances because no minimal levels of injury
would be required of a plaintiff to prevail, or because of the severity of
the injury, they could get more compensation in the tort system than
under the Settlement matrix. 150 Notably many of the opt out cases had
been filed in jurisdictions which have a reputation as being favorable to
plaintiffs' interests. 15' Wyeth settled virtually all of these claims on terms
that there was no latent injury resulting from the ingestion of the client drugs was a crucial
element of the Settlement Agreement approval. See Judge Bechtle Finds Compensation
Reasonable, Approves AHP Settlement, 3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX 11
(2000). This finding of no latency helped avoid the "futures" problem which led to the
rejection of the class action settlement in Amchem v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). While
studies have indicated that any valve injury resulting from fen-phen use improves over
time to the point where echocardiograms become normal, see supra note 119, there are
medical experts who have testified that there is a latency period and the issue of latency
continues to be disputed. See Certain Class Members Reply Memorandum of Law in Sup-
port of Their Motion Under Rule 60(b) For Relief From Judgment, No. 99-20593 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 4, 2005) (statement of Dr. Colin Bloor), available at http://www.fen-phen-eresource.
com/60.pdf; see also Class Members Argue Mistakes in Settlement, 9 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.:
FEN-PHEN/REDUX 1 (2005).
148. See supra note 142.
149. Wyeth said it had resolved "all but a small percentage" of those 50,000 claims. Up
to 90,000 Opt Out of AHP Settlement; 61,000 File Claims, 6 MEALEY'S LrInG. REP.: FEN-
PHEN/REDUX 8 (2003).
150. While most studies indicated that use of fen-phen for less than three months did
not result in significant valvular injury, see supra note 118, juries in the tort system were
free to ignore such data and instead based their decisions on Wyeth's alleged failure to
have notified the FDA and doctors of knowledge of the effects of use of the drugs and on
sympathy for the plaintiff.
151. Many of the opt out plaintiffs had chosen to sue Wyeth in Mississippi, Texas, and
West Virginia. See Pre-Settlement Funding, supra note 133. In Jefferson County, Missis-
sippi where over 500 out-of-state fen-phen cases had been filed, the total number of all
liability claims pending in the Circuit Court outnumbered the number of residents in the
county. See David J. Morrow, American Home to Settle Some 1,400 Fen-Phen Suits: Deal
May Imperil Warner-Lambert Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1999, at C2.
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which were likely highly favorable to the plaintiffs. 152
2. Trust Claims
Those class members who did not initially opt out of the Settlement or
exercise a downstream opt out right to sue in the tort system could claim
non-matrix benefits under Fund A or matrix level benefits from Fund B.
The number of class members filing Trust claims, however, far exceeded
the number that had been projected.
The uncontroverted medical evidence introduced in the Settlement
hearings, as well as the provisions of the Settlement, led to "conservative
assumptions likely to overstate the demands 'on the Trust,"' that there
would be a maximum of 8,345 serious injury claims and a little over three
times that number of lesser injury claims-a total of 36,000 claims, at a
cost to Wyeth of two to four billion dollars.153 "Further, the projected
ratio of diet drug-induced aortic regurgitation to diet drug-induced mitral
regurgitation was five to one. ' 154 Those projections were based on a
"medical model" wherein class members would go to their own doctors
and receive a diagnosis in the course of their medical care.1 55 Instead of
36,000 claims, however, the Trust received over 87,000 matrix level claims
with the vast majority claiming moderate mitral valve regurgitation. 156
Wyeth's reliance on the requirement of documentary proof of the dura-
tion of use of the diet drugs as well as its reliance on the FDA Positive
requirement and on cardiologists' integrity in filling out the Green Forms,
turned out to be profoundly misplaced. In an unknown but perhaps sig-
nificant number of cases, plaintiffs submitted false medical and pharmacy
records which had undoubtedly resulted in substantial settlement pay-
152. Class counsel noted that Wyeth was "settling everything in sight for huge amounts
of money," and also observed that "[it was a feeding frenzy like I've never seen." Frankel,
Still Ticking, supra note 140, at 96. It was reported that "Wyeth hardly paused to consider
the strength of individual cases, settling enormous inventories of cases in mass agreements
with plaintiffs [sic] firms." Id. The Napoli firm (discussed infra at notes 172 et seq.) settled
at least 5,600 of the initial opt out cases. Id.
153. See Pretrial Order No. 2662, at 6, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
Docket No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Order No. 2662]; see also Gold
Rush, supra note 107, at 89.
154. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Li-
tig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 505 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
155. Id. at 506.
156. As of August 12, 2002, the Trust had received a total of 42,244 Green Forms, repre-
senting approximately 35,000 claimants (since some file duplicate forms) and was receiving
claims at a rate of about 1000 per week. Order No. 2662, supra note 153, at 7. By April 4,
2004, approximately 85,000 claims were received, "a little less than half of which were
sufficiently complete to state on their face a claim for matrix benefits." In re Diet Drugs,
226 F.R.D., at 507-08. As of January 5, 2005, in excess of "120,900 Green Forms were filed
with the Trust, representing more than 87,700 potential claims after duplicates were
tagged." Id. "In sum, these numbers manifest an enormous increase over what was antici-
pated at the Fairness Hearing in 2000." Id. at 508. In particular, Wyeth received many
more Level II benefits claims than expected. One journalist noted that "Wyeth had ex-
pected relatively few people to show these ominous indicators [which were required in
order to satisfy Level II], yet tens of thousands submitted echocardiograms and green
forms claiming them." Frankel, Still Ticking, supra note 140, at 4.
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ments from Wyeth; a few plaintiffs and attorneys were later convicted of
perpetrating these crimes. 15 7 More to its dismay, however, Wyeth
learned that the FDA Positive standard could easily be subverted by car-
diologists, who, with the help of sonographers maladministering echo-
cardiograms, would read both trace and mild mitral regurgitation as
moderate regurgitation because of the financial incentives for such mis-
readings. 158 Indeed, the Settlement, coupled with the effects of a few
large verdicts in initial opt out cases brought in the tort system 159 and
Wyeth's perceived generosity in settling thousands of the initial opt out
tort claims, proved to be the equivalent of the ranch house cook banging
on the metal triangle at dinner time. That call was met by several law
firms who responded to the establishment of the Trust and the down-
stream opt out right by instituting screenings to generate claimants by the
tens of thousands. 160 These law firms replaced the medical model with
the screening model used to generate claims in asbestos litigation. To
implement the model, they hired sonographers-the medical technicians
who administer echocardiograms-and a comparative handful of cardiol-
ogists who were ready and eager to, in the words of U.S. District Court
Judge Janis Jack, "manufacture diagnoses for money."
157. See Gates, supra note 27. In Barnett v. Wyeth, the plaintiff alleged that she was
suffering from heart valve damage as a result of having taken Redux from February 1989-
June 1989. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 381 F. Supp. 2d 421 (E.D. Pa. 2005). The court found, however, that the complaint
was false in three distinct respects. Id. at 423. First, Redux was not available in the United
States until June 1996; second, the name of the doctor that she claimed had prescribed the
drugs to her was a fabrication; third, the address where she claimed to have bought the
drugs is the location of a bar, not a pharmacy. Id. In United States v. Arledge, a Mississippi
plaintiff's attorney was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi for his role in the submission of fraudulent claims by patients in the fen-phen
settlement. United States v. Arledge, No. 5:06-cr-18-DCB-JCS, 2008 WL 227310, at *1-3(S.D. Miss. Jan. 24, 2008). See also Mississippi Attorney Guilty in Scheme to Create Fraudu-
lent Records, 10 MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORT: FEN-PHEN/REDuX 6 (2007).
158. An editorial written following the Burger Study, supra note 117, by a doctor affili-
ated with the University of California at San Francisco, Adult Echocardiography Labora-
tory, who had been a consultant for Wyeth and who had been asked to provide expert
testimony on both sides of the issue, questioned the contribution of fen-phen as an inde-
pendent risk factor for valvular regurgitation, and rejected the conclusion that fen-phen
use caused valvular heart disease. The writer stated that the FDA's definition of "moder-
ate mitral regurgitation" has no clearly defined medical or clinical meaning, and thus trace
or mild mitral valve regurgitation can easily be manipulated by those lawyers and doctors
with financial incentives to do so. Nelson B. Schiller, Editorial, 34 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOL-
OGY, 1159 (1999); see also Low Prevalence of Valve Disease Found in New Fen-Phen Study,
2 MEALEY'S LTIG. REP.: FEN-P-EN/REDUX 12 (1999). See also infra note 176.
159. Several substantial verdicts that were rendered in Mississippi drove up settlement
costs significantly and also led to an increased number of opt outs. Gold Rush, supra note
107, at 90. In 2000, in a case filed in state court which was decided after the settlement was
entered into but before the settlement gained judicial approval, an Oregon jury awarded a
total of $29.2 million to two plaintiffs who alleged mild aortic heart valve damage as a
result of fen-phen ingestion. See Oregon Case Settled for Undisclosed Amount, supra note
133, at 10.
160. See infra notes 168 et seq. for a description of these litigation screenings.
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3. Downstream Opt Outs
Litigation screenings also played a significant role in driving up the
number of downstream opt outs. As noted, under the terms of the Settle-
ment, class members who did not initially opt out of the Settlement could
opt out later, at the back-end of the Settlement, and file a claim in the
tort system subject to restrictions set forth in the Settlement including
meeting the FDA Positive requirement and foregoing punitive dam-
ages.' 61 This right allowed class members to first determine what amount
the Trust would offer in settlement and, if that was regarded as insuffi-
cient, to then opt out and seek relief in the tort system, albeit with the
limitations noted.162 This strategic error created a situation in which Wy-
eth was essentially bargaining with itself to satisfy the claims of class
members. 63 Approximately 90,000 claimants exercised this downstream
opt out right under the Settlement.1 64 Wyeth would later pay an addi-
tional $1.275 billion to the Trust in exchange for a limitation on down-
stream opt out rights. 165 Wyeth has vigorously contested downstream opt
161. See supra note 142.
162. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("Some claimants have completed a Green
Form and submitted it to the Trust seeking matrix benefits. However, these claimants have
also filed with the Trust their intention to exercise their intermediate opt-out right in the
event that the Trust auditors found them FDA Positive only but not entitled to matrix
benefits.").
163. See NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 139. Nagareda observed that the "class settle-
ment grid served as the analogue to the fifty dollar exercise price of the put option for
General Motors stock. Like the holders of put options in financial markets, moreover, fen-
phen users were not obligated by the class settlement to exercise their put options. Rather,
the put option enabled them, over time, to compare the compensation available under the
class settlement and that available in tort litigation." Id. "The put option in the fen-phen
settlement... placed Wyeth in the position of being compelled to purchase the tort claims
of fen-phen users in the event that they exercised their put options (by seeking compensa-
tion under the settlement grid) and if they did not by suing in the tort system instead, if
only for compensatory damages." Id. at 144. Furthermore, as a result of the fact that
"atypically high-value claims stand to lose the most from a settlement grid that constrains
the variance of payments ... high-value claimants will tend to depart, leaving mid- to low-
value claims in the class." Id. at 145.
164. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods., Liab.
Litig., 369 F.3d 293, at 312-15. By the May 3, 2003 deadline for downstream opt outs,
individuals had filed 90,000 opt out notices and at least 61,000 claims for injury compensa-
tion under the Settlement; 70,000 of these downstream opt outs were intermediate opt outs
(claiming mild or greater aortic regurgitation and/or moderate or greater mitral regurgita-
tion), while 20,000 were back-end opt outs, who asserted more serious injury. See Up To
90,000 Opt Out, supra note 149. As of September 2006, there were an estimated 60,000
downstream opt outs. See NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 147.
165. Faced with the prospect of claimants seeking to take two bites out of the apple, the
Seventh Amendment to the Settlement Agreement sought to ameliorate some of the
problems associated with claimants attempting to play their hand in a calculated manner.
The Seventh Amendment dealt with the issue of "covering opt outs," whereby some claim-
ants completed a Green Form and submitted it to the Trust seeking matrix benefits. These
claimants also, however, filed with the Trust their intention to exercise their intermediate
opt out rights in the event that the Trust auditors found that they met the FDA Positive
criteria only but were not entitled to matrix benefits. "Because the covering opt-outs' pri-
mary purpose was to be paid matrix benefits, the Seventh Amendment treats them as Cat-
egory One claimants who are required to opt out of the Seventh Amendment if they want
to preserve their downstream or other opt out rights. Thus, the Seventh Amendment ef-
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out cases, in particular, those generated by litigation screenings, with
some considerable success. 166 Many plaintiffs have received little or no
compensation and a significant number have discontinued their claims
without any payment from Wyeth. 167 Part of this success is due to the
bifurcation of a number of downstream opting out case trials. In a bifur-
cated trial, the jury first decides the issue of damages: whether there is an
injury and how much compensation is to be awarded. If the jury finds
injury and damages, then in the second phase of the trial, it determines
whether Wyeth is liable for that injury. This typically works to Wyeth's
benefit since the issues of injury and damages are decided without the
plaintiff being able to introduce damaging documentary evidence of Wy-
eth's alleged bad conduct, namely, its alleged failures to have disclosed
the harmful effects of ingestion of the diet drugs.
E. LITIGATION SCREENINGS
Just as with the silicone breast implant litigation settlement, the fen-
phen Settlement created an entirely new set of financial incentives for
lawyers to manufacture claims on a massive scale. To do so, several law
firms and echocardiogram companies created specifically for the purpose
of conducting litigation screenings spent millions of dollars 168 to set up
fectively eliminates covering opt-outs' ability to take a second bite at the apple. In an
effort to end the type of litigation that ensued from the close to 60,000 downstream opt-
outs in the existing Settlement Agreement, those who participate in the Seventh Amend-
ment will no longer have any right to exercise an intermediate, back-end, Sixth Amend-
ment, or financial insecurity opt-out and thus will forgo the right to sue Wyeth in the tort
system." In re Diet Drugs, 226 F.R.D. at 515. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 139.
166. See infra note 185.
167. Id. In re Diet Drugs, 226 F.R.D at 522 ("[cilaimants who have had the burden of
establishing liability and damages in the tort system face substantial risks."). See also,
Frankel, Still Ticking, supra note 140, at 97 ("Without the threat of punitive damages-and
furious to see in court some of the same lawyers, doctors, and echo mills that, in its view,
had corrupted the class action-Wyeth has taken a much harder line in these cases than it
did in the quickly settled first round of opt-out suits."). Wyeth's first win in a downstream
opt out case came in a 2003 case where Wyeth argued that the plaintiff's injury was the
result of a pre-existing condition. The trial resulted in a unanimous jury verdict for the
defendant. Wyeth Wins Trial of Back-End Opt out On Unanimous Verdict, 7 MEALEY'S
LiTIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDuX 2 (2003) (discussing Eichmiller v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
No. 2002CCV52077 (Ga. Super., Fulton County 2003). In a 2004 case, a downstream opt
out plaintiff alleged that she was suffering from moderate aortic regurgitation as a result of
having ingested the diet drug Pondimin. The jury found that the plaintiff did in fact suffer
an injury to her aortic valve, but that Pondimin was not the cause of the injury. Further-
more, three of the plaintiff's echocardiograms revealed that she only had trace aortic
regurgitation. Istnick v. Am. Home Prods., No. 00268, 2004 WL 2216185, at *1 (Pa. Com.
P1. Sept. 10, 2004). See also Jury Awards $48,000 to I Intermediate Opt out, Finds for Wyeth
in 2nd Case, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX (2004). For more details regarding
the downstream opt-out litigation-including judicial and expert commentary on echo-
cardiogram quality, see infra notes 173, 176, and 185.
168. A lead counsel for Wyeth in the fen-phen litigation estimated that lawyers spent
$100 million dollars for fen-phen screenings. See Contingent Fees in Mass Tort Litigation,
supra note 26, at 162. See also Peter Grossi & Sarah Duncan, Litigation-Driven 'Medical'
Screenings: Diagnoses for Dollars, 33 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 1027, 1028 (2005) (stat-
ing that one survey by plaintiffs' lead counsel in the fen-phen class action estimated that injust three years, plaintiffs' firms spent fifty-one million dollars on television commercials
soliciting potential claimants).
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makeshift "echo mills" in law offices and hotel rooms where so-
nographers administered echocardiograms to the thousands who re-
sponded to advertisements to attend the screenings if they had used fen-
phen. 169 The entrepreneurial sonography firms were paid tens of millions
of dollars for their efforts1 70 which included substantial bonuses if the
litigant received any settlement proceeds from the Trust.17 1
In July 2001, the Napoli, Kaiser, Bern & Associates LLP law firm and
Hariton D'Angelo LLP, a law firm formed in June 2001 mostly for the
purpose of bringing fen-phen claims, formed an association ("Napoli/
Hariton") to generate clients who would submit claims to the Settlement
Trust. The firm hired sonographers and employed eighty cardiologists
from around the country to provide and read echocardiograms.17 2 The
169. Gold Rush, supra note 107, at 88.
170. One such firm, EchoMotion Diagnostics Network, Inc., which was set up solely for
fen-phen litigation, performed about 70,000 screenings in a little over a year and cleared
ten million dollars in profit on a gross of fifteen million dollars. See Gold Rush, supra note
107, at 91. See also Grossi & Duncan, supra note 168, at 1028 (stating that EchoMotion
recruited its technicians from a list of the founder's friends; these technicians then screened
up to thirty patients a day in hotel rooms or lawyer's offices). Another echo mill, Diagnos-
tic Management Service, wrote to attorneys in 1999 that his group had already performed
over 2000 echocardiograms in the Southeast, and that "approximately 90% of the reads are
positive for abnormal heart valve functioning. ... Wyeth's Amended Opposition To
Certain Class Members' Expedited Motion For An Order Suspending the Claims Integrity
Program And The Medical Practices Questionnaires Deadlines at 25, No. 99-20593, MDL
No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Wyeth's Amended Opposition]. Southern
Imaging, another sonography firm, indicated that it had billed at least $2,483,475 to two
law firms for echocardiogram testing. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Inter-
vene at 2, 99-20593, (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006); Memorandum For Leave to Intervene, No.
2:05-cv-20494-HB (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006).
171. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 170, at 1-2 (indi-
cating that Southern Imaging was paid $425 for administering an echocardiogram and an
additional payment of $1275 "as a deferred amount of compensation," if the parties settled
any of the fen-phen litigation); Memorandum for Leave to Intervene, supra note 170, at 1-
2 (also so indicating).
172. As described in one of Wyeth's pleadings:
As a result of advertising efforts and other means, the Napoli/Hariton firms
were successful in gathering an inventory of thousands of diet drug clients.
To process the clients, Napoli[Hariton set up an echocardiogram "assembly
line." They purchased 3 or 4 echocardiogram machines, which were used by
8 sonographers hired directly by Napoli/Hariton and paid on per diem basis.
These sonographers traveled to various locations to conduct echocardi-
ograms and then sent the echocardiogram tapes to cardiologists around the
country to be read. ...
In addition to its own hired sonographers conducting echocardiograms, Na-
poli/Hariton also employed about 80 doctors from around the country, in-
cluding Drs. [Linda] Crouse and [Richard] Mueller, to both acquire and read
echocardiograms. But Napoli/Hariton's paid sonographers were closely in-
volved in this process too. . . . [A] sonographer employed by Napoli/Hari-
ton traveled to the doctors' offices ostensibly to "train" the doctors'
sonographers on how to measure valvular regurgitation.
One such Napoli/Hariton sonographer, whose principal responsibility was to
travel around the country conducting such "teaching" sessions testified that
she would "explain and show [the doctors' sonographers] exactly how to do"
the planimetry to measure mitral regurgitation. Similarly, Dr. Crouse testi-
fied that before she began performing echocardiograms for Napoli/Hariton, a
sonographer from the Hariton firm met with Dr. Crouse's lead sonographer
to "make sure we understood how to make the measurements."
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sonographers hired by Napoli/Hariton, as well as by other attorneys, ac-
cording to a medical expert, frequently maladministered the echocardi-
ograms. 173 In addition, a unique feature of the agreements entered into
by Napoli/Hariton with the cardiologists they hired to read the echocardi-
ograms was a "hold harmless" clause which purported to "relieve the
doctors reading the echocardiograms from any medical and legal respon-
sibility for erroneous readings. ' 174 This clause appears to have been a
virtual invitation to the cardiologists to disregard medical protocols.
This invitation appears to have been readily accepted by two of these
cardiologists hired by Napoli/Hariton, doctors Linda Crouse and Richard
Mueller. Between them, they read thousands of echocardiograms and
were paid millions of dollars for finding that the substantial majority of
screened litigants were eligible for compensation from the Trust. They
were the subject of extensive proceedings during the course of adminis-
tration of the Trust which revealed, inter alia, that they had relied on
medical histories provided by the law firms and signed "pre-checked"
Green Forms filled out by the law firms that hired them.175 Because of
... To complete the claimants' medical histories, nurses employed by Napoli/
Hariton met with the clients and filled out a worksheet. . . . Two of [the
nurses who took these histories] testified that they did not fill out or ask
about the portions of the worksheet concerning valvular regurgitation diag-
nosed prior to diet drug use and carcinoid tumors-factors which could have
resulted in an 80% decrease in the individuals' Matrix compensation ...
One of these nurses even testified that the Hariton firm's Medical Coordina-
tor, Barbara Krohmer, actually instructed her not to complete certain of
these items on the form....
Based on these ersatz "medical histories," Napoli/Hariton would then fre-
quently fill out the entire Green Forms, except for the date and the doctor's
signature....
Wyeth's Memorandum in Support of its Motion To Deny Claims For Settlement Benefits
Submitted By Napoli/Hariton at 5-7, In re Diet Drugs, Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593,
MDL No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2005) (internal citations omitted).
173. See infra note 182 and text accompanying notes 188-194. In a letter opinion issued
on May 9, 2005, New Jersey Superior Court Judge Charles J. Walsh ruled that the echo-
cardiograms and/or echo interpretations of forty-one of forty-seven plaintiffs who had
opted out of the settlement were inadequate and returned them to the settlement class. In
re Diet Drug Litig., No. BER-L-13379-04MT, 2005 WL 1253991, at *2 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. L. May 9, 2005). Judge Walsh concluded that the echocardiograms of these plaintiffs
"have not been performed and/or interpreted in a medically reasonable manner." Id. at *2.
In many instances, Judge Walsh noted, "the techniques used in acquiring the echocardi-
ographic images fell so far below appropriate practice as to make the data reported and
conclusions made by plaintiffs' experts virtually worthless in either diagnosis or treat-
ment." Id. at *11.
174. See Wyeth's Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion To Deny Claims, supra note
172, at 9.
175. Despite the fact that they signed under penalty of perjury thousands of
Green Forms requiring information from the patient's medical history, in the
vast majority of cases, Drs. Crouse and Mueller played no role in the taking
of these histories. Instead, they let the law firms decide how to compile and
report the medical histories.
... Based on these ersatz "medical histories," Napoli/Hariton would then
frequently fill out the entire Green Forms, except for the date and the doc-
tor's signature, for Drs. Course and Mueller. Dr. Crouse admitted to signing
these "pre-checked" Green Forms. Dr. Crouse thus never reviewed medical
records or took patient histories before signing thousands of Green Forms
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these mass production techniques, doctors Crouse and Muller were found
to have provided thousands of medically unreasonable readings. 176
under penalty of perjury. Incredibly, Dr. Crouse testified at the hearing that
"it is the law firm's duty to take a history."
Dr. Mueller also acknowledged signing forms that appeared to have been
filled out by computer. In reviewing this practice, the Court specifically
noted that it is "concerned about the Hariton firm's involvement in supplying
Dr. Mueller with information required in the Green Form" given that the
form "explicitly states that Part II is to be 'completed by a Board-Certified
Cardiologist."'
... After reviewing the evidence and briefing submitted in connection with
the Napoli/Hariton hearing, the Court. .. [issued] findings ... with respect to
the "recurring flaws" in Drs. Crouse and Mueller's readings [that] illustrate
how the mass claim operation.. . generated inflated, medically unreasonable
readings-readings that were designed to earn the firms million of dollars in
contingency fees....
Based on these findings-and the facts described above concerning the dubi-
ous "mass production" operation that Napoli/Hariton had engineered-the
Court ordered not only that the Trust could audit all of the claims submitted
by Drs. Crouse and Mueller, but also all of the claims submitted by Napoli/
Hariton.
Id. at 6-10 (internal citations omitted).
176. Id. at 9-16. In 1998, Dr. Crouse participated in a clinical study which examined the
link between the fen-phen and valvular abnormalities. The study was "blinded" and Dr.
Crouse was unaware at the time that she read the echocardiograms whether or not each
patient had taken the diet drugs. She performed 600 echocardiograms over a six month
period as part of the study and found that approximately five percent of the diet drug
patients had moderate or greater mitral regurgitation. Her findings were similar to the
overall conclusions of the study. Order No. 2640, supra note 109, at 22. Nonetheless, Dr.
Crouse found at least moderate damage in sixty to seventy percent of the thousands of
claims she reviewed for litigation purposes. Id. at 21. This percentage is remarkably simi-
lar to the percentage of positive findings of fibrosis in asbestos litigation. See supra note 53.
In a challenge to the attestations of moderate or more severe mitral regurgitation by
doctors Crouse and Mueller, Dr. John Dent, an expert in echocardiography, testified that
he disagreed with fifty-three out of fifty-five echocardiograms interpreted by Dr. Crouse
and twenty-five of twenty-eight echocardiograms interpreted by Dr. Mueller as to whether
there was any reasonable medical basis to support the benefits sought. Joint Proposed
Findings of Fact, supra note 109, at 14. According to Dr. Dent, Dr. Crouse's so-
nographer-and ultimately Dr. Crouse herself-misinterpreted backflow as moderate mi-
tral regurgitation in forty-six of the fifty-five claimants he reviewed. Id. For a discussion of
backflow and how it can be misread as regurgitation, see supra note 109. Dr. Dent further
testified that none of the claimants exhibited significant levels of mitral valve regurgita-
tion-findings which the court accepted. Order No. 2640, supra note 109, at 13-16. In New
Jersey, a state court judge presiding over downstream opt out cases appointed independent
experts to review the claims. See Wyeth's Memorandum In Support of Its Motion to Deny
Claims, supra note 172, at 2. These experts found that the medical evidence was "fake."
Id.; see also Sharon P. Duffy, Fen-Phen: Are Claims Exaggerated?, THE LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Sept. 26, 2002.
Dr. Crouse earned $725,000 for reviewing 725 electrocardiograms for Napoli/Hariton
and $2.5 million in a one year period for reviewing 10,000 echocardiograms for a consor-
tium of lawyers-this, in addition to her seeing 80 patients a week and participating in
other activities. Id.; see also In re: Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d. 445, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Thus, she was paid approxi-
mately $3.25 million for fen-phen work. Doctor Richard Mueller was paid $1500 for filling
out each Green Form which he acknowledged took him only about five minutes. See
Grossi & Duncan, supra note 168, at 1030; see also Frankel, Fen-Phen Follies, supra note
121, at 92. He was thus paid an estimated $18,000 per hour to fill out the forms, in contrast
to the estimated $1500 per hour he received to review echocardiograms. Id. Thus, he had
a significant financial incentive to find a compensable condition.
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F. LITIGATION SCREENINGS: A COMPARISON OF FEN-PHEN
AND ASBESTOS SCREENINGS
There are many parallels between the litigation screenings in the fen-
phen litigation and the asbestos and silica screenings-which were un-
doubtedly a model for the fen-phen screenings. In asbestos and silica
litigation, doctors certified as B Readers were paid hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year for reading chest X-rays; in the fen-phen liti-
gation, cardiologists were paid millions of dollars for reading echocardi-
ograms. In both litigations, the payments were in exchange for
diagnosing very high percentages of disease. Moreover, just as in asbes-
tos and silica litigation, some of the cardiologists who accounted for the
largest number of diagnoses never met the individuals they diagnosed
and did not even review the medical records of the claimants. 177 Also, as
in asbestos litigation, some cardiologists were paid more if they found
that those screened had suffered heart valve damage. This was done by
paying the doctors substantial sums to fill out a Green Form required to
accompany a claim for payment under the terms of the National Class
Action Settlement. 178 Of course, a Green Form was only filled out if the
cardiologist certified that the claimant had the requisite heart valve dam-
age. This same "bonus" payment for finding disease also prevailed in
asbestos litigation.
As in asbestos and silica screenings, legal staff rather than doctors re-
corded critical medical histories and instructed technicians. 179 And just
as in asbestos and silica screenings, doctors diagnosed the requisite dis-
ease that would yield compensation without regard to possible other
causes of the condition that was being relied on for the diagnosis.' 80
Just as in asbestos litigation with respect to the maladministration of
PFTs by technicians employed by screening companies, 81 the fen-phen
Other cardiologists also provided thousands of medical reports based on echo mill
screenings and made up to five million dollars for interpretations that were likewise done
on a part-time basis. Dr. Waenard Miller signed approximately 13,000 interpretations
working part-time on weekends, ultimately generating about $2.5 million in fees. Wyeth's
Amended Opposition, supra note 170, at 16. Dr. Eugene Hutcheson testified that he re-
viewed approximately 9,000 echocardiograms at a rate of about ten minutes per study and
a further five minutes to fill out a Green Form, netting him approximately five million
dollars. Id. at 16-18. Other doctors who made in excess of one million dollars for fen-phen
work included Winston Gandy ($1.7 million), Malcolm Taylor ($1.2 million), and George
Miller ($1.1 million). Id. at 17. See Grossi & Duncan, Screenings, supra note 168, at 1031.
177. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 456-457.
178. See supra note 176.
179. See supra notes 172 and 175; see also Gold Rush, supra note 107, at 88.
180. Thus, one part of the Trust's claim form required the doctor to certify that the
claimant did not have a history of disease or drug use known to cause the valvular heart
diseases. Grossi & Duncan, supra note 168, at 1030. This requirement was routinely ig-
nored by the cardiologists who supplied the bulk of the diagnoses. Id. One cardiologist
"contended that precisely because he had never met with the claimants, reviewed their
medical records, nor taken any medical history, he could check, 'NO' for all of those alter-
native causes-since, given that ignorance, 'to the best of [his] knowledge,' the answer was
'NO."' Id.
181. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 111-128.
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sonographers had ample ways of distorting the results of the echocardi-
ograms in order to produce the desired findings18 2 that would generate
substantial bonuses for successful claims.
18 3
Unlike asbestos litigation, however, the specious claim generation by
the "echo mills" has not been an unmitigated success. First, Wyeth has
vigorously defended the downstream opt out cases 184 and has succeeded
in gaining the dismissal of large numbers of Napoli/Hariton generated
claims.18 5 Second, because of the volume of suspect Trust claims, the au-
dit procedure was changed and instead of auditing fifteen percent of the
182. For example, "by adjusting even slightly the settings on the [echocardiogram] ma-
chine, a cardiologist or sonographer can influence and even distort the quality of the image
that he or she sees. Over-manipulated settings can produce false images, including arti-
facts and phantom jets." Order No. 2640, supra note 109, at 11. In addition, a technician
may artificially inflate the degree of regurgitation shown on the tape by improperly setting
the machine. Id. Additionally, screening companies employed other methods in attempts
to artificially increase patients' echocardiogram readings. A plaintiff who had opted out of
the Wyeth Settlement testified, for example, that she and a group of fifteen or twenty diet
drug claimants were screened by a company called "Cardiovascular Sonographers" at a
Ramada Inn in Mississippi. The plaintiff testified that she was told to drink a large amount
of water because "whatever the problem is would show up better if you had a lot of water."
This instruction to the potential litigants to "drink a lot of water" was an apparent effort to
artificially increase blood pressures and thereby inflate any regurgitation that might show
up on echocardiograms. Wyeth's Memorandum in Support of Its Extended Motion For
Entry of a Court-Approved Procedure to Preserve Settlement Funding and to Address the
Pervasive Abuse of the Matrix Claims Process at 6, In re Diet Drugs Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2004). It is similar to the practice of smoking
a cigarette immediately before being administered a battery of pulmonary function tests in
asbestos litigation screenings in order to inflate any findings of lung impairment.
183. See supra note 171.
184. See supra note 167.
185. See Wyeth's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Deny Claims, supra note
172, at 14-17. In downstream opt out cases brought in New Jersey before Judge Charles J.
Walsh, court-appointed experts strongly disagreed with the exaggerated readings submit-
ted by Napoli[Hariton. Id. at 15-16. In ten cases filed by Napoli/Hariton in which the
plaintiffs alleged severe aortic or mitral regurgitation, for example, court-appointed ex-
perts found that the plaintiffs in five of the cases had, at most, trivial or trace regurgitation;
three others had only mild regurgitation, to the extent to which these echocardiograms
were readable at all, and one echocardiogram was not susceptible to any medical assess-
ment at all as a result of poor frame image quality. Id. at 16. The court-appointed experts
were disturbed by the medical diagnoses reached by the plaintiffs' qualifying echocardi-
ogram readers. In Henrie v. Wyeth, for example, a court-appointed expert described the
assessment of mild aortic regurgitation that had been made by the plaintiff's echocardi-
ogram reader, Dr. Mueller, as "all together ridiculous." Id. The expert referred to the
quality of the relied upon echocardiogram as "absolutely dreadful," and likened the echo-
cardiogram to "modern art," explaining that "no reasonable person would have attempted
to even measure it." Id.; see Henrie v. Wyeth Inc., No. BER-L-8202-03-MT (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Sept. 23, 2004). In another case, Harris v. Wyeth, another court-appointed
medical expert explained that the finding of moderate aortic regurgitation rendered by
Napoli/Hariton's qualifying echocardiogram reader, Dr. Mark D. Gelernt, "didn't meet,
under any stretch of the imagination FDA criteria for a significant leak of either valve."
Wyeth's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Deny Claims, supra note 172, at 16-17;
see Harris v. Wyeth Inc., No. BER-L-6818-03-MT (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. Sept. 23, 2004).
In LaRocca v. Wyeth, a court-appointed expert explained that it was unreasonable for Dr.
Mueller even to have attempted to measure the poor quality image which he had used to
diagnose mild aortic regurgitation in the plaintiff, noting that any other trained physician
would not have even tried to make a measurement of the frame from the echocardiogram.
Wyeth's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Deny Claims, supra note 172, at 17; see
LaRocca v. Wyeth, Inc., No. BER-L-8260-03-MT (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 23, 2004).
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claims, the Trust was ordered to audit every claim for matrix level bene-
fits from Fund B that had not yet been paid. 186 These audits resulted in
the rejection of many of the claims generated by the screenings. In addi-
tion, the Trust hired Dr. Joseph Kisslo, a prominent Duke cardiologist
who had been a leading expert on the design and utilization of the echo-
cardiogram machine, to conduct reviews of the echocardiograms. 187 Dr.
Kisslo assembled a panel of seven cardiologists assisted by nine cardiac
sonographers to review 968 sets of echocardiograms that had passed the
audit procedure, but had not yet been paid prior to the stay ordered by
the court in May 2004, when it became apparent that thousands of bogus
claims had been filed and were being paid. 188
The results are essentially a replay of the PFT tests in asbestos litiga-
tion which have mostly been administered to produce false findings of
impairment. 189 The Kisslo panel found that in seventy percent of the
claims that had successfully passed the audit, the echocardiograms were
manipulated to produce incorrect results and evidenced "material mis-
representations of the level of regurgitation." 190 Dr. Kisslo concluded
that it was reasonable to infer that there had been "intentional misrepre-
sentation" based upon findings of alterations of medical records, errors,
and techniques that consistently inflated the size and duration of
regurgitation' 91 in order to make "non-payable claims appear to be paya-
ble."' 192 Among his findings was that eighty-seven echocardiogram stud-
ies contained "extrinsic inserts [rogue frames inserted into the printouts]
that are not contemporaneous with the time of the rest of the echocardi-
ogram study," which were "deliberate misrepresentations of the actual
medical condition of the claimants . "... ,193 In plain words, Dr. Kisslo
found that a significant number of the echocardiograms had been fraudu-
lently administered or altered after the fact in order to show evidence of
injury that was not there. He stated:
See also New Jersey Judge Dismisses 6 of 7 Opt out Cases On Medical Eligibility, 7 MEA-
LEY'S LITIG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDUX 12 (2004).
Also, on June 2, 2005, Judge Walsh had dismissed forty-seven out of fifty-five opt-outsbased on poor echocardiogram quality and/or exaggerated readings. New Jersey Judge Dis-
misses 47 Of 55 Opt outs On Echocardiogram Quality, 8 MEALEY'S LrnG. REP.: FEN-PHEN/
REDUX 9 (2005). Judge Walsh stated that "[tihe initial reports of physicians with respect to
virtually all these challenged echocardiograms have significantly overstated the pathology
observed and/or claimed that the echocardiograms were of good diagnostic quality when
they clearly were not." Id.
186. Pretrial Order No. 2662, supra note 153. Prior to that, the Settlement Agreement
provided for an audit procedure, but limited the number of audits to fifteen percent of
claims filed. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 139 at 116-17, 121.
187. Report of Joseph Kisslo, M.D. on the Integrity of Pre-Stay PADL Matrix Claims at
1, 7-8, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, MDL No. 1203 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9,
2004) [hereinafter Kisslo Report].
188. Id. at 2, 9.
189. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 561-63.
190. Kisslo Report, supra note 187, at 5, 21.
191. Id. at 21-22.
192. Id. at 23.
193. Id. at 28-29.
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[M]y review has confirmed that ... echocardiogram companies that
performed large numbers of diet drug echocardiograms devised...
and used distinct methods ("recipes") to misuse echo machines and
to misrepresent ("cook") the degree of regurgitation represented on
their echocardiograms. These providers manipulated echo machine
settings repeatedly in such a way as to create images that ... exag-
gerated the appearance of blood flow patterns.
194
G. THE COST OF THE FEN-PHEN LITIGATION
Wyeth has thus far set aside approximately twenty-two billion dollars
to pay for the cost of resolving approximately 600,000 claims.' 95 It is not
yet determinable whether this sum overstates Wyeth's ultimate liability or
whether additional amounts will have to be added to the reserve.
A substantial portion of the money paid by Wyeth to claimants in the
fen-phen litigation has gone to settle the 50,000 initial opt out claims
brought in the tort system. 196 As previously noted, many of the initial opt
out cases were filed in jurisdictions that were quite favorable to the inter-
ests of plaintiffs and their lawyers. The terms of the Settlement reflect
Wyeth's great vulnerability in these opt out cases even where the plain-
tiff's regurgitation almost certainly pre-existed the ingestion of the diet
drugs and where the drugs were taken for less than the minimum thresh-
old duration reported in clinical studies.
Wyeth has also settled an additional 50,000 downstream opt out cases
brought in the tort system which were mostly generated by litigation
screenings. Wyeth has vigorously defended these cases, 19 7 and the settle-
ments there have been far less generous than the initial opt out cases.
Indeed, many of these cases have been settled for "nuisance value" nomi-
nal amounts as part of inventory settlements with individual law firms in
which Wyeth agreed to pay a set sum and the law firm allocated specific
amounts to each of its clients included in the settlement as it saw fit. 198 I
194. Id. at 41.
195. Gold Rush, supra note 107, at 87. The authors provide an estimate that about six
billion dollars, which was seventy percent of the money that was thus far paid, went to
patients who "aren't sick and don't deserve it." Id. The authors of the Gold Rush article
added that "[i]t may add up to one of the biggest tort scams ever . I..." Id
196. See supra notes 149, 152.
197. See supra notes 164, 167.
198. These are aggregate settlements and under ethical rules, clients must give their
informed consent to their assigned settlement amounts. This disclosure must include the
fact that a single sum of money has been provided by the defendant; that the lawyer has
allocated specific amounts to each client; and that each client's allocation depends upon
what the lawyer has allocated to the other clients participating in the aggregate settlement.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.8(g). Failure to obtain informed consent may
result in fee forfeiture. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232, 245-46 (Tex. 1999). In a
proceeding currently before New York Supreme Court Justice Charles Ramos, the issue of
whether the law firm of Napoli Kaiser & Bern ("Napoli Firm") entered into an aggregate
settlement with Wyeth of 5,000 claims for a reported one billion dollars and whether it
conformed to New York Disciplinary Rule 5-106, 22 NYCRR §1200.25 with regard to noti-
fying its clients that there was an aggregate settlement and getting their informed consent,
is being determined. See In re N.Y. Diet Drug Litig. 839 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007). Also under review is an allegation by the law firm of Parker & Waichman LLP, that
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estimate that the settlement value of that portion of the 50,000 down-
stream opt out cases, which were generated by screenings and based on
the type of diagnoses described in this Article, is in the range of one to
two billion dollars. Illegitimate screening-generated Trust claims proba-
bly account for an additional few hundred million dollars. Even though
the court instituted a 100% audit in response to the screenings, many
specious claims had already been approved for payment. 199 And, accord-
ing to Dr. Kisslo, a significant number of the claims that passed the audit
in response to the screenings had echocardiograms that were manipulated
to produce incorrect results.20 0
In toto, litigation screening claims supported by improperly adminis-
tered echocardiograms and the assembly line diagnoses by a comparative
handful of cardiologists have probably accounted for somewhere in the
vicinity of one and a half to two billion dollars in payments. This amount,
however, is only a fraction of what law firms which sponsored the screen-
ings undoubtedly anticipated. While the litigation screenings in the fen-
phen litigation did not achieve nearly the financial success as those in the
asbestos and silicone breast implant screenings, they certainty matched
those screenings in terms of the brazenness of the scheme to generate
tens, and perhaps hundreds, of thousands of manufactured claims.
VI. SILICONE BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION
According to the scientific literature, women with silicone breast
implants have no greater incidence of autoimmune connective-tissue
diseases,20 including rheumatoid arthritis,202 lupus, 20 3 and sclero-
when the Napoli Firm allocated the settlement proceeds among its 5,000 clients, it allo-
cated disproportionately larger amounts to its own clients and lesser amounts to the clients
referred to the firm by Parker & Waichman, so that the Napoli Firm could capture contin-
gency fees at the expense of Parker & Waichman. See Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 815
N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006), recalling and vacating 806 N.Y.S.2d 19 (2005). See also
Anthony DePalma, 9/11 Lawyer Made Name in Lawsuit on Diet Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2008, at A23.
199. Prior to instituting the 100% audit imposed in mid-2002, however, "85 percent of
[Trust] claims were being paid without any real check on their legitimacy .... " In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
200. See supra notes 190-194.
201. Autoimmunity is the mechanism by which the body turns its immune system de-
fenses against foreign bodies against the cells and molecules of the body itself; connective
tissue disease refers to any disease in which connective tissues are the primary location of
disease, such as arthritis. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 107 (1996). Autoimmunity is the
cause of some connective tissue diseases and is suspected in others. Id.
202. Rheumatoid arthritis is a chronic disease, mainly characterized by inflammation of
the lining of the joints. Approximately 750,000 American women have this disease. Amer-
ican College of Rheumatology, Rheumatoid Arthritis (May 2004), http://www.rheu-
matology.org/public/factsheets/ra-new.asp.
203. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus ("Lupus") is a chronic, rheumatic, autoimmune
disease, which affects the joints, muscles, and other parts of the body. For unknown rea-
sons, the immune system attacks normal tissue and results in inflammation. Approxi-
mately 1.35 million American women have this disease. Lupus Foundation of America,
Inc., Frequently Asked Questions About Lupus (December 2004), http://www.lupus.org/
education/faq.html#1; Lupus Research Institute, Written Testimony: Before the H. Sub-
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derma,2 0 4 than do women without breast implants.2 0 5 Despite the ab-
sence of evidence of causation, breast implant litigation attained mass
tort status on the basis of hundreds of thousands of claims of connective
tissue and rheumatoid diseases alleged to have been caused by silicone
breast implants. Here, too, the litigants were recruited by screenings or-
ganized by lawyers in search of a fee and their claims were supported by
specious diagnoses and theories of causation that were inconsistent with
the medical and scientific evidence.
The first silicone breast implants were manufactured and sold by Dow
Corning in 1962.206 At the time, implants, which are considered medical
devices, were not subject to regulation by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion ("FDA") or other government agency.20 7 Nor did Dow, or any of its
competitors, perform studies on women who received the implants to de-
termine whether they were safe, despite knowing that an undetermined
percentage of implants ruptured and that minute amounts of silicone
could leak through the permeable membrane.20 8 Instead, the manufac-
turers relied on plastic surgeons to inform patients of the possible dan-
gers, a task often unperformed.2 0 9 In 1976, Congress passed the Medical
Devices Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, placing breast
implants and other medical devices under the regulatory jurisdiction of
the FDA.2 10 Under the amendment, the FDA could, at its discretion, re-
quire that the manufacturers of new devices submit animal and human
studies of safety and effectiveness before getting approval to market the
device.21 ' Breast implants were initially exempt from this requirement
comm. on Labor, Health, and Human Servs., Educ. and Related Agencies of the H. Comm.
on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://www.lupusresearchinstitute.org/
downloads/testimony-to congress.pdf.
204. "Scleroderma is a disease that can cause thickening, hardening or tightening of the
skin, blood vessels and internal organs." Arthritis Foundation, Scleroderma, http://www.
arthritis.org/conditionsfDiseaseCenter/scleroderma.asp (last visited September 29, 2006);
see generally Scleroderma Research Foundation, What is Scleroderma?, http://www.srfcure.
org/srf/patients/whatis.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
205. INFORMATION FOR WOMEN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS
6-7 (Martha Grigg, et al. eds., 2000).
The Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), a part of the National Academy of Sciences, pub-
lished the results of an extensive study of silicone breast implants that was requested by the
U.S. House of Representatives and sponsored by the Department of Health and Human
Services. Id. at 4-5. The 440-page report concluded that "there is no evidence that silicone
breast implants contribute to an increase in autoimmune (connective tissue) diseases ...
[and there is] no link between implants and connective tissue disease or rheumatic condi-
tions." Id. at 5-7.
206. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 39. Silicone was apparently first used to enlarge
breasts in Japan after World War II. Id. at 35. Japanese prostitutes had liquid silicone
injected directly into their breasts in order to increase their appeal to American occupation
forces. Id. at 35-36. This practice, however, led to often painful and disfiguring complica-
tions. Id. at 38.
207. David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 463 (1999).
208. Id. at 462.
209. Id. at 462, 510 n.16 (citing a memo from Dow Corning's public relations team that
noted that doctors "haven't wanted to bother the pretty little heads of their patients with
all this information" despite the fact that Dow had provided it to them).
210. Id. at 463; see also ANGELL, supra note 201, at 51.
211. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 51.
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because they had been on the market for almost fifteen years. By 1982,
however, the FDA, concerned about the scar tissue that formed around
the implants, the potential toxic effects of silicone leaks, and the impact
of silicone in the implant shells themselves, for the first time proposed
that manufacturers submit studies to verify the safety of the devices. 212 It
would be another six years before the regulation was finalized. 213
Nineteen-eighty-two also saw the first lawsuit filing alleging that sili-
cone had leaked from breast implants causing a woman's serious health
problems. With little more than the speculation of her doctors that sili-
cone might have caused her chronic fatigue and joint pain, Maria Stern
sued Dow Corning and ultimately won a verdict of $1.4 million. 214 Be-
cause there was no valid scientific evidence supporting a link between
silicone breast implants and Stem's health problems,215 Stern's lawyers
used internal Dow Corning documents to argue that the company had
irresponsibly marketed a product without knowing whether it was safe.216
The strategy worked. A trickle of suits followed Stern's victory, but it
would be several more years before a combination of political pressure,
media sensationalism, and regulatory action would produce an atmos-
phere conducive to the creation of a mass tort.
The political pressure was initiated by Public Citizen, a Naderite con-
sumer advocacy group, which released a study done by Dow Corning
scientists in which silicone gel implanted under the skin of rats caused
cancer in twenty to twenty-five percent of the animals.217 This study,
however, did not indicate that humans would have a similar outcome. To
the contrary-the same response does not occur in humans. 218 Congres-
sional hearings that followed relied solely on expert witnesses hired by
plaintiffs' lawyers for its scientific evidence.2 19 The litigation was really
fueled, however, in 1990 when a television program, Face to Face with
Connie Chung, set off a national panic. Calling silicone gel "an ooze of
212. Id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 207, at 463, 465.
213. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 51-53. Manufacturers were given two and a half years
to provide the data. Id. at 52.
214. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 463-64. The jury awarded Stern $200,000 in compen-
satory damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages. Id. at 464. Other sources say the
award was close to two million dollars. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 52.
215. A few anecdotal reports noted the presence of connective tissue disease in women
who had had silicone injected directly into their breasts. Id. at 51-52. Another article
found connective tissue disease in three Australian women with silicone-filled implants. Id.
at 52. But none of these anecdotal reports provided proof of a causal connection between
the implants and disease.
216. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 463-64, 510 n.22.
217. Id. at 465.
218. The problem with the study was that the type of cancer found in the rats,
fibrosarcoma, occurs in rodents in response to any large smooth object placed under the
skin. Id. at 465-66. This same response does not appear to occur in humans. Id. at 466.
Bernstein argues that Public Citizen ignored this fact in its determination to use the breast
implant issue to push its agenda to reverse the anti-regulatory policies of the Reagan Ad-
ministration. Id. at 466-67.
219. Id. at 468.
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slimy gelatin that could be poisoning women, ' 220 Chung, with the active
assistance of plaintiffs' lawyers, showcased the stories of five women who
believed that they had serious illnesses that were related to their breast
implants. 221 The sensationalistic nature of the program was capped when
one woman revealed her chest, disfigured by the removal of her implants,
to the audience.222
The public alarm raised by the show spurred a moderate increase in the
number of breast implant lawsuits filed.22 3 Public Citizen put together a
"Silicone Clearinghouse" of thirty-nine law firms to provide representa-
tion for potential plaintiffs.224 And, as some of the lawsuits filed earlier
came to trial, plaintiffs won several multi-million dollar verdicts, provid-
ing new financial incentives for both plaintiffs and lawyers. 225 The most
important of these cases involved Mariann Hopkins, 226 a California wo-
man diagnosed with mixed connective tissue disorder, an autoimmune
disorder with clinical features of systemic lupus, rheumatoid arthritis,
polymyositis, and scleroderma. 227 The diagnosis came just three years af-
ter one of her silicone breast implants had ruptured. 228 The jury awarded
Hopkins $7.34 million despite the fact that her own rheumatologist testi-
fied that he believed her symptoms began before she received her first set
of implants.229 Once again, the "bad documents" that had been used in
the Stern case seven years earlier seemed to play an important role in the
jury's decision.230 Despite these successes, the number of litigants still
remained relatively small, with just 137 lawsuits filed as of early Decem-
ber 1991.231
Against this backdrop of multi-million dollar verdicts, political pres-
220. Id. at 467 (quoting Face to Face with Connie Chung (NBC television broadcast
Dec. 10, 1990)).
221. Marcia Angell, M.D., Shattuck Lecture: Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Im-
plants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1513, 1514 (1996). Chung cited two doctors to support a link between implants and
autoimmune disease but failed to indicate that they had never published studies in a major
medical journal and that both were paid medical experts for plaintiffs' lawyers in pending
breast implant litigations. See Kathy McNamara-Meis, "It Seemed We Had It All Wrong,"
FORBES MEDIACRITIC, Winter 1996, at 40, 43.
222. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 467-68.
223. Id. at 471.
224. Id. The president of Public Citizen later acknowledged his intention to create a
deluge of lawsuits against the manufacturers as a means to further his agenda. Id.
225. A woman in Alabama was awarded $5.35 million in damages (later reduced to
$2.25 million before being vacated and remanded for a new trial) while a New York plain-
tiff received a $4.45 million verdict (later reduced to $1.5 million dollars). Id. In his opin-
ion, the judge in the Alabama case wrote that the scientific basis for the testimony of the
plaintiffs expert was "not generally accepted." Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543,
1551 (M.D. Ala. 1991), vacated, 999 F.2d 1430 (11th Cir. 1993).
226. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994).
227. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 118-19.
228. Id. at 119.
229. Id. at 122.
230. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 473.
231. Id. at 472.
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sure, and media outrage,2 32 and despite the lack of any new scientific evi-
dence of the health impacts of silicone breast implants, in early 1992, an
FDA advisory panel recommended for the first time that silicone breast
implants be banned in almost all situations. 233 The only exception was
for women who required reconstructive surgery following a mastec-
tomy.234 The exception appeared peculiar given the reasons for barring
the implants because these women, generally recovering cancer patients,
were already facing severe health problems and a safe alternative, saline
implants, was available. 235 On April 16, 1992, FDA commissioner David
Kessler followed the panel's recommendation and implemented the
ban.236
In the two years following the FDA ban, more than 16,000 lawsuits,
brought by more than a thousand lawyers, were filed in state and federal
courts. 237 The combination of aggressive advertising and computer
networking that allowed lawyers to read about and copy the complaints
filed in cases from across the country helped spur the increase. 238 The
number of lawyers connected to Public Citizen's clearinghouse also rose
to 179 by the end of 1992, while the Breast Implant Committee of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America increased 800% from 20 to 160
in the six months prior to the FDA ban.2 39
At the same time as the FDA implemented its ban, the first studies
investigating the link between breast implants and cancer were pub-
lished.240 None found any connection. 241 As a result, plaintiffs' attorneys
quickly shifted their focus from the claims alleging that breast implants
232. Following Chung's program, other media outlets picked up the story including
ABC's PrimeTime Live, which used the story to attack deregulation, and The Jenny Jones
Show, where the host told the story of her own personal experience with breast implants.
Id. at 475; ANGELL, supra note 201, at 45-46. In addition, Dow Corning was forced to
release to the public the internal memos that had played a key role in several of the ver-
dicts against it and acknowledge that it had known for two decades that some silicone gel
would leak through the implant's membrane. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 474-75.
233. Id. at 475.
234. Id.
235. Id. Bernstein believes the decision was a political one given that breast cancer
survivors were "well-organized politically, were represented on the FDA panel, and would
have bitterly fought ... if the ban had been applied to women who had undergone mastec-
tomies. Other potential implant recipients were diffuse and unorganized . I. " Id. at 476.
236. Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants, supra note 221, at 1514.
Access to silicone implants was limited to women requiring reconstruction due to mastec-
tomy, and then only under carefully controlled clinical protocols. See Council on Scientific
Affairs, American Medical Association, Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 270 JAMA 2602,
2605 (1993).
237. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 69. The number of suits against Dow Corning, for
example, rose from 200 at the end of 1991 to approximately 10,000 at the end of 1992. Id.
238. Id. at 70. This copying was evident in the appearance of identical typographical
errors in many of the complaints. Id.
239. Id.
240. Hans Berkel, Breast Augmentation: A Risk Factor for Breast Cancer?, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1649 (1992); Dennis M. Deapen & Garry S. Brody, Augmentation Mam-
maplasty and Breast Cancer: A Five-Year Update of the Los Angeles Study, 89 J. PLASTIC &
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 660 (1992).
241. Additional studies in subsequent years found similar results. See Bernstein, supra
note 207, at 477 n.94.
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caused the plaintiff's cancer to those claiming that the ruptures of or
leaks in the silicone gel implants caused a systemic immune system dis-
ease, such as rheumatoid arthritis, lupus, or scleroderma. 242 This switch
was facilitated by the fact that the epidemiological studies that would
prove or disprove a link between breast implants and these diseases were
still several years from being published.243
Still, the success of this strategy turned on the "scientific legitimacy of
the silicone-related diagnosis. '244 To convince juries that the implants
were really the cause of the diseases required scientific and medical ex-
pert witnesses who would testify that (1) the plaintiffs had serious dis-
eases, and (2) that the silicone implants caused the diseases. The
financial incentives to provide this testimony were substantial and a small
group of doctors and scientists emerged to fill the need for such testi-
mony. Three in particular, Marc Lapp6, Dr. Nir Kossovsky, and Dr.
Frank Vasey, played key roles in the breast implant litigation, testifying at
trials, appearing before Congress, 245 and providing new medical "theo-
ries" upon which plaintiffs' cases often rested. 246 Dr. Kossovsky was re-
ferred to by the firm of John O'Quinn, the leading lawyer in this mass
tort, as a "senior world authority on the biological properties of sili-
cone. '247 Only one of the three, Vasey, was an expert in rheumatology,
the branch of medicine dealing with connective tissue disease, and none
were epidemiologists, schooled in the study of the connections between
disease and possible risk factors.248 All three, however, were eager pro-
ponents of the idea that the silicone gel in breast implants can cause
autoimmune diseases and each advanced his own theory in support. 249
242. Id. at 477. Silicone implants do occasionally cause complications that require sur-
gery and removal. These are implant rupture, capsular contracture, and pain. INFORMA-
TION FOR WOMEN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS, supra note 205, at
2.
243. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 476-77.
244. Gary Taubes, Silicone in the System, DISCOVER, Dec. 1995, at 65-66.
245. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
246. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 120.
247. Taubes, supra note 244, at 66-67.
248. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 120-22.
249. Lappd, whose background is in experimental pathology, had postulated a new
autoimmune disease, silicone-reactive disorder, in which "silicone triggers an intense over-
stimulation of the immune system, perhaps in response to the silica component of the sili-
cone envelope." Id. at 108. While he has published his theory in a journal called Medical
Hypotheses, he has not provided persuasive evidence to support it. Id. (discussing M.
Lappd, Silicone-Reactive Disorder: A New Autoimmune Disease Caused by Immunostimu-
lation and Superantigens, 41 MEDICAL HYPOTHESES 348 (1993)). Moreover, the epidemio-
logical evidence demonstrates the theory is invalid.
Kossovsky, also a pathologist who did not have board certification in either rheu-
matology or immunology-disciplines that were central to the issues of causation-ad-
vanced a theory that the silicone which leaks from implants combines with native
molecules to form a new complex that the body no longer recognizes. ANGELL, supra note
201, at 121. A native compound is one that "occurs naturally within the cell or its extracel-
lular environment." Edward D. Harris, Biochemical Facts Behind the Definition and
Properties of Metabolites, Texas A & M University, available at www.fda.gov/ohrms/dock-
ets/ac/03/briefing/3942bl 08_Harris%20Paper.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). As a result,
he postulated that the body attacks these new particles in an autoimmune response and
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Indeed, the key to the plaintiffs' lawyers' success was the testimony of
these expert witnesses on causation and diagnoses by a cadre of doctors
that had focused their practices on developing evidence for use in the
litigation so that they could collect substantial fees.250 These doctors and
scientists who advanced their fanciful theories of causation, however, had
no support in the scientific literature.251 Indeed, by 1994, published epi-
demiological studies showed no association between silicone implants
and the claimed diseases. 252 Two years later, U.S. District Court Judge
this reaction spreads to other parts of the body. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 107. Kossov-
sky had shown that such a response occurs in guinea pigs where the immune system reacts
to the presence of silicone-serum complexes, but not to silicone itself. Moreover, this re-
sult does not prove a similar response in women with implants, nor does it prove that the
result is an autoimmune disease. Id. He dismissed the epidemiological studies showing
that there was no increased risk of autoimmune or connective diseases as irrelevant be-
cause the silicone implants were causing a new, as of yet unrecognized by medical science,
disease which he called "silicone syndrome." See MICHAEL E. GORMAN, TRANSFORMING
NATURE 226 (1998). This assertion about a new disease is not supported by scientific evi-
dence. INFORMATION FOR WOMEN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS,
supra note 205, at 6. He also marketed a diagnostic test, Detecsil, mainly to trial lawyers
that purported to "diagnose" this disease. Taubes, supra note 244, at 71. However, this test
could not actually diagnose any disease and Kossovsky admitted in a court deposition that
his test could not actually determine if someone was sick. Id. at 74. The Autoimmune
Disease Center at Scripps Research Institute in La Jolla, California sent him "blind" sam-
ples of blood for testing. Kossovsky's test failed to distinguish women with autoimmune
diseases and implants from women with autoimmune disease and no implants. Id. at 70.
When asked to provide the raw data from which he is making his conclusions, he offered
that it must have been destroyed by an earthquake, and that coffee spilled on everything,
and he threw out anything that "looked disgusting or not particularly important." Id. at 74.
Moreover, the FDA warned that "until Detecsil had proven diagnostic ability... [its pro-
motion] ... was misleading .... " Id. at 74. Nevertheless, Kossovsky has been one of the
most popular and effective plaintiffs' witnesses, testifying in the Hopkins and Johnson
cases, among many others. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 151. Having heard Kossovsky
speak at a program for trial lawyers, I can personally attest to his effective manner. Even
though I have an undergraduate degree in chemistry, I was hard put to find a defect in the
step-by-step argument that Kossovsky reprised "showing" that the silicone that leaked
from implants created new particles that the body did not recognize and so generated an
autoimmune response. Kossvsky's causation theory was bogus, but his presentation was
convincing.
Vasey's belief in the connection between silicone breast implants and connective tissue
disease comes from a clinical rather than a theoretical perspective. The chief of the Divi-
sion of Rheumatology at the University of South Florida College of Medicine, Vasey re-
ported about a group of patients in his practice whose connective tissue disease or
symptoms were alleviated by the removal of their breast implants. Id. at 121-22; see also
FRANK B. VASEY & JOSH FELDSTEIN, THE SILICONE BREAST IMPLANT CONTROVERSY:
WHAT WOMEN NEED TO KNOW 49 (1993). Clinical impressions, however, can be mislead-
ing: "In medical practice, it is not unusual for a specialist who attracts patients with a
certain type of problem to gain erroneous impressions about its frequency or its association
with other conditions. Without controls and appropriate population sampling techniques,
it is easy to draw conclusions that will not stand up to later, more careful epidemiological
analysis. Even a large clinical experience, while possibly suggestive, cannot substitute for a
cohort or case-control study in getting at whether implants cause disease. The history of
medicine is replete with examples of mistaken 'clinical impressions based' on uncontrolled
and often undocumented personal experience." ANGELL, supra note 201, at 122.
250. See infra notes 272-282 and accompanying text.
251. Taubes, supra note 244, at 66.
252. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 101. In 1994, the Mayo Clinic and other medical
schools and clinics conducted several epidemiological studies, which unanimously found
that there was no association between the breast implants and a higher risk of developing
1272 [Vol. 61
Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts
Robert E. Jones, who was overseeing breast implant cases, appointed an
independent panel of experts to assess the scientific validity of the testi-
mony of the plaintiff's experts under the Daubert standards and based on
this assessment, he ruled that plaintiffs' experts would not be permitted
to testify.253 Without that expert testimony on general causation, the
plaintiffs had no case.
In June 1992, before the epidemiological studies disproving the connec-
tion between silicone breast implants and connective tissue diseases were
finished, the Federal Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation certified a
multi-district class action lawsuit against the major implant manufactur-
ers. By the end of 1992, plaintiffs had filed 10,000 suits against Dow
Corning, the manufacturer with the largest market share.254 That same
month, the O'Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle firm won the biggest verdict yet,
$25 million, including $20 million in punitive damages, for a plaintiff
whose implants had ruptured and who claimed that the silicone that
leaked out caused an autoimmune disorder.255 What made the case
unique was that the plaintiff, Pamela Johnson, had never been diagnosed
with a recognized immune system or connective tissue disease. 256 In-
stead, she suffered from what her lawyer described as a silicone-induced
"autoimmune disorder, in which she feels like she has a bad case of the
flu all the time."'257 Her symptoms were all vague and nonspecific, such
as sinusitis, respiratory ailments, sore throats, colds, and bladder infec-
tions.258 Her lawyers succeeded by keeping the focus on the concern that
her condition could worsen,25 9 however, and the idea that their client was
a proxy for the thousands of other women who might get sick due to their
implants.2 60 The O'Quinn firm and others responded opportunistically to
any of the claimed diseases. Id. at 101-102. These studies were further followed up by
studies from the Harvard Medical School, which concluded that there was "no evidence of
an association between silicone breast implants and either connective-tissue diseases ...."
Jorge SAnchez-Guerrero, M.D. et al., Silicone Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-
Tissue Diseases and Symptoms, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1666 (1995).
253. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-94 (D. Or. 1996).
254. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 69. Other sources put the number higher. See supra
note 237.
255. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 479.
256. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 134.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. During closing arguments, Johnson's lawyer told the jury: "[My client] has seen the
women with this disease that has progressed to the point that they can't walk or they can
only walk with a cane. Must she not think, Dear God, is this going to happen to me. She's
heard of the lymphomas and cancers and all the real serious diseases of that nature that are
found among these hundreds of thousands of women with this condition." Bernstein,
supra note 207, at 479 (quoting attorney John O'Quinn). Note the reference to cancer
fears despite the fact that two scientific studies released just eight months earlier had found
no connection between silicone breast implants and cancer.
260. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 135. Johnson's case was also weak for other reasons.
She was a smoker and at least some of her symptoms could have been related to that fact.
Id. at 136. In addition, her doctor had ruptured the implant during a procedure intended
to break up scar tissue. Id. at 135. To counter this fact, O'Quinn argued that the issue
wasn't whether the implants were defective, but whether the manufacturer could prove
that they were safe. Id. at 136. This shift in the normal burden of proof was so effective
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this victory by filing hundreds of new lawsuits, 261 engaging public rela-
tions agencies, and traveling around the country with medical experts to
stage events to explain the dangers of implants, create public awareness
of the "new threat," offer legal advice, and refer women to doctors and
laboratories that they had selected that would diagnose silicone related
diseases. 262 By December 1993, the number of lawsuits filed against Dow
Corning alone had grown to 12,359.263
In the spring of 1994, the implant manufacturers, Dow Corning, Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb, Baxter International, and Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing Co. ("3M"), agreed in a class action settlement to pay $4.2
billion to women with silicone implants, of which about $1 billion would
go to the attorneys.264 However, the settlement soon collapsed under the
weight of a much larger than expected pool of claimants and the decision
of litigants with the strongest cases to opt out of the settlement.2 65 The
implosion was the result of a lack of sufficient specificity in the medical
requirements listed for eligibility for compensation 266 and also the result
of the absence of any requirement that the illness alleged was caused by
implants.267 As the settlement was structured, a woman could qualify for
lucrative compensation even without any objective signs of illness. For
example, joint and muscle aches, disturbed sleep, fatigue, and burning
pain in the chest-all symptoms that cannot be objectively verified by a
that O'Quinn's tactics were the subject of a teaching videotape entitled "Look Over Here:
Johnson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company: How Houston Plaintiff's Lawyer John
O'Quinn Won the Largest Breast Implant Verdict to Date by Keeping a Jury on the
Strongest Elements of His Case." Id. at 137. For more in-depth discussion of the strategy
and tactics used by the plaintiff's lawyers in this case, see id. at 134-40; Bernstein, supra
note 207, at 477-79.
261. O'Quinn alone had approximately 700 cases pending by the end of 1992; by mid-
1995, that number was over 2,000. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 140. His success in court
combined with his large pool of litigants gave him considerable leverage in settlement
talks. By mid-1995, his firm had apparently settled close to 200 cases for over one million
dollars each and another 300 for less than that. Id. at 141. O'Quinn's success earned him
the sobriquet the "king of torts" from Forbes magazine in July 1995. Id. at 140. See also C.
Palmeri, A Texas Gunslinger, FORBES, July 3, 1995, at 42.
262. Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at
Dl.
263. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 479.
264. Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants, supra note 221, at 1514-15.
The settlement applied to all women with silicone breast implants who already had or
within the next thirty years developed one of ten listed connective tissue diseases or related
symptoms, so long as the symptoms began or worsened after the implants were inserted,
though proof of causation was not required. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 80-81. Compen-
sation was determined according to the disorder, its severity, and the age of onset. Id.
Women who had not gotten sick could also be reimbursed for emotional distress and for
the uninsured expenses of implant removal; husbands and some children were also entitled
to make claims. Id. at 81. Just over a quarter of the money, $1.2 billion, was set aside for
women who were already sick. Id. at 80.
265. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 479-80.
266. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 70.
267. Gina Kolata & Berry Meier, Doctors, Lawyers and Silicone: A Special Report;
Implant Lawsuits Create A Medical Rush to Cash In, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al.
There was no process created in the settlement for verifying that the illness that was al-
leged was caused by the implants; plaintiffs' attorneys referred clients to clinicians whose
practice was based on such patients, and whose fees were paid by attorneys. Id.
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doctor-would be enough to entitle a claimant to up to $700,000.268 All
she would need was substantiating medical records or a doctor's diagno-
sis. 2 69 And, of course, plaintiffs' lawyers would supply the doctors who
would consistently provide the "right" diagnosis. These defects were
quickly exploited by lawyers. Using "800" telephone numbers and other
mass advertising techniques, they instituted screenings and recruited
more than 440,000 claimants27 0-far beyond what was anticipated when
the settlement was entered into. According to one estimate, the defen-
dant manufacturers would have had to contribute an additional $24 bil-
lion to the settlement fund to pay these claims.271
In some cases, lawyers flew doctors all over the country to see potential
claimants, and sometimes lawyers' offices doubled as examining rooms
for cursory examinations on an assembly line basis, which were mostly
paid for by the lawyers. 272 In this manner, thousands of women were
diagnosed by a few dozen doctors for whom "implant work [was] a lucra-
tive specialty. '2 73 For example, Dr. Robert I. Lewy, an internist and he-
matologist in Houston, saw 4,700 women with implants, 3,000 of those
within two years.274 He said that lawyers had referred over ninety per-
cent of the women and that he had found ninety-three percent of them
268. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 81.
269. Id.
270. In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 1996).
271. In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997).
272. Kolata & Meier, supra note 267. Many of the women complained that their exami-
nations were "assembly line," with dozens of women in the waiting room. One woman
commented: "[iut was kind of like cattle." Another woman said, "[i]t took a few minutes.
He told me to stick out my tongue, he looked in my ears, thumped on my chest, boom
boom. That was the test, period." Id. Another woman was told by such a doctor that she
had a degenerative nerve disorder linked to the implants, but when she went to see two
neuropathologists, they both said her nervous system was normal. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. These cases became such a large part of his practice that Dr. Lewy even set up
a foundation, Breast Implant Research, Inc. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 147. He would
perform a large array of tests, including expensive bone scans and MRIs to reach his diag-
noses-despite the fact that there is no specific test or series of tests for finding silicone-
related diseases-and recommended that at least some of them be repeated every three
months. Id. at 148. According to his foundation's brochure, Dr. Lewy seems to believe
that women with breast implants will almost inevitably develop an autoimmune disorder
and that their children are at risk as well (under the class-action settlement, children of
women with breast implants can also be entitled to compensation). Id. at 147-48. Dr.
Lewy is quite open about the ultimate purpose of his diagnoses. In his brochure, he points
out that "[d]ocumentation of the complaint by medical personnel is important, but diagno-
sis of a condition related to them (such as chronic fatigue, myalgia, fibromyalgia, sclero-
derma, nerve abnormalities) is of great value to your claim." Id. at 149.
A Houston television station reported the story of a nurse who allegedly saw Dr. Lewy
after being referred by a lawyer she consulted about any compensation she might be enti-
tled to under the class action settlement. Id. Although she did not see Lewy himself, she
underwent an extensive series of tests, including an MRI which she was instructed to have
at a particular facility, not at the hospital where she worked. Id. Alarmed by the diagnosis
of lupus she was eventually given, she sought a second opinion from her own doctor who
could find no evidence of disease. Id. at 149-50. The doctor believed her diagnosis to be
based on borderline results from one test (which were not uncommon even in healthy
people) and the MRI that was reported as "abnormal." Id. at 150.
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sick. 275 Dr. Lewy said his income rose from about $300,000 in 1993, to $2
million in 1994 when he focused on breast implant diagnosing. 276 An-
other doctor, Dr. Bernard Patten, a Houston neurologist, performed
nerve biopsies on women with implants, claiming that eighty percent of
them had nerve damage. 277 He prescribed expensive and risky treat-
ments including intravenous gamma globulin, corticosteroids, and an-
timetabolites that cost about $10,000 per month.278 According to reports,
Patten earned more than $300,000 a year from his breast implant prac-
tice.279 Some of the doctors involved in the screening set up assembly-
line practices, charging $6,000 per examination including tests,280 and di-
agnosing more than ninety percent of the women with "symptoms that
would make them eligible for compensation .... "281 One doctor re-
ported earning approximately one million dollars for doing consultations
and dealing with forms.282
The women who opted out of a revised class action settlement28 3 found
that juries remained generous. In March 1994, two of O'Quinn's clients
won $19.2 million in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages
despite complaining of only vague symptoms and despite the fact that
their implants remained intact. 284 O'Quinn convinced the jury that the
minute amount of silicone that leaked through the implant's membrane
was enough to cause immune system problems.2 85
However, the science continued to favor the defendants. In June of
1994, the first study investigating the relationship between silicone breast
implants and connective tissue diseases was published in the New En-
gland Journal of Medicine.2 6 It found no association. 287 A second study,
275. Id. at 149.
276. Kolata & Meier, supra note 267.
277. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 150. Patten was featured on a CNN investigative re-
port about the breast implant controversy, Fire and Fury, Part 4: The Merchants of Fear
(CNN Presents broadcast Oct. 16, 1994).
278. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 151. One former patient reported being hospitalized
on three separate occasions at a cost of $30,000 each time though her condition never
changed. Id. Patten warned her that without the treatments, "[y]ou'll be very surprised
how quickly you will go downhill, and you could potentially die." Id.
279. Id. (citing the CNN report), supra note 277.
280. Kolata & Meier, supra note 267. See also supra note 274.
281. McNamara-Meis, supra note 221, at 44.
282. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 151.
283. Following agreement on a new class action settlement involving just Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Baxter International, and 3M (Dow Corning chose to declare bankruptcy instead
of taking part in the settlement, see discussion infra note 292 and accompanying text),
ninety-two percent of eligible women chose to participate. Bernstein, supra note 207, at
480. None of the O'Quinn firm plaintiffs opted in. Id.
284. The plaintiffs complained of fatigue, malaise, and muscle pain. Id.
285. Id.
286. Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders
After Breast Implantation, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1697 (1994). See also ANGELL, supra
note 201, at 100-01.
287. Id. Marcia Angell, the editor of the journal, wrote an accompanying editorial
which noted that while the study could not "conclusively rule out some association of
breast implants with the disorders studied ... any possible risk from breast implants in this
population could not be large." Bernstein, supra note 207, at 481 (quoting Marcia Angell,
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a year later, reached similar results.288 Based on these two studies, the
American College of Rheumatology and the FDA both concluded that
silicone breast implants did not significantly increase the risk of connec-
tive tissue disorders.28 9 Since that time, peer-reviewed scientific journals
have published over a dozen additional studies that have failed to find a
connection. 290 Although one study did find a twenty-four percent in-
crease in connective tissue disorders in women with breast implants, these
results were based on self-reports and not medical records, so its reliabil-
ity is questionable in light of the extensive publicity the issue received. 291
After the original class action settlement imploded under the weight of
the 440,000 claims mostly generated by lawyer-sponsored screenings,
Dow Corning made the strategic decision to walk away from the settle-
ment and instead file for bankruptcy. While the other three manufactur-
ers, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Baxter, and 3M made a business judgment to
continue and pay their share of a revised settlement, Dow determined
that it would fare better in the bankruptcy arena where it believed it
could get a quick up-or-down ruling on general causation based on the
epidemiological data that had emerged indicating there was no causal re-
lationship between autoimmune disease and silicone breast implants. 292
The bankruptcy court, however, declined to place the initial focus of the
proceeding on the valuation of pending tort claims,29 3 and rejected Dow
Corning's motion for appointment of a panel of experts under Rule 706
of the Federal Rules of Evidence to consider the issue of general causa-
tion, leaving the issue to be litigated later in the proceeding. 294
Five years of intense litigation ensued before Dow Coming was able to
obtain approval to proceed to the full-blown claims-allowance process
that it was seeking to include a trial on general causation.295 By then,
however, Dow Corning suffered a case of "cold feet" and while its motion
for summary judgment, based on the absence of causation and the exclu-
sion it sought of the claimants' experts in a Daubert proceeding, was
pending, it negotiated a plan in which it agreed to set aside $3.2 billion,
mostly to pay claims that the epidemiological evidence demonstrated had
not been caused by the implants.2 96
Do Breast Implants Cause Systemic Disease? Science in the Courtroom, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1748, 1748 (1994)).
288. Jorge Sanchez-Guerrero et al., Silicone Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-
Tissue Diseases and Symptoms, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1666 (1995). See also ANGELL,
supra note 201, at 102.
289. Bernstein, supra note 207, at 482-83.
290. Id. at 483.
291. Id. at 482. See also ANGELL, supra note 201, at 103.
292. See NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 35-36.
293. In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Dow
Corning Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 929 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995).
294. In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. at 591.
295. NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 36.
296. In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634, 641 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999). See also




In total, approximately four to five billion dollars have been paid by
the manufacturers for connective tissue and autoimmune disease claims
mostly generated by litigation screenings netting lawyers one to two bil-
lion dollars despite the fact that "there is no evidence that silicone breast
implants contribute to an increase in autoimmune (connective tissue) dis-
eases ... and [there is] no link between implants and connective disease
or rheumatic conditions. '297
VII. WELDING FUME LITIGATION
Litigation screenings have also been used to generate thousands of
claims of injury allegedly caused by exposure to gasses emitted in the
welding process. Since at least 1931, welders have sought compensation
for injuries caused by exposure to welding fumes,298 but starting in the
early 1990s, welding fume litigation has increasingly centered on claims
that exposure to manganese in welding fumes causes neurological disor-
ders. 299 Even these claims were sporadic, however, until the January
2001 publication of a study that suggested the possibility of a link be-
tween welding and Parkinson's disease 300 spurred an onslaught of litiga-
tion in state and federal courts across the country. 30 1 Shortly thereafter,
297. INFORMATION FOR WOMEN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS,
supra note 205, at 6-7.
298. See Adam M. Helleck, Welding Fumes: A Review of the History, Workplace Stan-
dards, Research, and Litigation from the 1920s to Present for Welding Fumes in General and
Manganese Dust/Fumes, 48 S. TEx. L. REV. 527, 550-56 (2006) (discussing the history of
welding litigation from 1931 to 2006). Initial claimants sought workers' compensation for
the respiratory effects of exposure to welding fumes. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Sullivan Mining
Co., 6 P.2d 856, 856-58 (Idaho 1931); see also James Antonini, Health Effects of Welding, 33
CRITICAL REVIEWS IN TOxICOLOGY 61, 71-82 (2003) (describing the adverse respiratory
effects, such as bronchitis, airway irritation, a possible increase in the incidence of lung
cancer, and changes in lung function, many full-time welders experience). In several recent
cases, welders have won large jury verdicts by claiming that the asbestos in welding rods
caused their lung disease. See, e.g., In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 806 N.Y.S.2d 531,
532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (six million dollar verdict); Yencho v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc.,
No. 2003-0884 (Pa. Comm. Pls. 2004) ($500,000 verdict).
299. See, e.g., Kallenbach v. Lincoln Elec., No. 91-C-1012-S (W.D. Wis. 1992); Siddens
v. Lincoln Elec., No. 90-2273 (C.D. Il1. 1994); Canfield v. Lincoln Elec., No. 92-C-0517
(E.D. Wis. 1995); Jones v. Lincoln Elec. (N.D. Ind. 1995). Now, the overwhelming major-
ity of welding rod cases state this claim. This Article will focus exclusively on welding rod
litigation based on alleged neurological injury.
300. Brad A. Racette et al., Welding-Related Parkinsonism: Clinical Features, Treatment,
and Pathophysiology, 56 NEUROLOGY 8, 12 (2001). See discussion infra notes 330-334 and
accompanying text.
301. Most welding fume claims were originally brought in state courts, especially in
Mississippi and West Virginia, whose generous joinder rules allowed hundreds of specious
claims to be joined with a single compelling one, see discussion infra notes 348-350 and
accompanying text, as well as in Texas, Illinois, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania, among others.
After a number of cases were filed in federal district courts or removed there by defend-
ants, those claims were consolidated into an MDL and transferred to the Northern District
of Ohio for consideration. See infra note 375. Two states, California and Ohio, have also
created coordinated proceedings to handle the welding fume cases in their jurisdictions.
The California Coordinated Welding Products Cases litigation involved approximately one
hundred cases at its peak, while as a many as one hundred remain in the Ohio proceedings.
California Defendants' Reply Supports Summary Judgment of Punitive Damages Claim, 5
MEALEY's LrnG. REP.: WELDING RODS 7 (2008).
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several groups of plaintiffs' lawyers began using litigation screenings to
generate large numbers of claimants. 302 As a consequence, within a few
years of the study, the number of cases had burgeoned from dozens to
thousands, with close to 10,000 new lawsuits against welding rod manu-
facturers and distributors filed in 2003 alone. 30 3 One of the lawyers lead-
ing the charge was Richard "Dickie" Scruggs, the lawyer who pioneered
asbestos litigation screenings and the state tobacco litigations. 30 4 Deter-
mined to create a new mass tort, Scruggs and another Mississippi tort
lawyer, Don Barrett, were the first to begin screening welders during this
period.30 5 Several groups of plaintiffs' lawyers have now generated
thousands of welding fume claims through litigation screenings. 306 Al-
though some of the screening procedures have been ostensibly designed
to avoid the worst abuses of the litigation screenings considered in this
Article, the results of the Scruggs-Barrett screenings, which I focus on in
this Article, indicate that large numbers of diagnoses are being generated
302. This Article discusses the screenings conducted by four groups of lawyers involved
in the federal multi-district welding fume litigation. Three of these groups-one from Mis-
sissippi that includes Richard Scruggs and Don Barrett, one from Texas that includes the
Provost Umphrey Law Firm, and one from Louisiana-employed Dr. Paul Nausieda and a
small group of additional neurologists to conduct their screenings. The fourth, the Law
Firm of Motley Rice, employed a slightly different screening process and used Dr. Michael
Swash to make their diagnoses. See infra note 431 for a discussion of the difference in the
screening processes.
303. According to defense attorney John Beisner, 9,510 cases were filed in 2003, more
than in any other year. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Lincoln No-Accord Stance Avoids Tobacco-
Sized Awards (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 22, 2008, available at http://www.bloom-
berg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aUj.XZ.h5H9Q&refer=us.
304. See Terry Carter, Long Live The King of Torts?, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2008, at 44, 46,
available at http://abajournal.com/magazine/longjlive the-king-of__ torts/; Boyer, supra
note 23, at 46-48. See also discussion infra note 395. Scruggs began paying for screenings
for prospective clients in asbestos cases to gain a competitive edge. Boyer, supra note 23,
at 46. Indeed, Scruggs earned his reputation as the "King of Torts" not in the courtroom,
where he reportedly lost the only case he tried to verdict, but through his prowess in
recruiting clients and then using the resulting mass of claims to force defendant corpora-
tions into massive settlements. Carter, supra, at 46. He used his attorneys' fees from as-
bestos litigation to capitalize the launch of the concerted litigation by states against the big
tobacco companies. Id.
305. As of February 2006, Barrett's firm, the Barrett Law Offices of Lexington, Missis-
sippi, had screened 33,239 welders. Transcript of February 13-15, 2006 Hearing at 383, In
re Welding Fume Products Liability Litigation, No. 1:03 CV 17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 13-15, 2003) [hereinafter Hearing Tr.]. Scruggs filed his first welding fume case
in New Orleans in 2003. Susan Beck, Trophy Fees: A Behind-the-Scenes Account of the
Controversial Awarding of $13 Billion to the Plaintiffs Tobacco Bar, THE AM. LAWYER,
Dec. 2, 2002, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1036630492127.
306. As of February 2006, lawyers involved in the MDL litigation had screened over
57,823 welders "with exposure and reported symptoms," including the 33,239 by the Bar-
rett Law Offices, 16,169 screened by a group of Texas lawyers, 4,142 screened by Ranier,
Gayle & Elliot, a Louisiana law firm, and 4,573 screened by Motley Rice, a South Caro-
lina-based law firm. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 243; Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Oppo-
sition to Defendants' Motion for Fees, Sanctions and Remedial Relief at 10, In re Welding
Fume Products Liability Litigation, No. 1:03-CV-17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Janu-
ary 17, 2006) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/17/06]. Of those screened, 2,408 had
received a diagnosis of parkinsonism related to manganese exposure, while an additional
3,552 had not completed the second stage of the two-stage screening process as of early
2006. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 244; Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/17/06, supra, at 10.
See also discussion, infra notes 434 and 439, for more detail regarding the screening results.
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that appear to be more the product of financial incentives than good faith
medical practices. 30 7
A. THE WELDING PROCESS
Welding is a process used to join two pieces of metal by melting the
edges together, often with the use of welding rods made of manganese,
iron, chromium, nickel, zinc, aluminum, copper, and other materials that
are used to strengthen the joint.308 When the pieces cool, a solid joint is
formed. During the heating process, fumes are emitted which are prima-
rily made up of materials from the welding rod, including manganese,
which is essential to create hardness in the joint.30 9 The amount of man-
ganese and other particulates present in the fumes depends on the weld-
ing process employed,310 the composition of the welding rod,311 and the
conditions present at the worksite. 312 Thus, both the content and degree
of exposure to welding fumes varies widely from workplace to workplace
and welder to welder.313
307. See discussion infra notes 459-462.
308. Welding in WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oxford Reference Online Oxford University
Press (2008)) (on file with author).
309. James M. Antonini et al., Fate of Manganese Associated with the Inhalation of
Welding Fumes: Potential Neurological Effects, 27 NEURoToxICOLOGY 304, 305 (2006)
("Manganese is an essential ingredient in the welding of steel because it increases hardness
and strength, prevents steel from cracking during manufacture, improves metallurgical
properties, and acts as a deoxidizing agent to remove iron oxide from the weld pool to
form a stable weld.").
310. The American Welding Society has identified over eighty different types of weld-
ing and allied processes, including shielded manual metal arc welding, gas metal arc weld-
ing, flux-cored arc welding, gas tungsten arc welding, submerged arc welding, and plasma
arc welding. Antonini, Health Effects, supra note 298, at 63.
311. See Antonini, Manganese, supra note 309, at 305 ("Most of the materials in the
welding fume come from the electrode, which is consumed during the welding process.").
Depending on the metals being joined and the welding process being used, the welding rod
may contain a combination of the following elements: chromium, nickel, iron, manganese,
silica, fluorides, zinc, aluminum, copper, or cadmium. See Antonini, Health Effects, supra
note 298, at 67-69. During the welding process, the metals vaporize into very small particu-
lates that become suspended in the air, creating the welding fume. Id. at 67. "The amount
of manganese in welding rods can range from 1 to 20% of the metals present depending on
the welding process used" and the joint hardness required. Antonini, Manganese, supra
note 309, at 305 ("[M]ost welders are exposed to mixed metal fumes that contain a small
percentage of manganese (<5% per total metal present). However, some welders are ex-
posed to aerosols generated from hard-facing electrodes that contain a higher percentage
of manganese (10-20%).").
312. See id. ("[Welders] work in a variety of locations, ranging from well-ventilated
outdoor and indoor settings to poorly-ventilated confined spaces (e.g., hull of a ship, build-
ing crawl space)."). See also American Welding Society, Careers in Welding, http://www.
aws.org/w/a/education/career.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (listing careers in welding in-
cluding shipbuilding; automobile manufacturing and repair; aerospace applications; under-
water welding; metal sculpting; bridge construction and repair; pipe-joining in pipelines,
power plants, and refineries; construction welding on oil platforms at sea or on skyscrapers
on land; and manufacturing of small electronic devices, medical components, and
nanotechnology).
313. "Several hundred studies have evaluated the health effects associated with welding
fume inhalation. However, these effects are oftentimes difficult to assess because of differ-
ences in worker populations, industrial settings, work area ventilation, welding processes
and materials used, and other occupational exposures besides welding fumes." Antonini,
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B. MANGANESE, WELDING, AND HEALTH
The presence of manganese in welding fumes has spurred the current
litigation against manufacturers and suppliers of welding rods, companies
that use welding in their operations, and associated trade organizations
and businesses. 314 Manganese, although an essential and common ele-
ment,315 has long been known to cause neurological consequences among
miners and smelters exposed to toxic levels of the metal.316 The resulting
condition, known as manganism, is a form of parkinsonism, the term used
for any condition that causes movement abnormalities such as those seen
in Parkinson's disease.317 Manganism is distinguishable from Parkinson's
Manganese, supra note 309, at 306-08 (noting that differences in welding process and rod
composition can impact the body's ability to transport, process, or absorb manganese in-
haled in welding fumes).
314. Defendants include current and former manufacturers and sellers of welding prod-
ucts, such as Lincoln Electric Company, Hobart Brothers, The ESAB Group Inc., BOC
Group, and Deloro Stellit Company; manufacturers of welding machines, such as Miller
Electric Manufacturing Company; trade organizations such as the American Welding Soci-
ety, the National Electrical Manufacturer's Association, and Feroalloys Association; and
premises/contractor defendants such as Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP, Proctor &
Gamble Paper Products Company, Chevron USA Inc., Union Oil Company, and C&H
Sugar Company. Ralph A. Zappala, Scientific Aspects of Welding Rod Cases at 3-4, availa-
ble at http://www.lbbslaw.com/uploadedFiles/publications/welding.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2008); Jean Hellwege, Welding Rod Litigation Heats Up; Workers Claim Toxic Fumes Cause
Illness, 40 TRIAL 14-15 (2004), available at http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi0199-573630/
Welding-rod-litigation-heats-up.html.
315. Manganese is the twelfth most common element and the fourth most commonly
used metal. C. W. Olanow, Manganese-Induced Parkinsonism and Parkinson's Disease,
1012 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 209, 209 (2004). It is abundant in the environment and is an
essential dietary component because it plays a critical antioxidant role in neurons and
other cells. Foods such as nuts, grains, tea, and legumes provide an average daily intake of
about 5 mg/kg. Joseph Jankovic, Searching for a Relationship Between Manganese and
Welding and Parkinson's Disease, 64 NEUROLOGY 2021, 2021-22 (2005).
316. See, e.g., L. Casamajor, An Unusual Form of Mineral Poisoning Affecting the Ner-
vous System: Manganese? 60, JAMA 646, 649 (1913); J. Couper, On the Effects of Black
Oxide of Manganese When Inhaled Into the Lungs. 1 BR. ANN. MED. PHARMACOL. 41-42
(1837); W. McNally, Industrial Manganese Poisoning-With a Review of the Literature, 4
INDUST. MED. 581, 596, 598 (1935).
317. Parkinsonism refers to the constellation of motor system disorders caused by the
loss of dopamine-containing brain cells and distinguished by the presence of any combina-
tion of the movement abnormalities seen in Parkinson's disease, including tremors, slowed
movements, impaired speech, and muscle stiffness. The Mayo Clinic, Parkinsonism: What
Causes It?, available at http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/parkinsonism/AN01178 (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2008).
Parkinson's disease, the most common form of parkinsonism, affects one to two percent
of the adult population. Olanow, supra note 315, at 217. It is distinguished by four pri-
mary symptoms: rest tremor (trembling in the hands, arms, legs, jaw, and face); rigidity
(stiffness of the limbs and trunk); bradykinesia (slowness of movement); and postural in-
stability (impairment of balance and coordination). See Chadwick W. Christine & Michael
J. Aminoff, Clinical Differentiation of Parkinsonian Syndromes: Prognostic and Therapeu-
tic Relevance, 117 AM. J. MED. 412, 413-14 (2004); National Institute of Neurological Dis-
orders and Strokes (NINDS), NINDS Parkinson's Disease Information Page, http://www.
ninds.nih.gov/disorders/parkinsons-disease/parkinsons-disease.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2008) [hereinafter NINDS]. While symptoms are subtle at first and appear gradually, as
they become more pronounced, they can impair a patient's ability to walk, talk, and com-
plete simple tasks. Id. Parkinson's disease, which usually affects people over the age of
fifty, is both chronic and progressive. Id. Patients may become severely disabled or expe-
rience only minor symptoms. Id. Parkinson's disease "can be difficult to diagnose accu-
2008] 1281
SMU LAW REVIEW
disease by its bilateral onset of symptoms, distinctive gait, absence of rest
tremor, lack of response to the drug levodopa, and implication of differ-
ent areas of the brain. 318
Despite the widespread use of manganese in industrial processes,
319
manganism is relatively rare.320 Researchers disagree whether there is
even a connection between the disease and manganese in welding
fumes.321 According to James Antonini, a research toxicologist at the Na-
rately." Id. To date, there is no definitive blood or laboratory test for the disease (or
parkinsonism in general), so doctors use a patient's medical history and a neurological
exam to make their diagnosis. Id. In addition, brain scans and laboratory tests can rule out
other diseases. Id. In the early stages of disease, however, it may be difficult to determine
whether a patient has Parkinson's disease or another parkinsonism disorder. Parkonson-
ism: What Causes It?, supra, at 317. The misdiagnosis rate may be as high as twenty-five
percent. Olanow, supra note 315, at 210 (citing A. J. Hughes et al., Accuracy of Clinical
Diagnosis of Idiopathic Parkinson's Disease: A Clinico-Pathologic Study of 100 Cases, 55 J.
NEUROL. NEUROSURG. PSYCHIATRY 181 (1992)). As the disease progresses, additional
signs and symptoms can help differentiate the diagnoses. Id. at 216. While there is no cure
for Parkinson's disease, medications such as levodopa can provide relief from some symp-
toms. NINDS, supra.
Manganism is a form of parkinsonism caused by exposure to manganese. It is also some-
times referred to as manganese-induced parkinsonism. It can be distinguished from Par-
kinson's disease and other parkinsonisms by its bilateral onset, symmetric impairment,
absence of rest tremor, gait, and balance problems (including a distinctive "cock walk"),
dysarthria (slow or slurred speech), and poor or non-response to levodopa. Jankovic,
supra note 315, at 2023; D.B. Calne et al., Manganism and Idiopathic Parkinsonism: Simi-
larities and Differences, 44 NEUROLOGY 1583, 1584 (1994). In addition, brain scans show
that different areas of the brain are implicated in manganism and Parkinson's disease.
Olanow, supra note 315, at 211-16 (noting that degeneration of dopamine neurons in the
substantial nigra pars compacta ("SNc") is a hallmark of Parkinson's disease while the
primary sites of damage following manganese neurotoxicity are the globus pallidus ("GP")
and the substantia nigra pars reticularis ("SNr")). As a result, PET scans and MRIs may
be able to differentiate between the two disorders. See, e.g., Yangho Kim et al., Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) in Differentiating Manganism from Idiopathic Parkinsonism,
44 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 91, 91-94 (1999) (suggesting that PET scans can differentiate
between manganism and idiopathic Parkinson's disease with incidental exposure to
manganese).
318. Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2023 (citing seventeen typical features of manganese-
induced parkinsonism); Olanow, supra note 315, at 210 (outlining the clinical features of
manganism).
319. Of the eight million tons of manganese mined annually, more than ninety percent
is used in the manufacture of steel (where it acts as a hardening agent). Olanow, supra
note 315, at 209. Manganese is also used in batteries, water purification, bactericidal, and
fungicidal agents, and MMH, an antiknock agent added to gasoline. Id.
320. Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2021. See also Olanow, supra note 315, at 210 & nn.2-
21 (noting the case reports and studies of manganese toxicity from 1837 to 1989). Histori-
cally, manganism primarily occurred in workers involved in the mining, grinding, or smelt-
ing of manganese ore or in the manufacture of dry batteries. Id. It was almost never seen
in welders. Id. There were no cases of manganese-induced parkinsonism in welders re-
ported in the scientific literature during and after World War II, despite a 2000% upsurge
in welding during the war. See, e.g., WALDEMAR C. DREESSEN ET AL., HEALTH OF ARC
WELDERS IN STEEL SHIP CONSTRUCTnON (1947). Researchers have postulated several rea-
sons for this difference in toxicity including the lower exposure levels involved, the body's
better ability to expel the small particulates present in welding fumes than the larger parti-
cles present in ore dust, and the presence of iron, which inhibits the transport of manga-
nese across the blood-brain barrier, in welding fumes. Antonini, Manganese, supra note
309, at 306-307; Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2022.
321. The debate has become more complicated as the two sides in the welding fume
litigation have become major funders of much of the research that is currently being pub-
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lished on the issue. Plaintiffs' attorneys have funded studies supporting the connection
between welding fumes and parkinsonisms. See, e.g., Leonard Post, Suits Sparked by Arc
Welding, NAT'L LAW J., Dec. 9, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1069801713142 (discussing a study of 20,000 welders by Dr. Paul Nausieda, a neurologist
who has performed a major proportion of the welding fume litigation screenings that were
funded by a group of plaintiffs' attorneys, but which has never been published); Brad A.
Racette et al., Prevalence of Parkinsonism and Relationship to Exposure in a Large Sample
of Alabama Welders, 64 NEUROLOGY 230, 234 (2005) (comparing rates of neurological dis-
ease found in welders identified through litigation screenings to a general population sam-
ple from another county). The welding rod industry has funded a number of the studies
that have found no connection between welding fumes and parkinsonisms. See, e.g., C.M.
Fored, Parkinson's Disease and Other Basal Ganglia or Movement Disorders in a Large
Nationwide Cohort of Swedish Welders, 63 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 135, 138-39(2006) (comparing the rates of hospitalization and death of a cohort of 50,000 Swedish
welders to a control group of 500,000 Swedish non-welders; funding was provided by the
International Epidemiology Institute which, in turn received funding from current and for-
mer manufacturers of welding rods); Jon P. Fryzek, A Cohort Study of Parkinson's Disease
and Other Neurodegenerative Disorders in Danish Welders, 47 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL.
MED. 466, 469 (2005) (using hospital records to compare the rate of Parkinson's disease
between welders and the general population).
Still other studies have been published by doctors and researchers with known ties and
financial connections to one side of the litigation or the other although the authors either
received support for that specific study from more neutral sources or did not reveal the
source of funding at all. See, e.g., William C. Koller, Effect of Levodopa Treatment for
Parkinsonism in Welders: A Double-Blind Study, 62 NEUROLOGY 730 (2004) (Koller helped
design one of the litigation screening processes and was one of the screening neurologists
for plaintiffs' attorneys); Olanow, supra note 315 (Olanow is an expert witness for the
defense; two consulting firms linked to him reportedly received almost $2.9 million in fees
from welding rod manufacturers).
In December of 2007, after years of legal battles over money paid to researchers by both
sides, Judge Kathleen O'Malley, who is presiding over the Welding Fume MDL, ordered
each side to submit a full accounting of payments made to scientists studying the effects of
welding fumes. Jim Morris, Toxic Smoke and Mirrors, MOTHER JONES, July/August 2008,
at 28, available at http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2008/O7/witness-
smoke-and-mirrors.html. Specifically, Judge O'Malley wanted to see a list of payments
made to the authors of scientific articles relied on by expert witnesses during their testi-
mony. While the disparity between the numbers submitted by the two sides is large-12.5
million paid out by welding fume companies versus just over $522,000 by plaintiffs-a
closer look at the reports put together by each side reveals a more complex story. Id. See
also List of Authors' Payments Submitted by Defendants, In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 1:03-CV-17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2008), available at http://
projects.publicintegrity.org/Manganese/ManganesePayOutList.pdf [hereinafter Defend-
ants' Payments]; Author Payments (Plaintiffs), In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
1:03-CV-17000 (N. Dist. Ohio Feb. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Supplemental Author
Payments (Plaintiffs), In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-CV-17000 (N. Dist.
Ohio Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author); Second Supplemental Author Payments (Plain-
tiffs), In re Welding Fume, No. 1:03-CV-17000 (N. Dist. Ohio Feb. 21, 2008) (on file with
author) [hereinafter the three separate lists of plaintiffs' authors' payments will be refer-
enced collectively as Plaintiffs' Payments].
To begin with, defendants made payments to twenty-five organizations, including many
universities, and thirty-three researchers, Morris, supra, at 28, while plaintiffs' payments
went to just two organizations and twelve researchers. See Defendants' Payments, supra;
Plaintiffs' Payments, supra. This disparity reflects, at least in part, the fact that the major-
ity of research to date has failed to find a connection between exposure to welding fumes
and parkinsonism. Indeed, over eighty percent of the payments made by plaintiffs went tojust two men: Dr. William Koller, who helped design the screening process described in this
Article and who performed some of the early screenings, and Dr. Brad Racette, author of
the 2001 article that suggested the possibility of a link between welding and Parkinson's
disease. Plaintiffs' Payments, supra. Plaintiffs provided over $230,000 to help fund Ra-
cette's 2005 study of a group of Alabama welders identified through litigation screenings
that found a higher prevalence of Parkinson's disease among welders than non-welders.
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tional Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) who studies
the effects of welding fumes, "there is a question whether manganese is
even available enough in welding fumes to cause an effect. ' 32 2 In 2006,
he noted that a "causal association between neurological effects and the
presence of manganese in welding fume has yet to be established. '323 His
colleague, Robert Park, a NIOSH epidemiologist, however, believes
there is ample evidence that welding fumes cause neurological effects.
324
Citing several Korean studies from the 1990s that showed a greater inci-
dence of tremors, speech, and gait impairment in welders than non-weld-
ers,325 he said, "I'd be amazed if there was something else going on
Id.; Racette, supra, at 230. Their accounting also did not include the more than two million
dollars that has been paid to Dr. Paul Nausieda, the neurologist that has performed the
vast majority of the screenings because his work has not been accepted for publication. See
discussion, infra notes 462, 468. Meanwhile, of the $12.5 million paid out by defendants,
approximately seven million dollars have gone to testifying experts and close to $1.5 mil-
lion for payments made to sources covered by the work product privilege, primarily non-
testifying experts. See Defendants' Payments, supra. Another four million dollars have
been used to fund research, including over $3.3 million for a prospective study by The
Parkinson's Institute that has not been completed yet. Id. at 20-21. An additional $645,000
was paid to the International Epidemiology Institute to help fund two Scandinavian studies
that did not find a link between welding and Parkinson's disease. Id. at 9.
A final note: as recently as 2005, plaintiffs' lawyers were castigating the welding rod
industry for not having funded epidemiological studies to determine whether welding
fumes cause neurological problems. Reflections on Pressler, LITIGATION WATCH: WELD-
ING FUMES, Mar. 2005, at 9-10, available at http://www.harrismartin.com/pdfs/Welding
Fumes0503Issue.pdf (plaintiff's opening statement by attorney Mikal Watts). Plaintiffs'
lawyers now contend that studies funded by the welding rod industry should be rejected
because their validity is compromised by the source of the funding. See, e.g., Scruggs Law
Firm Announces Favorable Verdict in Welding Fume Case, REUTERS, Dec. 5,2007, available
at http://www.reutcrs.comlarticle/pressRelease/idUS238289+05-Dec-2007+PRN20071205
("This jury heard for the first time that the industry even went so far as to pay for bogus
scientific studies and biased medical articles written by industry-paid hired guns to attempt
to dispute the scientifically proven link between welding fume exposure and neurological
injury.").
322. M.R. Kropko, Suit Claims Welding Fumes Caused Tremors, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Monday, June 12, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2006/06/12/AR2006061200774.html (quoting NIOSH researcher James M. Antonini).
Antonini and others believe the body's ability to either rid itself of or neutralize the man-
ganese from inhaled welding fumes limits its toxic potential, especially as compared to the
larger, more easily ingested particles found in the manganese dust from mining that is
known to cause neurological problems. Antonini, Manganese, supra note 309, at 306-307;
Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2022, 2024-25.
323. James M. Antonini, Development of an Animal Model to Study the Potential Neu-
rotoxic Effects Associated with Welding Fume Inhalation, 27 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 745, 750
(2006). In a more recent review of the scientific literature co-written with industry consul-
tants (per Morris, supra note 321), Antonini and his co-authors concluded that available
data does not support the conclusion that the manganese in welding fumes causes neuro-
logical disorders in welders but suggests areas for further research on the topic. Annette
B. Santamaria et al., State-of-the-Science Review: Does Manganese Exposure During Weld-
ing Pose a Neurological Risk?, 10 J. ToXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH, PART B 417, 458
(2007).
324. Robert M. Park, Potential Occupational Risks for Neurogenerative Diseases, 48
AM. J. INDUS. MED. 63, 73 (2005) (concluding that four cited studies from the United
States, Europe, and Korea support the connection between welding and parkinsonism).
325. K.S. Kim et al., Factors Associated With Psychoneurobehavioral Outcomes in
Workers Exposed to Manganese, 11 KOREAN J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 213 (1999)
(cited in Park, supra note 324, at 75); D-H Moon et al., Manganese Exposure and Its Health
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instead of manganese. '326 NIOSH's own website links manganese expo-
sure from welding fumes to "changes in mood and short-term memory,
altered reaction time, and reduced hand-eye coordination," but reaches
no conclusion on the clinical significance of these findings.327 The vast
majority of scientific studies, however, including six recent large scale epi-
demiological studies among others, 328 have failed to find a link between
welding or exposure to welding fumes and neurological disorders such as
manganism, Parkinson's disease, or other similar movement disorders.329
Hazards of Welders, 11 KOREAN J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 476 (1999) (cited in Park,
supra note 324, at 76).
326. Morris, supra note 321, at 82.
327. NIOSH, Welding and Manganese: Potential Neurologic Effects, June 24, 2008, http:/
/www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/welding/#NeurologicalandNeurobehavioral. The agency ex-
pects to release its own review of the scientific literature relating to the relationship be-
tween welding fumes and neurological disorders in early 2009. Id.
328. See, e.g., Finlay D. Dick et al., Environmental Risk Factors for Parkinson's Disease
and Parkinsonism: The Geoparkinson Study, 64 OccuP. ENVTL. MED. 666 (2007); Fored,
supra note 321, at 138 (finding no support for a relation between welding and Parkinson's
disease or any other neurodegenerative disorder in a study of almost 50,000 Swedish weld-
ers); Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2026 (finding no convincing evidence in the scientific
literature that welding is a risk factor for Parkinson's disease or other parkinsonisms); R.
Frigerio, Education and Occupations Preceding Parkinson Disease: A Population-Based
Case-Control Study, 65 NEUROLOGY 1575, 1581 (2005) (finding an inverse association be-
tween being a metal worker (a group that includes welders) and a risk of developing Par-
kinson's disease in a study of all Parkinson's disease cases among the residents of Olmstead
County, Minnesota); Fryzek, supra note 321, at 469-40 (finding no significant difference in
the rates of hospitalization for Parkinson's disease between welders and the general popu-
lation in Denmark over a twenty-five year period); Gary M. Marsh & Mary Jean Gula,
Employment as a Welder and Parkinson Disease Among Heavy Equipment Manufacturing
Workers, 48 J. Occup. & ENVTL. MED. 1031, 1044 (2006) (finding no elevated risk of devel-
oping Parkinson's disease, parkinsonism, or related disorders among welders employed by
Caterpillar as compared to employees of the company who were not exposed to welding
fumes); Jungsun Park et al., A Retrospective Cohort Study of Parkinson's Disease in Korean
Shipbuilders, 27 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 445, 448 (2006) (finding no increased risk of Parkin-
son's disease among Korean shipyard workers as compared to a control group who were
not exposed to manganese); Jungsun Park et al., Occupations and Parkinson's Disease: A
Multi-Center Case-Control Study in South Korea, 26 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 99 (2005) (finding
that "occupations with potential exposure to [manganese] such as welder, smelter, welding
rod manufacturer, []miner, [and] workers in the iron and steel industries ... showed con-
sistently negative association with [Parkinson's disease] after adjusting [for] the confound-
ers such as age, sex, smoking and education level."); Joseph K.C. Tsui et al., Occupational
Risk Factors in Parkinson's Disease, 90 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH 334 (1999) (finding that weld-
ing was not one of the occupations associated with an increased risk of Parkinson's disease
in the general population of Vancouver, British Columbia).
329. From a scientific standpoint, it is rarely possible to prove that a particular sub-
stance causes a specific disease; it is merely possible to show that it is a risk factor that is
associated with the disease. ANGELL, supra note 201, at 98. This distinction is important
because it limits not only what scientific evidence can prove, but also how it can prove it.
Specifically, when it comes to disease causation, it is not enough to show that people with
exposure to a particular substance have a specific disease; to prove an association between
the two, researchers must find a significantly greater percentage of the disease in people
with the exposure than in people without it. See id. at 99-100. Anything less can be simply
coincidence. Thus, the only scientifically accepted way to prove that a substance such as
manganese in welding fumes is a risk factor for a specific disease such as parkinsonism is an
epidemiological study that compares the rate of disease between large, demographically
matched populations of people who were exposed to the substance and people who were
not. Id. at 100.
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Nonetheless, in a 2001 article, Dr. Brad Racette, a neurology re-
searcher at Washington University, postulated just such a causal link be-
tween welding and Parkinson's disease.330 Finding an earlier age of onset
of Parkinson's disease among the fifteen welders in a study of 953 parkin-
sonian patients at a movement disorder clinic, he hypothesized that expo-
sure to manganese in welding fumes might have accelerated the onset of
the disease.331 Other researchers have criticized Racette's speculation. 332
They point out, among other flaws in the study, that the majority of the
welders examined had a family history of Parkinson's disease, a fact that
has a high correlation with early onset of the disease.333 Indeed, Racette
and his co-authors acknowledged that the results did not prove that man-
ganese is the cause and that exposure to other substances could be re-
sponsible for Parkinson's disease in welders. 334
C. THE CREATION OF A MASS TORT
Despite the so far tenuous evidence linking welding fumes to neurolog-
ical disorders, Racette's study appears to have been an impetus for
Dickie Scruggs, Don Barrett, and other plaintiffs' lawyers to attempt to
create another mass tort patterned after the asbestos screening model
that Scruggs had pioneered in the early 1980s. The requisite ingredients
for entrepreneurial lawyers to create a mass tort appear to have been in
place. First, the mass. With an estimated 385,740 active welders in the
United States,335 and hundreds of thousands of former welders and
330. Racette et al., supra note 300, at 8.
331. Id. at 11.
332. See, e.g., Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2025 (criticizing the methodology of the
study, including the lack of random selection of study participants; the lack of information
about the employment of the welders and how they came to be referred to the clinic where
the study occurred; and the possible bias created by studying a pool of specialty clinic
patients who are generally atypical of the general population); Antonini, supra note 298, at
84 (noting that Racette's findings did not prove that manganese caused the early onset of
Parkinson's disease).
333. Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2025 (noting that more than half-eight out of fif-
teen-of the welders had a family history of the disease as compared to fifteen percent of
the general population). See also Caroline M. Tanner et al., Parkinson Disease in Twins:
An Etiologic Study, 281 JAMA 341, 345 (1999) (finding 100% concordance between
monozygotic twins with early onset Parkinson's disease, suggesting a genetic component);
B.A. Rybicki et al., A Family History of Parkinson's Disease and Its Effect on Other PD
Risk Factors, 18 NEUROEPIDEMIOLOGY 270 (1999) (finding a greater correlation between
Parkinson's disease and a family history thereof in people under seventy years old than in
those over seventy).
334. Racette et al., Welding-Related Parkinsonism, supra note 300, at 12. He concluded
that "[flurther studies are necessary to clarify this important issue." Id. Racette reiterated
this point while testifying in the Elam case in Illinois in 2003: "This research doesn't prove
that welding causes Parkinson's disease, but it's suspicious that the majority of these pa-
tients had a much younger age of onset." Brian Brueggemann, Welders Seem Unworried
About Parkinson's After Jury Awards $1 Million to Ailing Man, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMO-
CRAT, Nov. 3, 2003, available at http://www.weldinginfonetwork.com/media/11 03_03_bnd.
html.
335. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Welders, Cutters, Solderers, and Brazers, Occupational
Employment Statistics: Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2007, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes514121.htm.
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others who have worked around welders, the pool of potential litigants is
well over 700,000 and could be as high as two million people. 336 Plain-
tiffs' attorneys and industry analysts have estimated that as many as
35,000-70,000 claims could be filed against welding rod manufacturers. 337
Second, general causation. The Racette study, however tenuous on this
issue, would be sufficient if the asbestos model prevailed, that is, the use
of mass filings in selected jurisdictions to compel settlements. Third, the
mass injury to sustain the mass filing. The fact that there is no evidence
of any mass injury would be overcome by use of litigation doctors moti-
vated by financial incentives who would screen potential litigants and find
sufficient numbers of the requisite neurological disorders that meet the
requirement of specific causation. These findings would be facilitated by
the fact that there are no medical tests that can definitively establish the
presence or absence of the neurological disorder being claimed. 338 This
strategy would come to be implemented by use of Dr. Paul Nausieda, a
board-certified neurologist, to be the "lead litigation doctor." Dr.
Nausieda diagnosed the vast majority of welders screened in a process
sponsored by Scruggs and Barrett and attorneys from Texas and Louisi-
ana.339 The head of a Parkinson's clinic in Wisconsin, Dr. Nausieda never
connected welding and parkinsonism until a patient told him about an ad
336. HSBC Bank estimated in 2003 that there are approximately 700,000 current and
former welders in the United States. HSBC BANK BOC GRoup: LITIGATnON A REAL
RISK, Jan. 20, 2003, at 1, 4; see also Richard W. Fields et al., How Should Your Company
Respond to Welding Rod Claims?, WELDING & GASES TODAY ONLINE, Summer 2004,
available at http://www.datakey.org/gawdajournal/3q04/claims-a.php3. This number does
not include people who have worked around welding and who thus may have been ex-
posed to fumes although they themselves did not weld. Id. One estimate puts the number
of exposed non-workers as high as 1.2 million. Post, supra note 321 (quoting plaintiffs'
attorney Allen Vaughan). Elam, the first successful welding fume plaintiff, is an example
of the latter group. See discussion infra notes 401-406.
337. In 2003, the investment bank HSBC put the potential damages as high as seventy
billion dollars in 70,000 suits. HSBC BANK, supra note 336, at 4; Fisk, supra note 303. In
addition, those who worked around welding fumes could be potential plaintiffs like Elam,
greatly expanding the pool of litigants.
338. Autopsy is generally considered the only definitive means to confirm a diagnosis of
Parkinson's disease. Mark Guttman et al., Current Concepts in the Diagnosis and Manage-
ment of Parkinson's Disease, 168 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 293, 294 (2003), available at http://
www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/168/3/293; Jankovic, supra note 315, at 2021 (noting that re-
cent genetic discoveries have begun to challenge that view). Some researchers have argued
that PET scans or MRIs may be able to distinguish between different parkinsonisms, spe-
cifically Parkinson's disease and manganism. Id. at 2023; Olanow, supra note 315, at 215-
16.
339. Of the approximately 700 cases in the MDL for which plaintiffs submitted Notices
of Diagnosis, see infra notes 379-381, as of October 2007, ninety percent had positive
screening diagnoses made by one of three doctors hired by plaintiffs' counsel: Dr. Paul
Nausieda, Dr. Juan Sanchez-Ramos, or Dr. Katherine Widnell, an associate of Dr.
Nausieda; Dr. Nausieda alone was responsible for seventy percent of those 700 positive
diagnoses. Defendants' Motion For Entry of Supplemental Case Administration Order at
3, In re: Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-CV-17000, MDL 1535, (N.D. Ohio Oct.
3, 2007) [hereinafter Defendant's Motion of 10/3/07]. Plaintiffs' court filings, which sepa-
rated out the numbers for the screenings by the attorneys who sponsored them, see supra
note 306, put the total percentage of welders screened by Dr. Nausieda (and given positive
diagnoses) even higher. Of the 3,649 welders seen by neurologists at screenings funded by
Scruggs and Barrett and lawyers in Texas and Louisiana, Dr. Nausieda diagnosed 3,093, or
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soliciting plaintiffs for litigation.340 As for the welders identified through
screenings as having related neurological disorders, the vast majority had
never seen a doctor about their disorder either prior to or even after be-
ing diagnosed with the disorder by Dr. Nausieda or another screening
doctor.3
4 1
These are the ingredients for a mass tort. To recruit the mass,
thousands of plaintiffs were screened using the tactics that proved highly
effective in asbestos litigation. These included advertisements holding
out the promise of lucrative paydays to prospective litigants342 and web-
sites designed to look like neutral medical or scientific resources, but
which are actually intended to generate litigants for screenings. 343 In ad-
dition, pre-screening questionnaires or fact sheets were provided that of-
fered a laundry list of the exact symptoms lawyers were seeking, such as,
lack of facial expression, slow or slurred speech, trembling fingers, ner-
vousness, hoarse voice, difficulty writing, difficulty swallowing or eating,
muscle stiffness, tremors or shaking, shuffling or difficulty walking, uri-
nary problems, impotence, and poor balance, among others.344 These
lists provide a blueprint for individuals who are so inclined to fabricate or
84.8%. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/17/06, supra note 306, at 7. He found 1,889 of the 3,093,
or 61.1%, positive for manganese-induced parkinsonism. Id.
340. In 1993, a patient of Dr. Nausieda sent him an advertisement for a Chicago law
firm soliciting welders with Parkinson's disease and asked, "What is this about?" Hearing
Tr., supra note 305, at 400. Unable to answer his patient's question, Dr. Nausieda con-
tacted the law firm for more information. Id. at 400-01; see also Testimony of Paul
Nausieda at 40-41, Elam v. A.O. Smith, No. 01-L-1213 (Cir. Ct., Madison County, I11. June
12, 2003) [hereinafter Nausieda Testimony 6/12/03]. Until that moment, Dr. Nausieda had
not associated welding and Parkinson's disease. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 401. Inter-
estingly, Nausieda himself welded occasionally as a hobby. Nausieda Testimony 6/12/03,
supra at 41-42. The law firm that ran the ad was Vaughan Cascino Law Offices, a small
firm that specializes in toxic tort and accident cases. Robert McCoy and others in the firm
were among the first to file welding fume claims. See Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 401.
See also Post, supra note 321; Vaughan Cascino Law Offices, Ltd. Home Page, available at
http://www.vclo.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
341. Nausieda Testimony 6/12/03, supra note 340, at 40.
342. The New York Daily News, for example, ran an ad promising that "[i]f you, or a
family member have been exposed to welding fumes you may be entitled to compensa-
tion." Dan Sheridan, Riding Out the Tidal Wave of Litigation: Industry Responds to Plain-
tiffs' Strategy, CYROGAs INT'L, August/September 2005, at 30.
343. See, e.g., Manganism, HealthDangers.org, http://www.healthdangers.com/toxic-
substances/welding-fumes/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (providing information to
"educate the general public about current health issues which may affect their lives," then
forwarding inquiries to sponsoring law firms to evaluate the merits of a site visitor's claim);
LevodopaScreening.com, http://www.levodopascreening.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2008)(providing information about non-responsiveness to the Parkinson's drug Levodopa as a
lure for potential welding fume litigants).
344. See, e.g., Texas Welding Fumes Lawyer, Williams Kherkher, available at http:/l
www.williamskherkher.com/welding-rod-lawyer.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (listing
nine symptoms); Welding Rod Fumes Linked to Manganese Poisoning, YourLawyer.com,
Parker Waichman Alonso LLP, available at http://www.yourlawyer.com/topics/overview/
welding.rod-fumes (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (listing twelve symptoms); Welding Rod
Fumes Linked to Parkinson's, Industrial-Accidents.info, available at http://www.industrial-
accidents.info/industrialaccidents/rodfumes.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (listing 14
symptoms); Welding-Related Manganism Symptoms, Vaughan Cascino Law Offices, Ltd.,
available at http://www.looplawyers.com/weld-symptoms.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2008)(listing 27 symptoms); see also Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 16.
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exaggerate their symptoms in order to manufacture a claim.345 The out-
reach effort was successful. According to fact sheets submitted by the
plaintiffs in the MDL, fifty-four percent heard about the screenings
through ads on television or in a newspaper, fifteen percent were con-
tacted directly by an attorney, sixteen percent heard about the screenings
from their union, and fifteen percent from friends. 346 As a result, plain-
tiffs' attorneys were able to quickly screen thousands of welders to create
a large pool of litigants.347
To avoid having to litigate individual cases once the necessary mass of
claims was manufactured, they would be filed mostly in Mississippi and
West Virginia which had joinder rules tailor-made for mass tort genera-
tion. In both jurisdictions, if there was one or more properly venued
plaintiffs, a nearly unlimited number of other plaintiffs from any jurisdic-
tion could be joined to that litigation, provided there was some tenuous
connection. 348 Mississippi and West Virginia effectively invited plaintiffs'
lawyers from across the country to bring their mass tort cases to their
states even though the cases had no connection to the jurisdictions. As
the dissent in Shewbrooks v. A.C. & S., Inc.,349 the Mississippi case that
opened the door to these out-of-state cases, warned:
It is not just that we have obligated our courts to decide this particu-
lar controversy in spite of the fact that no sane person could imagine
that it has any relation to our state. One such incident could be
borne, albeit with some grumbling. The greater evil is that the pre-
sent litigants are but the scouts for the plague of locusts that will
inevitably descend upon us in response to today's engraved invita-
tion. We have doomed Mississippi to become a dumping ground for
the nation's homeless tort litigation.350
The strategy that had generated billions of dollars in payments for spe-
cious claims brought in Mississippi and West Virginia required that the
one or more properly venued plaintiffs have a credible case and serious
injury. Joining numerous other plaintiffs would allow them to tar each of
the defendants with voluminous acts of alleged wrongdoing without any
examination of the medical condition of the individual plaintiffs. Even a
345. At least two litigants have been caught exaggerating their symptoms to make a
claim. See, e.g., discussion of the Morgan case, infra note 489.
346. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 16.
347. Sheridan, supra note 342, at 28-30. See also supra note 306.
348. Rule 20(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "All persons
may join in one action as plaintiff if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all of these
persons will arise in the action." Miss R. Civ. P. 20(a). Mississippi does not permit class
actions. Rule 20(a) as applied filled this gap.
349. 529 So. 2d 557 (Miss. 1988).
350. Id. at 574 (Anderson, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the plaintiffs in the
case were from Delaware; that it was not clear that they had ever even been to Mississippi
before; that none of the numerous defendant corporations had their principal place of
business in Mississippi; and that the injuries that were the basis of the suit occurred on the
other side of the country. Id. "In short, we have a controversy that has about as much to
do with Mississippi as does a feud between two nomadic tribes in the Gobi Desert." Id.
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jury determined to keep separate mental notes on each plaintiff's claim
would simply be overwhelmed and would be inclined to find that the to-
tality of alleged wrongdoing was to be credited to each of the plaintiffs
and be inculpatory of each of the defendants. Moreover, the serious
harm suffered by the properly venued plaintiff would be ascribed to all of
the others no matter how tenuous their claim of injury.
Scruggs and Barrett's intentions appear clear. Few, if any, of the tens
of thousands of cases to be generated by the screenings would be liti-
gated. Defendants, when faced with the prospect of trying cases in Mis-
sissippi and West Virginia under their aggregated procedures, would elect
to settle the claims en masse as they had done in asbestos litigation.
To jumpstart the screenings, lawyers took a page out of the silicosis
litigation play book. In the silica litigation, lawyers had paged though
their Rolodexes of asbestosis claimants and retreaded many of them as
silica claims. Indeed, sixty to seventy percent of the silica plaintiffs in the
MDL had previously filed asbestosis claims.351 Judge Jack called the pro-
cess of retreading asbestosis claims part of a "scheme" by "lawyers, doc-
tors and screening companies [who] were all willing participants," to
"manufacture... [diagnoses] for money. '352 Despite Judge Jack's charac-
terization of these retreaded asbestosis claims as essentially fraudulent,
plaintiffs' lawyers in the welding fume litigation nonetheless sought to
retread some of these same asbestosis and asbestosis/silicosis claims into
welding fume claims. Welding fume lawyers apparently culled their as-
bestos and silica files, looking for former clients who were welders, then
sent them letters outlining "information that may be important to
you. '353 As a result, according to the fact sheets filed by plaintiffs in the
welding fume MDL, twenty-eight percent of welding fume litigants had
previously filed asbestos claims, and eight percent had filed silica
claims. 354 The vast majority of those who filed silica claims had also filed
asbestos claims as well.355
The first in the wave of cases that was intended to lead to the creation
of a mass tort was the Charles Ruth case.3 5 6 Ruth had a compelling
case. 357 He was not a product of the screening process that Scruggs and
351. See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005: Hearing on "Asbestos:
Mixed Dust & Fela Issues" Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.(2005) (testimony of Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law of Yeshiva University).
352. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005). See also
supra notes 98-104.
353. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 14.
354. Id.; Timothy Aeppel, Plaintiffs in Welding-Fumes Case Win a Skirmish in Federal
Court, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at D4.
355. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 14.
356. The Vernon Stanley Morris case, involving 22 plaintiffs, was filed in Copiah
County, Mississippi a month before the Ruth case, but was not served until 2002.
357. Ruth, who had begun welding at the Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi in
1997, was diagnosed with manganese-induced parkinsonism just three years later. Morris,
supra note 321; Richard P. Schweitzer, Esq., Settlement Not the End for Welding Fume
Litigation: Legal Battle to Continue in 2006, WELDING & GASES TODAY ONLINE, Winter
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Barrett had instituted; he was clearly ill and had a diagnosis of mangan-
ism from his treating neurologist. 358 In fact, he was the subject of a case
report published in the scientific literature. 359 He was thus an ideal plain-
tiff to use to spearhead the creation of a mass tort. Ruth filed his original
complaint on August 27, 2001 in Hinds County, Mississippi, but shortly
thereafter, it was amended twice-first on November 11, 2001 then again
on November 30, 2001-to add a total of thirty-four additional plaintiffs.
Dozens of multi-plaintiff cases soon followed, both in Mississippi and
West Virginia state courts. One case filed in West Virginia involved 2,400
plaintiffs.360
The Scruggs/Barrett game plan fell victim to a political change and a
counter strategy. First, Mississippi underwent a sea change in the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial arenas. In 2002, Mississippi enacted tort re-
form legislation, effective January 1, 2003, that did away with mass
joinder "Mississippi-style" and required that "[i]n any civil action where
more than one (1) plaintiff is joined, each plaintiff shall independently
establish proper venue; it is not sufficient that venue is proper for any
other plaintiff joined in the civil action. '361 To beat the deadline, plain-
tiffs filed over fifty welding fume cases with multiple plaintiffs in Missis-
sippi state courts. The Dantzler case, for example, was filed on December
31, 2002; it had 1,199 plaintiffs and an unknown number of spouses, with
over half of the plaintiffs residing in Georgia.362 Ultimately, plaintiffs'
lawyers filed eighty-four multi-plaintiff lawsuits in Mississippi with more
2006, available at http://www.datakey.org/gawdajournal/lq06/settlement.php3. His symp-
toms, including facial "masking" and impaired motor skills, were obvious and would be
quite visible to a jury. Id. A journalist who visited the former welder in 2008 described his
condition at that time:
[H]is face looked blank, his voice was a dull monotone, and his right hand
shook ceaselessly. Since his diagnosis, Ruth's marriage had failed and he'd
lost his job, not to mention hunting, fishing, and the church softball league.
He can't drive anymore-at one point he was detained by an officer con-
vinced by Ruth's erratic driving that he'd pulled over a drunk. He's had
recurring depression and suicidal thoughts, but hasn't acted on them because
of his girls, ages 10 and 16, and his 8-year-old boy. "I can't wrestle with my
son because I'm scared I might fall on him and hurt him," Ruth laments.
"When I eat, food goes all over me."
Morris, supra note 321.
358. Ruth was diagnosed by doctors at the Baylor Medical Center in Houston, Texas.
M.R. Kropko, Worker Settles Lawsuit Over Exposure to Welding Fumes, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 5, 2005. See also Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 98. See discussion infra note
418.
359. Ahmed H. Sadek, Parkinsonism Due to Manganism in a Welder, 22 INT'L J. ToX-
COLOGY 393 (2003). See also Rosemarie M. Bowler, Parkinsonism Due to Manganism in a
Welder: Neurological and Neuropsychological Sequelae, 27 NEURoToxICOLOGY 327
(2006). Dr. William Koller, who helped design the screening process described in this Arti-
cle and who performed some of the initial litigation screenings, was a co-author of the
Bowler case report. Id. at 327.
360. Adames v. AGA Gas, Inc., No. 04-44, (N.D. W.Va. 2004). The case was trans-
ferred to the welding fumes MDL and the plaintiffs severed. See Severed Plaintiffs in West
Virginia Action Seek Remand, LITIGATION WATCH: WELDING FUMES, Mar. 2005, at 18.
361. Miss. CODE ANN. §11-11-3(2) (West Supp. 2007).
362. Complaint, Dantzler v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., No. C102-0458 (Cir. Ct., Forrest
County, Miss. Dec. 31, 2002).
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than 4,000 named plaintiffs. 363
The legislative reform still left tens of thousands of multi-plaintiff as-
bestos, silica, and welding fume tort cases pending in Mississippi. How-
ever, the Mississippi Supreme Court, sporting a new look, thanks to
election campaigns that had unseated pro-plaintiff lawyer judges,364 put.
the kibosh to these "beat-the-clock" claims in Janssen Pharmaceutica,
Inc., v. Armond,365 a pre-tort reform multi-plaintiff case. Plaintiffs, fifty-
six users of the prescription drug, Propulsid, filed suit against the manu-
facturer and forty-two physicians who allegedly prescribed the drug, al-
leging a full panoply of torts.366 Of the fifty-six plaintiffs, only one
resided in Jones County where the action was filed.367 The court found
that joinder in this case unfairly prejudiced the defendants in that the
fifty-six plaintiffs had different medical histories, alleged different injuries
at different times, ingested different amounts of Propulsid over different
periods of time, received different advice from forty-two different doc-
tors, who, in turn, gave different information about the risks associated
with the medicine via six different warning labels utilized during the time
of the lawsuit. 368 Put plainly, with this decision, the court announced that
it had begun to close the forum-shopping tort window, 369 throwing
363. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 22.
364. After Mississippi's liberal joinder rules opened the door to a flood of lawsuits,
plaintiffs' lawyers used their settlement money to help promote the election of pro-plaintiff
judges. Boyer, supra note 23, at 47. The result, as Scruggs himself candidly acknowledged
during a panel discussion in 2002, was a playing field strongly tilted against corporate
defendants:
The trial lawyers have established relationships with the judges that are
elected; they're State Court judges; they're populists. They've got large
populations of voters who are in on the deal, they're getting their piece in
many cases. And so, it's a political force in their jurisdiction, and it's almost
impossible to get a fair trial if you're a defendant in some of these places....
The cases are not won in the courtroom. They're won on the back roads long
before the case goes to trial. Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk in
there and win the case, so it doesn't matter what the evidence or the law is.
Id. (quoting comments made by Scruggs at a 2002 panel discussion hosted by Prudential
Financial). Eventually, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and corporate interests instituted
a campaign to raise money to support the election of pro-business judges and politicians
committed to tort reform. Id.
365. 866 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. 2004).
366. Id. at 1093. Plaintiffs stated claims based on strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranty, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and deceit/civil conspiracy, agent misrepre-
sentation, products liability, and medical malpractice/negligence. Id.
367. Id. at 1094 n.2.
368. Id. at 1095-96.
369. Janssen made clear that allegations of an industry-wide conspiracy by itself was not
sufficient grounds to justify joinder of cases. Id. at 1098. Subsequent cases limited the
grounds for joinder further. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Rogers, 912 So. 2d 853, 858
(Miss. 2005) (use of or exposure to the same product alone is not enough to provide a basis
for Rule 20(a) joinder); Crossfield Prods. Corp. v. Irby, 910 So. 2d 498, 501 (Miss. 2005)
(common worksite or employer alone is not enough to establish a basis for joinder under
Rule 20(a)); Miss. Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 905 So. 2d 1179, 1184-85 (Miss. 2005) (mass fraud
and misrepresentation alone not enough to establish grounds for joinder under Rule
20(a)).
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Scruggs and Barrett's strategy into disarray.370
The Mississippi Supreme Court administered the coup de grdce in Har-
old's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Mangialardi.371 In its decision, the court admon-
ished plaintiffs' lawyers for not providing specific facts about each claim
in a multi-plaintiff lawsuit. The lawyers, who represented 264 residents of
Bolivar County in their suit against 137 asbestos manufacturers, had not
indicated in the complaint which residents were exposed to which prod-
ucts manufactured by which manufacturer in which workplace at what
particular time.372 The court viewed the lawyers' practice, common in
mass tort cases, of filing dozens, if not hundreds, of cases before knowing
whether there was a viable claim or against whom the claim should be
made as "a perversion of the justice system. '373 In fact, the lawyers were
simply following the established model: screen, sue, and settle, without
even having to show any inculpatory evidence in most cases.
D. THE WELDING FUME MDL
In addition to falling victim to tort reform, the scheme launched by
Scruggs and Barrett also fell victim to a counter strategy: defendants' re-
moval of many of the state court cases to federal court. 374 Thus, for ex-
ample, the Ruth case was removed to federal court on April 24, 2002. In
June 2003, as the number of cases either brought in or removed to federal
district courts grew, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation trans-
ferred all pending cases to the courtroom of Judge Kathleen O'Malley in
the Northern District of Ohio for consolidated pretrial proceedings. 375
As discussed infra,376 plaintiffs later selected Ruth as the first case to be
tried in the MDL proceeding that was created.
To date, more than 10,000 plaintiffs have been a part of the welding
fume MDL, though in many cases their claims were eventually remanded
370. Barrett acknowledged as much when he stated that the Janssen case "thr[ew] a
monkey wrench in our trial strategy." Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 112.
371. 889 So. 2d 493 (Miss. 2004).
372. Id. at 494.
373. Id. at 495. Furthermore, the court wrote, "[a]bsent exigent circumstances, plain-
tiffs' counsel should not file a complaint until sufficient information is obtained, and plain-
tiffs' counsel believes in good faith that each plaintiff has an appropriate cause of action to
assert against a defendant in the jurisdiction where the complaint is to be filed. To do
otherwise is an abuse of the system, and is sanctionable." Id. at 494.
374. In an interview, Steve Harburg of O'Melveny & Meyers, a liaison counsel for the
MDL defendants, explained that plaintiffs prefer to bring suit in state courts, where they
think they have the best chance to win a large verdict, while defense lawyers prefer the
federal court system and the chance to litigate issues in consolidated, multi-district litiga-
tions. Sheridan, supra note 341, at 31 ("[W]e have a belief that the Federal Court system
provides a much more fair battleground in which to have these issues litigated.... With an
MDL, you don't have to be putting out fires in lots of different courts. You have one judge
who devotes themselves [sic] to the issues involved in the case and controls the discovery
process.").
375. In re Welding Rod Prods. Liab. Litig., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
376. See infra note 418.
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back to state courts. 377 By early 2006, there were 5,500 active cases filed
in the MDL, with another 8,600 potential plaintiffs who had taken advan-
tage of a tolling agreement filed with the court. 378 Since that time, a sub-
stantial number of the cases that were in the MDL have been dismissed
by plaintiffs or by the court, largely as a result of the court's case manage-
ment order requiring plaintiffs to provide a Notice of Diagnosis. 379 The
Notice required the plaintiff or a physician to certify that a licensed medi-
cal doctor had examined and diagnosed the plaintiff with a manganese-
induced neurological disorder.380 The form also asked whether "the
medical conclusion by the above-named doctor [was] made at a screen-
ing[.]" 381 Between June and November 2005, approximately twenty-five
percent of the pending claims were dismissed by the court for failure to
comply with this order.382 A substantial number of the fact sheets for
claims pending at the time failed to identify any disease suffered as a
result of exposure to welding fumes or failed to allege a diagnosis of any
neurological condition.383
In addition, the court ordered medical records discovery for one hun-
dred cases it had chosen. Plaintiffs' counsels were to review the cases
with their clients and determine whether they would proceed to trial or
dismiss them without prejudice. 384 The court would then choose fifteen
377. As of April 2006, the court had remanded the claims of approximately 4,500 indi-
viduals back to state courts. In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03 CV 17000,
MDL No. 1535, 2006 WL 1173960, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2006) (ruling on defendants'
motion for sanctions) [hereinafter April 2006 Order].
378. An agreement in the MDL allowed for the statute of limitations to be tolled at the
plaintiffs' request in order to limit cases to those that were already cognizable. See id. As
of mid-2008, the number of tolled cases had reached 11,000. Morris, supra note 321, at 83.
Including the cases remanded back to state courts, the MDL had dealt at least tangentially
with almost 19,000 plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs as of early 2006. April 2006 Order,
supra note 377, at *6.
379. On March 31, 2006, Judge O'Malley entered a Case Administration Order requir-
ing, among other things, that each plaintiff in the MDL submit a Notice of Diagnosis by
December 31, 2006. Case Administration Order at I.B, In re Welding Fumes Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:03 CV 17000 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2006); see also Defendant's Motion for
Entry of Supplemental Case Administration Order, supra note 339, at 3; Ralph A. Davies,
A Balanced Perspective: The Welding Fume Litigation, August 2007, available at www.
dmcpc.com/documents[DRIArticleDO285577.PDF.
380. Davies, supra note 381, at 9.
381. Id.; Defendant's Motion for Entry of Supplemental Case Administration Order,
supra note 339, at 3. See, e.g., Notice of Diagnosis, Steelman v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:06-
CV-17206, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2006) (answering in the affirmative) (on
file with author).
382. Report of Proceedings of the Jury Trial Held Before the Honorable Nicholas G.
Byron, Circuit Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit, State of Illinois, on Tuesday November
8, 2005, In re: Welding Fumes Prods. Liab. Litig. (Morgan v. Lincoln Elec. Co.), No. 1:03
CV 17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2005).
383. Id. at 68-69.
384. In re Welding Fumes Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03 CV 17000, MDL No. 1535, 2007
WL 80242, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Second Case Administration Order].
Plaintiffs' lawyers moved to make ten of the first seventeen cases they dismissed part of the
tolling agreement, see supra note 378, but the court ordered them to "fish or cut bait" and
make a final determination about whether they were prepared to take the cases to trial. Id.
at *4.
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of these cases for full discovery. 385 Of the first one hundred cases the
court selected, plaintiffs dismissed fifty-nine before records could be col-
lected. 386 When the court named replacements for these cases, plaintiffs
immediately dismissed nineteen of the newly-chosen claims. 387 Indeed,
as of July 2008, plaintiffs had dismissed approximately 140 of the 179
cases that the court had selected for medical records discovery.388 All
told, plaintiffs have dismissed more than 4,000 cases since January
2006.389 Including 200 cases dismissed in March of 2008, there has now
been an eighty percent reduction in cases in the federal MDL and a more
than sixty-six percent drop in pending cases overall.390 Estimates place
the number of cases still pending in state and federal courts at 2,800 as of
mid-2008. 391
As of October 2007, approximately 700 plaintiffs in the MDL who had
not dismissed their cases had submitted Notices of Diagnosis. 392 Of
these, seventy percent were diagnosed at screenings run by Dr. Nausieda,
and an additional twenty percent were diagnosed by two other doctors,
Dr. Juan Sanchez-Ramos and an associate of Dr. Nausieda, Dr. Kathe-
rine Widnell.393 Thus, the vast majority of the claims remaining in the
MDL as of October 2007 were the product of the screenings sponsored
by Scruggs, Barrett, and the lawyers from Texas and Louisiana-and
most of them were the product of screenings conducted by Dr. Nausieda.
385. Id. at *1.
386. WELDING ROD LITIG. INFO. NETWORK, WELDING FUME LITIGATION STATUS RE-
PORT: JULY 2008, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.weldinginfonetwork.com/litigation/




389. This figure was cited by the Welding Rod Litigation Network, a group of current
and former manufacturers and distributors of welding consumables. Id. at 1. See also
WELDING ROD LITIG. INFO. NETWORK, WELDING FUME LITIGATION STATUS REPORT: Au-
GUST 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.weldinginfonetwork.com/litigation/Welding
_FumeLitigationStatusReportAugust%20_2007.pdf [hereinafter AUGUST 2007 STA-
TUS REPORT]; WELDING ROD LITIG. INFO. NETWORK, WELDING FUME LITIGATION STA-
TUS REPORT: FEBRUARY 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.weldinginfonetwork.
com/litigationlWeldingFumeLitigationStatusReport02 07.pdf [hereinafter FEBRU-
ARY 2007 STATUS REPORT]. Plaintiffs dismissed more than 3,100 MDL cases in 2006, more
than half in response to the case administration order requiring a notice of diagnosis of a
relevant neurological condition by December 31, 2006. AUGUST 2007 STATUS REPORT,
supra, at 2. Another 450 cases were dismissed in Mississippi state courts in August of 2007.
Id.
390. Defendants Win Multi-Plaintiff Welding Fume Trial in Louisiana State Court: Jury
Returns Unanimous Defense Verdicts After One Hour of Deliberations, REUTERS, Mar. 7,
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS230827+07-Mar-
2008+BW20080307 [hereinafter Louisiana Verdict]; JULY 2008 STATUS REPORT, supra note
386, at 1-2.
391. Morris, supra note 321, at 83.
392. Defendant's Motion for Entry of Supplemental Case Administration Order, supra




1. Plaintiffs' Co-Lead Counsel
On September 17, 2003, Judge O'Malley appointed Scruggs and Bar-
rett, the two Mississippi lawyers that had led the charge to create a new
mass tort, as co-lead counsels.394 Both Scruggs and Barrett had previ-
ously appeared before Judge O'Malley in mass tort litigations.395
394. See Case Management Order at 4, In re Welding Rod Prods. Liab. Litig., Case No.
1:03-CV-17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2003).
395. Richard "Dickie" Scruggs is best known for his role in initiating the states' attor-
neys-general litigation against the tobacco companies which culminated in a $246 billion
dollar settlement that enriched the lawyers retained on a contingency fee basis by over
fifteen billion dollars payable over twenty-five years. Carter, supra note 304, at 44.
Scruggs' share of the fee is reported to be about one billion dollars. Id.; Beck, Trophy Fees,
supra note 305. Scruggs began his mass tort career in asbestos litigation and appears to
have been the first lawyer to use litigation screenings to generate claims on a mass basis. It
has been reported that in "the early 1980s, while others were taking only those [asbestos]
clients who had exhibited symptoms, Scruggs was the first lawyer to pay for X-rays and
asbestosis screening for potential clients." Carter, supra note 304, at 46. For discussion of
asbestos screenings, see section III, supra. To bring his clients cases to trial faster, he con-
vinced a judge to institute a two-tiered trial process that determined general liability in one
hearing for all plaintiffs, then determined individual awards in separate mini-hearings.
Boyer, supra note 23, at 46-47. The fear that a single bad verdict in the initial hearing
would expose defendants to huge financial risks encouraged the early settlement of cases.
Id. at 47.
Scruggs appeared before Judge O'Malley in another proceeding in 2002. On that occa-
sion, Scruggs and Joseph Langston, another Mississippi attorney, teamed to represent Sul-
zer AG, a Swiss Company which was the target of a class action involving defective hip and
knee replacements. Langston and Scruggs were retained by Sulzer to use their ties to
plaintiffs' lawyers to obtain a resolution of the litigation. One of the principal negotiators
on the plaintiffs' side was Don Barrett, who had previously worked with Scruggs on the
tobacco litigation, among others. See generally Affidavit of John W. (Don) Barrett at 6,
Sept. 9, 2004, available at http://www.barrettlawoffice.com/pdfs/AFFIDAVIT091304.pdf
[hereinafter Barrett Affidavit]. Scruggs, Barrett, and their negotiating partners eventually
reached a $1.045 billion settlement on behalf of the parties. Id. This new role created by
Scruggs and Langston has become known as "resolution counsel." According to Langston,
"the concept of resolution counsel is unique in that traditional plaintiff firms like ours are
hired by corporate defendants to work with the plaintiffs' bar to resolve mass tort litiga-
tion." Special Advertising Section, MID-SouTH SUPER LAW. MAG. (2006). The resolution
of the Sulzer litigation was approved by Judge O'Malley in In re: Inter-Op Hip Prosthetics
Prod. Liab. Lit., No. 1:01-CV-9000, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21696 (N.D. OH 2002), after
the initial settlement amount had been substantially increased. Scruggs is reported to have
earned twenty-five million dollars in fees for his representation of Sulzer, including a
twenty million dollar "success fee." Susan Beck, The Legend of Richard Scruggs: More
Myth Than Fact?, THE AM. LAWYER, Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1204804005480.
Scruggs has recently pled guilty to charges that he and others conspired to bribe a Mis-
sissippi state court judge who was presiding over a fee dispute between plaintiff's lawyer
John Griffin Jones and Scruggs and several other attorneys. Jones claimed that Scruggs
and the others refused to pay him his share of the $26.5 million in attorney fees awarded in
Katrina-spawned litigation brought on behalf of Mississippi home owners against State
Farm Insurance Company. Carter, supra note 304, at 48. See also Jonathan D. Glater,
Guilty Plea by Lawyer to Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at Cl; Boyer, supra note 23,
at 55-57. For a brief period, Scruggs was represented by Langston in this bribery case. See
Jimmie E. Gates, Scruggs Faces up to 5 Years in Prison, CLARION LEDGER, Mar. 15, 2008,
at 1A. Scruggs received the maximum sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine
(along with the costs of incarceration) from a federal judge who deemed Scruggs' actions
"reprehensible." Abha Bhattarai, Class-Action Lawyer Given 5 Years in a Bribery Case,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at C3.
Co-lead counsel Don Barrett, a fellow member of the "Ole Miss plaintiffs' bar," hadjoined Scruggs in many lawsuits, including the tobacco litigation, a subprime lender case,
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Scruggs, however, resigned as co-lead counsel on March 31, 2008, after
having pled guilty to bribery charges in an unrelated case. 396 Allegations
of misconduct by Scruggs have also impacted state welding fume litiga-
tion. In January 2008, Judge Bobby Delaughter recused himself from at
least ten welding fumes cases brought by Scruggs and his law firm in Mis-
sissippi state court after another attorney pled guilty to conspiring with
Scruggs to illegally influence the judge in a dispute over asbestos litiga-
tion fees.397
E. WELDING FUME LITIGATION
The welding rod industry has prevailed against twenty of the twenty-
three plaintiffs whose cases have gone to verdict and has seen thousands
of other suits dismissed in both state and federal courts, including six due
to the plaintiffs' misrepresentations. Prior to publication of Dr. Racette's
study that claimed to identify a possible link between welding fumes and
the early onset of Parkinson's disease, eight cases went to trial alleging
the post-Katrina claims against insurance companies, and the Sulzer hip replacement
MDL. See Beck, Trophy Fees, supra note 305; see also Suzanne Sataline, Dickie Scruggs
Takes on the Welding Industry, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May-June 2005, available at http://www.
legalaffairs.org/issues[May-June-2005/scene sataline-mayjun05.msp; Barrett Affidavit,
supra. Scruggs himself bragged that Barrett "made a lot of money off me in the tobacco
litigation." Sataline, supra.
In yet another case, both Scruggs and Barrett, along with their law firms, were disquali-
fied from representing the plaintiffs in another lawsuit against State Farm Insurance Com-
pany after it was discovered that Scruggs had made inappropriate payments to two
witnesses who worked for the insurer. Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Disqualify
Members of the Katrina Litigation Group and Associated Counsel at 2, McIntosh v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV1080 LTS-RHW (S.D. Mich. Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://fortunelegalpad.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/mcintosh-disqualification-order-4-4-
08.pdf. Barrett and the other plaintiffs' lawyers involved in the case were barred from any
further involvement in the case because they "were aware or should have been aware that
the payments were being made and did nothing to prevent their continued payment." Id.
at 3
396. See Letter from Richard Scruggs to Judge Kathleen M. O'Malley (Mar. 31, 2008)
(on file with author).
397. Langston, the attorney who pled guilty, had originally represented Scruggs in this
dispute over attorneys' fees. The suit alleged that the Scruggs firm had cheated another
lawyer of asbestos litigation fees due him. Boyer, supra note 23, at 50-51; Carter, supra
note 304, at 49. According to exhibits filed by federal prosecutors in the Katrina bribery
case, Joey Langston paid $900,000 to the former Hinds County, Mississippi District Attor-
ney-a close friend of Judge Bobby Delaughter who was presiding over that litigation-for
his help in getting the judge to rule favorably for Scruggs in the fee dispute litigation.
Carter, supra note 304, at 49. It is also alleged that Scruggs used his connection to former
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, Scruggs' brother-in-law, "to dangle[ ] the possibility of
a federal judgeship" in front of DeLaughter. Id. "The judge-disregarding a special
master's recommendation that Scruggs owed the plaintiffs roughly fifteen millions dol-
lars-essentially ruled for Scruggs, saying that he owed the plaintiff nothing further."
Boyer, supra note 23, at 50. Langston pled guilty to corruption charges in January 2008 for
his admitted attempt to influence the judge. Id. See also Gates, supra note 395. As of
June 2008, no charges have been filed against Scruggs or DeLaughter in this matter.
Michael Kunzelman, Miss. Judge Recused Amid Federal Probe, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
18, 2008, available at http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-binlarticle.cgi?f=/n/a12008/01/15/national
a123413S61.DTL&hw=henry&sc=245&sn=009; Judge Removes Himself From Cases Amid




that welding fumes caused the plaintiffs' manganism. 398 In each case, the
defense countered that the plaintiff suffered from idiopathic Parkinson's
disease, not manganism. 399 All eight resulted in defense verdicts.400 Fol-
lowing the publication of Dr. Racette's study postulating a link between
welding and Parkinson's disease, however, plaintiffs won their first ver-
dict in Elam v. Lincoln Electric Co.,401 a 2003 case brought in Madison
County, Illinois.402 Elam's case differed from the previous eight cases in
two significant ways. First, unlike previous plaintiffs, Elam, who had
been diagnosed in 1995 by a neurologist he consulted,40 3 cited Dr. Ra-
cette's study and argued that even if he suffered from Parkinson's disease
and not manganism, his exposure to welding fumes contributed signifi-
cantly to his disease.40 4 Second, because he had worked around welding
but rarely welded personally, he claimed that the manufacturers' warn-
ings about the dangers of welding fumes were not adequate because they
were aimed at welders and not those who worked around them.405 De-
398. D. Patterson Gloor, The Real Story Behind Welding Rod Litigation: Why Elam is
an Aberration, LITIG. WATCH: WELDING RODS, June 2004, at 5, available at http://www.
weldinginfocenter.org/litigation/harris-martin.pdf (citing Kallenbach v. Lincoln Elec. Co.,
No. 91-C-1012-S (W.D. Wis. 1992); Siddens v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 90-2273 (C.D. Ill.
1994); Canfield v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 92-C-0517 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Jones v. Lincoln Elec.
Co., No. 2:95-cv-00083 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Caldwell v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 231-1991 (Clar-
ion County Pa. 1997); Griffith v. Lincoln Elec., No. 94-L-16855 (I11. Cir. Ct. Will County,
1997); Walker v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 95-L-785 (I11. Cir. Ct. Madison County, 2000);
Scheiner v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 96089005 (Baltimore, Md. 2000)).
399. In each of the eight cases, defense counsel employed the same two-part strategy.
Id. at 3. First, the defense maintained that the plaintiffs had not developed manganism, but
rather idiopathic Parkinson's disease. Id. They effectively differentiated the two disorders
for the jury by highlighting their clinical, pharmacological, pathological, and neuroimaging
differences. Id. They then argued that because no scientific evidence existed that linked
welding fumes to Parkinson's disease (a fact conceded by plaintiffs' experts), welding could
not be shown to have caused the plaintiff's illness. Id.
400. In all eight cases, the jury verdicts in favor of the defense were unanimous. Id.
401. 841 N.E.2d 1037 (I11. App. Ct. 2005) (affirming the trial court's verdict).
402. Madison County has been renowned as a magnet for plaintiffs' lawyers. See, e.g.,
Rep. Norwood Releases Letter to Attorney General Ashcroft Concerning Civil Justice Abuse
in Madison County, Illinois, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 13, 2004 (highlighting some of the most
egregious verdicts and alleging a wide range of First Amendment and due process viola-
tions in the courts of Madison County).
403. Elam, 841 N.E.2d at 1041. Elam exhibited many of the classic symptoms of Par-
kinson's disease, including "fatigue, tremors, stiffness, and a mask-like face." Id.
404. Elam acknowledged that he might suffer from Parkinson's disease, not mangan-
ism. Gloor, supra note 398, at 4. Based on the Racette study, he argued that exposure to
welding fumes contributed significantly to his disease. Id.
405. The Elam case, like many welding fume claims, is based in large part on the indus-
try's "failure to warn" of the dangers involved in exposure to welding fumes. Elam, 841
N.E.2d at 1041. In this case, manufacturers had placed warnings on the welding rod car-
tons. Id. at 1043. The plaintiff's expert testified that this placement was not an effective
communication of the warning because "it was directed only toward welders, and not to-
ward welders' assistants or other bystanders who are within the plume of the welding fumes."
Id. (emphasis added). In other cases, the adequacy of the warning alone was enough to
support a defense verdict. See, e.g., Judgment and Verdict Form, Solis v. Lincoln Elec. Co.,
No. 1:04-CV-17363 (N.D. Ohio June 27, 2006) (jury determination that manufacturer's
warnings were adequate ended the case in the defendants favor); Verdict Form, Andre v.
A.O. Smith Corp., No. 03-11573 (La. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish, Mar. 7, 2008) (juror deter-
mination that not only were warnings adequate, but that plaintiff failed to prove an injury
caused by exposure to manganese in welding fumes) (on file with the author).
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spite doubts, the jury awarded him one million dollars, though this was
less than half of the $2,300,000 he had sought.40 6
Plaintiffs' lawyers were encouraged by this result, believing it heralded
the creation of a new mass tort, the next "asbestos," so some believed. 40 7
Indeed, Elam appears to have accelerated filings that were mostly already
in the pipeline. During the peak period of the welding fume litigation,
2003-2006, thousands of cases were pending in state courts across the
country in addition to the 5,500 cases consolidated into the MDL.408 But
despite this flood of filings, only ten post-Elam cases, involving fourteen
plaintiffs, have gone to trial since 2004.409 The first seven cases, which
involved eight plaintiffs, including the first three bellwether plaintiffs
whose cases were tried in the MDL, resulted in verdicts for the de-
406. A first trial resulted in a hung jury, but the second jury awarded Elam one million
dollars in damages. Gloor, supra note 398, at 4. Even in the second trial, however, the jury
was split. Five of the panel's members initially favored a defense verdict, but eventually
agreed to a compromise that awarded the plaintiff less than half the $2,300,000 judgment
he sought. Brian Brueggemann, Disease Makes Him a Recluse, Man Says, BELLEVILLE
NEws-DEMOCRAT, Oct. 30, 2003. After the trial, one juror admitted that she was not com-
pletely convinced of the link between welding and Parkinson's disease, finding it merely
"suspicious." Brueggemann, Welders Seem Unworried, supra note 334.
407. Some commentators speculated that "welding fumes [would] be the next asbes-
tos-producing soaring rewards for victims, bankrupting big companies and tying up the
court system with thousands of trials." Laborers' Health and Safety Fund of N. Am., Weld-
ing Fume Dangers Get Fresh Scrutiny, July 2004, available at http://www.lhsfna.org/in-
dex.cfm?objectlD=5CE2DA3D-D56F-E6FA-9C537BAFOD35BC04. Plaintiffs' lawyers
pushed the story in the press, emphasizing both the scope of the litigation ("If every welder
in the country gets tested, that is going to translate into 35,000 cases. The industry is in
serious trouble.") and the potential costs to the industry ("We have gotten involved be-
cause billions are at stake," and "I think we're talking aggregate damages way in excess of
a billion dollars."). Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 27 (quoting various plaintiffs' lawyers
from Trial Magazine, The Am. Lawyer, and Forbes, respectively). Plaintiffs' lawyers were
highly optimistic as to their prospects. One Cleveland-based plaintiff's attorney explained,
"There's a large population that's been exposed, and I think we're talking aggregate dam-
ages way in excess of a billion dollars." Mary Ellen Egan, Torch Song, FORBES, Feb. 2,
2004, at 44. Even though lawyers conceded there would probably be fewer claimants than
in the asbestos litigation, they anticipated much larger monetary awards: "With asbestosis
you have shortened breath, but a person with manganism can't talk, they shake, they can
hardly walk, their personality changes." Hellwege, supra note 314.
408. For example, an estimated 2,400 plaintiffs were involved in a putative class action
in West Virginia. Severed Plaintiffs, supra note 360, at 18. Seventy-two plaintiffs had
joined coordinated proceedings in California as of January 2006, with additional plaintiffs
added later. California Coordinated Trial Scheduled For June 2007; 10 Representatives To
Be Named, MEALEY'S Lro. REP.: WELDING RODS 10 (2006). See also supra notes 377-
379 and accompanying text for a discussion of the number of cases involved in the MDL.
409. Presler v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 23472-BHO3 (23rd Dist., Brazoria County, 2005);
Boren v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 01-L-786 (Ill. Cir. Madison Co., 2005); Solis v. Lincoln
Elec. Co., No. 1:04-CV-17363, 2006 WL 2873800 (N.D. Ohio May 10, 2006); Calloway v.
Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 2004-473-6 (Ark. Cir., 13th Dist., Div. 6, 2006); Haskell v. Lincoln
Elec. Co., No. 04-L-1152 (Ill. Cir., Madison Co., 2006); Godwin v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No.
03CV0801 (56th Dist., Galveston County, Tex. 2006); Quinn v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:06-
CV-17218 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Goforth v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:06-CV-17217 (N.D. Ohio
2006); Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:04-CV-18948, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83918 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 13, 2007); Jowers v. BOC Group, No. 08-36 (S.D. Miss. 2008); Andre v. A.O.
Smith Corp., No. 03-11573 (La. Dist., Orleans Parish, 2008); Champagne v. A.O. Smith
Corp., No. 04-873 (La. Dist., Orleans Parish 2008); Lethermon v. A.O. Smith Corp., No.
03-11573 (La. Dist., Orleans Parish 2008); Barras v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 08-85 (La. Dist.
Ct., Orleans Parish 2008).
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fense.410 Two more recent cases, like the Ruth case, involved plaintiffs
who did not attend a screening. These cases, Tamraz v. Lincoln Electric
Co. 411 and Jowers v. BOC Group,41 2 both decided in early 2008, resulted
in multi-million dollar verdicts for the plaintiffs. 413 Both are subject to
appeal. Finally, the day after the Jowers decision, a jury in a four-plaintiff
trial in Louisiana delivered a defense verdict after just one hour of delib-
eration.4 14 The four plaintiffs had been diagnosed with manganism
caused by chronic exposure to welding fumes by Dr. Nausieda in the
course of a screening even though three of the four plaintiffs had been
diagnosed previously with Parkinson's disease, not manganism, by their
treating neurologists. 41 5 During the trial, Dr. Nausieda acknowledged
that he had not published or presented to the medical community the
criteria he used for diagnosing manganism.4 16
In all three cases in which plaintiffs prevailed4 17-out of the twenty-
three that went to trial-the initial diagnosis was made by a treating doc-
tor, not by a litigation screening doctor. The pattern among cases dis-
missed or settled before trial is similar. The Ruth case, which plaintiffs
selected as the first of the MDL bellweather trials and which involved a
diagnosis made by a treating neurologist, settled on the eve of trial.418 At
410. Two of the cases, Boren and Haskell, were tried in Madison County, Illinois, the
same plaintiff-friendly venue that produced the Elam verdict. Elam v. Lincoln Elec. Co.,
841 N.E.2d 1037 (Il. App. Ct. 2005). The Texas and Arkansas courts where Presler, God-
win, and Calloway, were tried also have reputations as plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions ac-
cording to a website maintained by defense counsel. FEBRUARY 2007 STATUS REPORT,
supra note 389, at 5.
411. No. 1:04-CV-18948, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83918 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2007).
412. No. 08-36 (S.D. Miss. 2008).
413. A jury awarded Jeff Tamraz $17.5 million dollars and his wife an additional three
million dollars in a December 2007 verdict in Ohio. Damian G. Guevara, Lincoln Electric
Ordered to Pay Welder Sickened by Fumes $17.5 Million, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 6, 2007,
available at http://www.business- humanrights .org/Links /Repository/486838/link-page-
view. Tamraz was diagnosed with parkinsonism by a treating physician. See Plaintiffs' Mo-
tion in Limine Barring Evidence of Lawyer Advertising at 2, Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co.,
No. 1:04-CV-18948 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2007). A Mississippi jury awarded Robert Jowers
$2.9 million, including $1.7 million in punitive damages in March of 2008. Mississippi Jury
Awards Welder $2.9 Million For Failure To Warn Of Welding Fume; Appeal Promised, 4
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: WELDING RODS 1 (2008). Jowers was diagnosed with MIP (manga-
nese-induced parkinsonism) by two independent treating physicians and had not attended
any of the screenings. See Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Bar Testimony And/Or Exhibits
Regarding Medical Screenings Accelerometry at 2, Jowers v. Arcos Indus., No. 1:07-WF-
17010, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2008).
414. Andre v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 03-11573 (La. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish 2008); see
also Louisiana Verdict, supra note 390.
415. See Defendants Motion And Memorandum In Support of Motion to Exclude
Opinion Testimony of Paul Nausieda, M.D. at 1, Andre v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 03-11573
(La. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish Dec. 10, 2007).
416. Id. at 8.
417. Elam v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 841 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Tamraz v. Lincoln
Elec. Co., No. 1:04-CV-18948, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83918 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Jowers v.
BOC Group, No. 08-36 (S.D. Miss. 2008).
418. See generally Ruth v. A.O. Smith Corp., 416 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
This case, the first MDL case scheduled to go to trial, reportedly settled for $1.5 million on
the eve of its September 2005 trial date. Robert R. Lawrence, Hot Liability: Recent Pro-
Plaintiff Developments in Welding Fume Litigation Have Put Welding Companies and In-
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least six other cases were dismissed by either the court 419 or the plaintiffs
after significant discovery-five due to fraud or misrepresentations by the
plaintiffs. 420 Four of these cases arose out of the screening process.421 In
the other two, Dr. Nausieda consulted on the cases and confirmed the
diagnosis. 422 Plaintiffs have also dismissed the first ten cases they had
chosen to try in consolidated proceedings in the state courts of Califor-
nia.423 Still, at least four more cases are on the docket for 2008, including
the next case in the MDL and what would be the first case to go to trial in
the coordinated proceeding in California state court.
424
F. WELDING FUME LITIGATION SCREENINGS
Lawyer-sponsored screenings have generated a large majority of the
thousands of manganese exposure cases brought against welding rod
manufacturers. 42s The Scruggs-Barrett screenings, as well as the other
surers on the Alert, 106 BEST'S REV. 98, Apr. 1, 2006. At the time, defense attorneys dis-
puted that Ruth's disorder was the result of his exposure to manganese in welding fumes.
Kropko, Worker Settles, supra note 358 (quoting John Beisner of O'Melveny & Meyers
who served as the lead defense counsel in the welding fume MDL). But in late 2007,
during the Tamraz trial, they appeared to concede that Ruth did indeed suffer from man-
ganism, Morris, supra note 321, at 83, although their intent appears to have merely been to
differentiate Ruth from later cases.
419. The case, Boyd v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 04-545413 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas,
Cuyahoga County), had been scheduled to begin trial on September 17, 2007. AUGUST
2007 STATUS REPORT, supra note 389, at 3. On July 10, in granting the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, the presiding judge cited the plaintiff's sworn admission that he
had never read the warnings on the welding rod labels as dooming his failure to warn and
fraudulent concealment claims, while a lack of evidence undermined his negligent under-
taking claim. Id. Plaintiff appealed the decision, id., but no ruling has been made as of the
date of this writing.
420. See discussion infra note 476.
421. The cases involved plaintiffs Scott Landry, Joseph Boyd, Troy Smith, and Mary
Lopez. See Plaintiffs in Welding Fume Litigation Forced to Dismiss Fifth Trial-Ready Case
Due to Fraud, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 28, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
pressRelease/idUS183381+28-Mar-2008+BW20080328; AUGUST 2007 STATUS REPORT,
supra note 389, at 3.
422. Dr. Nausieda consulted in the cases of Dewey Morgan and Darwin Peabody. For
discussion of the two cases, see infra notes 489-490.
423. The plaintiffs in the tenth case asked the court to dismiss the case with prejudice
just ten days before their trial was scheduled to begin. California Test Trial Plaintiffs Dis-
miss Claims In Exchange For Avoiding Fight Over Fees, 4 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: WELDING
RODS 4 (2008). In exchange, the defense agreed not to attempt to recover the costs they
incurred preparing their defense. Id.
424. The sixth MDL case is set for November 3, 2008, with a plaintiff from Alabama.
Second Case Administration Order, supra note 384, at 1. Five cases in California are
spread throughout the year from March through November. Case Management Order No.
9 at 3, Welding Products Cases, JCCP No. 4368 (Alameda County Sup. Ct., Aug. 24, 2007).
425. For example, as of January 2006, the lead lawyers in the MDL litigation reported
screening a total of 57,823 welders. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 243. Of that number,
33,239 were screened by the Barrett Law Office alone. Id. at 383. Another 16,169 were
screened by a group of Texas lawyers led by the Provost Umphrey Law Firm; 4,142 were
screened by Ranier, Gayle & Elliot ("RGE"), a Louisiana law firm; and 4,573 were
screened by the South Carolina-based Motley Rice law firm. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/
17/06, supra note 306, at 10. Dr. Paul Nausieda was the primary neurologist for the first
three sets of screenings while Dr. Michael Swash performed the neurological screenings for
Motley Rice. Id. at 6; Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 394.
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lawyer-sponsored screenings that used Dr. Nausieda as the primary diag-
nostic neurologist, have ostensibly attempted to avoid the kinds of abuses
that characterized previous screenings documented in this Article, includ-
ing those sponsored by Scruggs in asbestos litigation42 6 and those con-
demned by Judge Jack. First, -the lawyers did not hire any screening
companies. 427  Instead, they directly hired physicians and had them
trained to examine potential litigants at-all levels of the process.428 In
addition, the lawyers paid the physicians doing the screenings by the hour
or by the day; there was no added bonus for a positive diagnosis.429 Nev-
ertheless, careful analysis of the screening process shows that it too has
been influenced by similar financial incentives and questionable scientific
underpinnings that have led to the mass production of specious claims in
the other four litigations discussed.
The welding fume litigation screenings conducted by Dr. Nausieda was
designed by a board-certified internist430 and involved a two tier pro-
cess. 431 In the first tier, medical residents evaluated the subjects using a
protocol derived from a standard neurological exam.432 They took medi-
cal and work histories of each welder and examined them for twenty pre-
selected physical manifestations of neurological disorder.433 Only twelve
to fifteen percent of those screened by first tier examiners continued on
to the second tier of the process. 434 Doctors were paid the same hourly
426. See discussion, supra note 395.
427. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *8.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. The Court referred to one of the screening designers as "a board-certified neurolo-
gist," id., however the primary designer was Dr. Joseph Cunningham, an internist. Hearing
Tr., supra note 305, at 351. Judge O'Malley's reference was to Dr. William Koller, a neurol-
ogist who made some final tweaks to the process Dr. Cunningham developed and helped
train the initial group of first-tier screeners. Id. at 352. The test that Dr. Cunningham
designed was based on a standard neurological exam but focused on just the signs-objec-
tive physical manifestations of movement disorders-and eliminated the symptoms-the
patient's own subjective report of how he feels. Id. Attorneys had no input into or ap-
proval of either the design or the results of the screenings, April 2006 Order, supra note
377, at *8, although the attorneys did request that the process produce "only bona fide
cases with symptoms obvious enough that they could be shown to a jury." Hearing Tr.,
supra note 305, at 242.
431. The Motley Rice law firm employed a similar screening process to the one de-
scribed here with one major difference: lawyers sought to limit those to be screened to
long-term welders by using pre-screenings based on work history and exposure (but not
symptomology) before sending them to the first tier screening. Id. at 394. Of the 4,573
welders the law firm initially screened, only 1,650 were referred for screenings by medical
personnel. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/17/06, supra note 306, at 10. Of the 1,650,534 who
were passed through to the second tier, 194 were given a diagnosis of manganism. Id. An
additional seventy-three were diagnosed with Parkinson's Disease unrelated to manganese
exposure. Id.
432. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *8. The doctors were residents in areas such
as ophthalmology and internal medicine, who would have a familiarity with and training in
neurological examinations. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 360.
433. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *8 ("[Tlhe protocol the doctors followed was
pre-designed by experts in conducting medical screenings in non-litigation contexts.").
434. Id. For example, of the 32,939 welders screened by the Barrett Law Office, 4,254,
or 12.9%, were passed through to the second tier. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/17/06, supra
note 306, at 10. The other law firms found similar rates: 2,418, or 15%, of the 16,169
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rate regardless of their determinations. 435
At the second level, Dr. Nausieda and a handful of other neurologists
examined each welder in person and assessed his or her symptoms in an
examination that, according to defense attorneys, lasted on average five
to nine minutes per person.436 Again, the doctors were paid a flat rate.437
Dr. Nausieda received $10,000 per day plus $2,000 in expenses, while his
associate, Dr. Widnell received $8,000 per day.438 While many welders
were sent home-often with diagnoses of neurological disorders not
linked to welding fume exposure-sixty percent of those who were se-
lected as positive in the first tier screening were diagnosed as having a
welding-related neurological injury, most commonly, manganism.439
Judge O'Malley ruled that this screening process was "robust. '440 She
specifically cited Judge Jack's ruling in the silica MDL and rejected the
argument that the same abuses were occurring here.441 Still, recognizing
the inherent risks of such a process, Judge O'Malley imposed the require-
ment that every plaintiff file a "Notice of Diagnosis" describing the diag-
nosis they have received and from whom they received it.442 With regard
to screenings, Judge O'Malley stated that, "[t]here is no question but that
a medical screening is not fully diagnostic, or that a plaintiff will need
more than the opinion professed by a screening neurologist to prevail at
welders screened by the Texas law firms continued through to the second tier, while 12.8%
(529 of 4,142) of the group screened by RGE and 11.7% (534 of 4,573) of the Motley Rice
screenees were referred for further screening. Id. Of the 57,823 total reported screened by
the MDL lawyers as of January 2006, 7,735, or 13.5%, were passed through to the second
tier. Id. See also supra note 431 for a discussion of the somewhat different screening
process employed by the Motley Rice law firm.
435. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *8. The rate was sixty-five dollars per hour.
Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 360. Doctors saw as many as twelve patients per hour
which would have averaged out to five minutes per screening. Id. at 367.
436. Id. at 444-45. Dr. Nausieda pushed back against the idea that the time he spent
with each person was inadequate: "[A]n obvious case is an obvious case. You just need to
do the remainder of the exam quickly to confirm it. Other cases took much longer periods
of time." Id. at 445. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the numbers appeared accurate
given the number of people seen and the number of hours worked on any given screening
day. Id.
437. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *8.
438. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 387.
439. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *8. As of January 2006, 3,649 of the welders
screened by the Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana law firms, see supra note 425, went on to
the second-tier neurologist. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 1/17/06, supra note 306, at 7. Of that
group, 2,222 had been diagnosed with a manganese-induced parkinsonism. Id.
440. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *7.
441. Judge O'Malley cited the fact that doctors in the silica MDL proceeding testified
that they had not seen the patients they diagnosed, were not familiar with the criteria for
diagnosing silicosis, and did not believe they were diagnosing patients. Id. at *7. Other
abuses she wrote about included the diagnosis of the same clients with both asbestosis and
silicosis, a medical impossibility, the payment of doctors for positive diagnoses only, the
finding of silicosis at a thousand times the expected rate, and the fact that at least some
lawyers were aware of and participated in these abuses. Id. Not finding such blatant
abuses here, Judge O'Malley dismissed the argument that there were meaningful similari-
ties between the two screening processes. Id.
442. Case Administration Order at 6, In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-




trial. '443 Nonetheless, Judge O'Malley issued a key ruling upholding the
validity of the Dr. Nausieda screenings, stating that "the two-tiered
screening process used by plaintiffs, culminating in a medical opinion by
Dr. Nausieda, provides a sufficient and adequate basis upon which a
plaintiff may file a claim for neurological injury caused by welding
fumes" 444 and prosecute that case.44
5
In approving the screening process, Judge O'Malley observed, in refer-
ring to the screenings conducted by Dr. Nausieda, that while "a medical
screening is not fully diagnostic, '446 "[t]he medical community has long
used screening processes to detect in large populations medical condi-
tions that do not have an objective diagnostic signature, and which rely
largely on self-reporting. '447 She went on to state that "the United States
Senate has recognized that the use of medical screenings by plaintiffs'
counsel has helped many asbestos victims learn they have a disease, when
otherwise they might not have known their own condition.
448
Judge O'Malley's statements about medical screenings indicate a lack
of recognition of the essential differences between medical screenings
and litigation screenings: litigation screenings have no intended health
benefits. Their only purpose is to generate claims for litigation. 449 As for
her contention that the U.S. Senate has recognized that asbestos screen-
ings have conferred a health benefit, that is simply a mischaracterization
of the Senate Report on S. 852, The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolu-
tion Act of 2005, with respect to litigation screenings. Indeed, the Senate
Bill sought to establish medical criteria for diagnosis of asbestos-related
443. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *9.
444. Id.
445. Case Administration Order 3/31/06, supra note 442, at 6. Judge O'Malley wrote
that "[g]enerally, the Court is satisfied so long as a plaintiff's Notice of Diagnosis docu-
ments a medical conclusion reached by a qualified neurologist using an evaluation no less
rigorous than the two-level screening process described in detail to the Court during the
hearings dated February 13-15, 2006." Id.
446. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *9.
447. Id.
448. See id. at *9 n.14.
449. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 63-64. Medical screenings
involve "the application of a test to detect a potential disease or condition in a person who
has no known signs or symptoms of that disease or condition," for the purpose of detecting
disease "early in its natural history when treatment might be more effective, less expensive,
or both." David M. Eddy, How to Think About Screening, in COMMON SCREENING TESTS
1, 1 (David M. Eddy ed., 1991). By comparison, litigation screenings are massive recruit-
ment programs of target populations who may have been exposed to a particular toxic
agent in order to secure a massive pool of potential plaintiffs. They are not intended to
detect disease for purposes of treatment. Indeed, litigation screenings have no intended
health benefits. One of the largest asbestos screening enterprises, Most Health Services,
which has screened over 400,000 potential litigants, acknowledged that it provided no
health services. Instead, "the sole purpose ... [of the] screening process [conducted by
Most] . . . is . . . collecting evidence for future asbestos litigation." Brief of Appellants at
19, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 98-1166 and 98-1165 (3d Cir. 2000), quoted in
Memorandum in Support Of Motion For Case Management Order Concerning Mass Liti-
gation Screenings at 5-10, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), Civ. Action Nos.
MDL 875, 2 MDL 875 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (describing in detail, including references to deposi-
tions and exhibits, the operation of Most Health Services, Inc., a screening company).
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diseases as a replacement for the diagnoses produced by the litigation
doctors which the bill sought to entirely supplant. 450 Judge O'Malley's
misunderstanding of the fundamental difference between a medical
screening and a litigation screening and of the import of the Senate Re-
port may have led her to minimize the effects of the financial incentives
which are the sole motivation for the screenings. Such incentives are in-
herent in the screening process that she termed "robust"-the same fi-
nancial incentives which were the basis for the other four litigation
screenings discussed in this Article.
1. The Insufficiency of the Screenings
A more in-depth analysis of the procedures employed in the screenings
by the MDL lawyers reveals their lack of medical purpose. To begin with,
the screenings are held in hotels, union halls, and convention centers, not
medical facilities.451 Furthermore, the first tier examination, which re-
jected eighty-five percent of those screened, is not as objective as
claimed; attorneys appear to have sought plaintiffs who could be ex-
pected to generate a sympathetic reaction from juries. 452 To that end, the
protocol employed by the medical residents, who generally were not
trained in neurology, focused on "signs," or visible physical manifesta-
tions of disease that could be observed by a jury, rather than "symp-
toms," a patient's subjective self-report of disease indicia, such as
headaches, insomnia, and irritability, to make determinations. 453 The
exam's designer argued that this emphasis made the results more objec-
tive because they were based on a screener's observations rather than
being based primarily on a patient's self-reported symptoms. 454 But
these "signs" could easily be faked. Indeed, in the last two years, two
cases that were close to trial were ultimately dismissed with prejudice
when videotapes showed that the plaintiffs had been faking or exaggerat-
ing their symptoms and another four were dismissed based on
fabrications in their claims.455 Moreover, early during the screenings, the
second tier screening neurologists, mainly Dr. Nausieda and to a lesser
extent, Dr. Juan Sanchez-Ramos and Dr. Katherine Widnell, were con-
450. S. 852, 109th Cong. § 225 (2005); S. REP. No. 109-97 (2005). Judge O'Malley did
cite to page 83 of the Senate Report for the proposition that the Senate Report also noted
that there can be "problems associated with mass screenings." April 2006 Order, supra
note 377, at *9 n.14.
451. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 17.
452. Id. at 242.
453. Id. at 352.
454. Id. at 356. Dr. Cunningham, the protocol's designer, testified that he chose to
focus on the physical manifestations of neurological disorders, the "signs," because the
brief nature of the screening made it difficult for the residents doing the first tier screen-
ings to determine the significance of self-reported "symptoms" that could not be seen first-
hand by the doctor. Id. In other words, it would be harder for the subjects to lie about or
fake a neurological disorder. Id. at 357. Nevertheless, five cases in the discovery phase
have already been dismissed due to plaintiffs who lied about or faked their illness. See
discussion infra note 476.
455. See discussion infra note 476.
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cerned about the low yield from the first tier screenings and instructed
the first tier medical residents to pass through more subjects.456 Dr.
Nausieda testified that he told the residents, "[j]ust have them walk, have
them move their hands, look at their face, listen to their speech, and if it
strikes you as abnormal, move them through to us. We'll take care of
them. '457 Even one physical sign of a neurological disorder was enough
to pass a subject through to the second tier.458
The problems at the second tier are even more profound. Although
there is no "bounty" for positive diagnoses as there has been in the other
litigation screenings considered, the neurologists still have a financial in-
centive to provide a substantial proportion of litigable diagnoses. Since
they have a financial interest in continuing to be hired-at the rate of
$10,000 per day plus $2,000 for expenses-they have a financial incentive
to find a compensable disease.4 59 In addition, by finding a compensable
disease, they create the opportunity to be designated a testifying expert
and obtain substantial additional fees. The effect of these financial incen-
tives is borne out by the percentages of positive diagnoses. Dr. Nausieda
diagnosed eight-five percent of the welders screened in the second tier by
Scruggs, Barrett, and the lawyers from Texas and Louisiana and found
that approximately sixty percent had manganism. 460 Drs. Sanchez-Ra-
mos and Widnell had similar diagnosis rates.461 For his efforts as both a
screening doctor and a testifying expert, Dr. Nausieda has earned more
than two million dollars in fees as of April, 2008.462
In addition, Dr. Nausieda and the handful of other neurologists in-
volved in the screenings are selected and paid by plaintiffs' attorneys.
463
Not surprisingly, the lawyers have selected doctors who contend that ex-
posure to manganese in welding fumes can lead to parkinsonism and
other neurological disorders.46 4 The large majority of doctors and re-
456. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 366.
457. Id. at 18 (quoting Nausieda deposition testimony from another case).
458. Id. at 380.
459. Id. at 62, 387, 417.
460. Dr. Nausieda saw 3,093 (84.7%) of the 3,649 welders who went to tier two screen-
ings sponsored by the Barrett-Scruggs, RGE, and Texas groups of lawyers. Plaintiffs'
Memorandum 1/17/06, supra note 306, at 7. Of the 3,093, Dr. Nausieda diagnosed 1,889 (or
61.1%) with manganese-induced parkinsonism. Id. This number represents 85% of the
2,222 total welders who received positive diagnoses in these screenings. Id.
461. Doctors other than Dr. Nausieda saw 556 of the 3,649 welders screened at the
second level. Id. They gave positive diagnoses to 333, or 59.9%, of them. Id.
462. See Report of Proceedings of the Jury Trial Held before the Honorable Nicholas
G. Byron, Circuit Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit, State of Illinois, on Tuesday, Novem-
ber 8, 2005, at 96, Winterman v. A.D. Smith Corp., No. 01-L-289-00-L-886 (I11. Cir.
Madison Co. Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Report of Proceedings of Jury Trial].
463. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 385-87. The Barrett Law Offices, which oversaw
the screening of more than 33,000 welders, hired just four neurologists. Id. at 385. Doctors
William Koller and Juan Sanchez Ramos each only saw a small number of subjects. Id.
Doctors Nausieda and Katherine Widnell, his then colleague at a regional Parkinson's dis-
ease clinic in Wisconsin, did the vast majority of the second-tier examinations for the law
firm, with Dr. Nausieda alone seeing over seventy percent of the total. Id.
464. In addition to Dr. Nausieda and his colleagues who performed the screenings for
the lead MDL lawyers, Dr. Koller, who helped design the screening protocol, wrote several
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searchers who have investigated the issue reject this view.465 Indeed, the
few neurologists who have performed the vast majority of the screenings
have also written many of the papers and produced most of the data that
have linked welding to Parkinson's disease and other disorders,466 giving
them a further, career-based incentive to find significant numbers of
welding-related parkinsonian disorders. To complete the feedback loop,
Dr. Racette has used claimants identified in screenings as the basis for a
scientific paper purporting to show a link between welding and neurologi-
cal disorders. 467 Dr. Nausieda's study of 20,000 welders in four Gulf
Coast states, which was funded by plaintiffs' lawyers, has not been ac-
cepted for publication. 468 Plaintiffs' lawyers have nonetheless used Dr.
Nausieda's study, as well as Dr. Racette's, to argue that the science sup-
ports their welding fume claims. 469
Given these incentives, it is not surprising that the screening doctors
appear to have expanded their criteria for diagnosing the disease beyond
what the science can support. Dr. Nausieda, for example, diagnosed sev-
eral former welders and others who worked around welders as having
developed manganism or welding-induced Parkinson's disease eighteen
papers about welding and parkinsonism. See, e.g., Bowler, supra note 359 (discussing
Charles Ruth, the welder who settled his MDL case before it went to trial); Koller, supra
note 321. Dr. Brad Racette, who authored the paper that first posited a link between
welding and Parkinson's disease, used claimants seen at litigation screenings in Arkansas,
as the basis for a second paper. See Racette, Prevalence of Parkinsonism, supra note 321, at
320.
465. See discussion supra notes 321-323 and accompanying text. Many of the neurolo-
gists who have concluded that there is no link between welding fumes and parkinsonism,
such as Dr. C.W. Olanow, Dr. David Garabrant, Dr. Karl Kieburtz, and Dr. Anthony
Lang, have testified on behalf of the defense in hearings and trials in state and federal
court.
466. In addition to the papers authored or co-authored, for example, by Dr. Koller, see
supra notes 321 & 359, Dr. Nausieda attempted to publish a study based on data collected
from welders involved in litigation screenings on the Gulf Coast. Transcript of Deposition
of Dr. Paul Nausieda at 45-49, In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03 CV 17000,
MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter Nausieda Deposition 10/10/07].
467. See Racette, Prevalence of Parkinsonism, supra note 321, at 320-21.
468. Post, supra note 321 (describing Dr. Nausieda's study of 20,000 welders he saw
during litigation screenings in four Southern states); Nausieda Deposition 10/10/07, supra
note 466, at 45-48 (describing the unsuccessful attempts by Dr. Nausieda and his co-author,
Dr. Juan Sanchez-Ramos, another litigation screening neurologist, to get a paper based on
the results of the screenings published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal). In 2004, Rob-
ert McCoy, who was among the first lawyers to pursue welding fume litigation, commented
on the importance of having new research by Doctors Nausieda and Racette published in
the scientific literature: "The sooner, the better. We've got the law. Now we have to get
the medicine." Hellwege, supra note 314. However, peer-reviewed scientific journals have
repeatedly rejected the papers submitted by Dr. Nausieda on the topic, Nausieda Deposi-
tion 10/10/07, supra note 466, at 45-48, while the specific research by Racette that McCoy
referenced-research intended to undermine defense experts claims that MRIs, PET
scans, and other imaging tests can distinguish manganism from Parkinson's disease-has
apparently generated only a single, inconclusive article. B.A. Racette et al., FDOPA PET
and Clinical Features in Parkinsonism Due to Manganism, 20 MOVEMENT DISORDERS 492
(2005) (describing the PET scans of a single parkinsonism patient with elevated levels of
blood manganese).
469. See, e.g., Elam v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 841 N.E.2d 1037, 1049-50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)(ruling that testimony about Dr. Nausieda's Gulf Coast study was admissible).
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to twenty-one years after their last exposure to welding fumes.470 On
several occasions, however, he admitted under oath that he was not
aware of a single peer-reviewed article in the scientific literature that sup-
ports the finding of such a long latency period. 471 Moreover, when asked
during a deposition, "[i]f I were to show you a thousand 70-year-old men
and all of them had classic Parkinson's disease with no atypical features
and all 1000 were welders, would you tell me that all 1000 had Parkin-
son's disease caused by welding?" Dr. Nausieda replied, "[M]ore likely
than not, yes."'472 Finally, despite having spent years diagnosing welders
and others with manganism, he admitted that he did not know what
movement disorders specialists and neurologists considered to be the
generally accepted criteria for diagnosing manganism. 473
A medical expert retained by the Motley Rice firm, which was compet-
ing with Scruggs and Barrett for domination of welding fume litigation,
acknowledged that the Nausieda screenings were medically deficient. 474
In an e-mail to another medical expert retained by that firm, he stated:
Some of the more aggressive attorneys, such as the ones involved in
the tobacco settlements [referring to Scruggs and Barrett] have be-
gun screening widely and loosely in order to get a large number of
clients in case there is a lump-sum settlement such as occurred with
asbestos, even though the clients may be minimally involved. 475
Furthermore, the "robust" screening process employed in the MDL
has not prevented significant abuses by potential plaintiffs themselves.
Of the first seven MDL cases chosen by plaintiffs to go to trial, three
were later voluntarily dismissed after defendants proved that the welders
involved either lied about, faked, or exaggerated their symptoms. 476 The
470. Defense lawyers highlighted three examples during their opening statements in a
hearing to determine whether to levy sanctions in two cases involving fraud and misrepre-
sentation on the part of the plaintiffs. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 67-68. In one case, a
ninety-one year old man presented with a slight tremor, some slowing of movement, and a
bad balance problem that first manifested eighteen years after he quit welding. Id. at 67-
68. Two non-welders who worked in the vicinity of welding attended screenings where
they demonstrated mild symptoms approximately twenty years after their final exposure.
Id. at 68. In one case, Dr. Nausieda diagnosed the person with manganism, in the other
Parkinson's disease caused by welding. Id.
471. Id. at 67. Dr. Nausieda shrugs off such criticism reasoning that "[I]t is up to the
literature to explain what we're seeing. It's not up to me to make my findings fit the
literature." Id. at 67 (quoting prior testimony from Dr. Nausieda).
472. Id. at 65 (quoting previous deposition testimony given by Dr. Nausieda).
473. Id. at 448 (testimony of Dr. Nausieda).
474. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 24-25.
475. Id. at 25.
476. In one case, the plaintiff was videotaped riding a tractor, gardening, carrying gro-
ceries, and walking without assistance-all activities he had claimed he was incapable of
performing. April 2006 Order, supra note 377, at *2. In two others, the plaintiffs lied about
prior drug use that could have caused their neurological symptoms. Id. at 1; Memorandum
and Order at 2, Peabody v. AIRCO, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-17678 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2006)
[hereinafter Peabody Order]. Only one of the three plaintiffs, Scott Landry, who lied
about past drug abuse, came through the screening process. Second Case Administration
Order, supra note 384, at 6. But Dr. Nausieda also examined Dewey Morgan, the plaintiff
caught exaggerating his symptoms on multiple occasions. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at
432.
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subjective, vague, self-reported nature of many of the symptoms com-
bined with the easy checklist provided on attorney websites and question-
naires are a virtual manual for plaintiffs to identify the "signs" and
"symptoms" that they need to exhibit in order to receive
compensation. 4
77
Even though the screening process, unlike other screenings discussed
in this Article, has weeded out the vast majority of potential claimants,
this has not prevented plaintiffs' attorneys from trying to overwhelm de-
fendants with large numbers of cases, thus forcing them into settlements
that would inevitably reward many, at best, marginal plaintiffs, along with
their attorneys. Indeed, lawyers have filed hundreds, if not thousands, of
welding cases with the expectation they would never come to trial, but
rather would be included in large-scale inventory settlements without
ever having to be litigated on their own merits.478
In thousands of other cases, attorneys did not even wait for the screen-
ing to generate a claim, but rather filed suit before the welders had even
been diagnosed with a neurological disorder.479 Indeed, as many as forty-
five percent of litigants in the MDL filed cases before they had even been
to a screening or completed the screening process.480 As with the other
litigation screenings in the asbestos, silica, fen-phen, and silicone breast
implant cases, the overwhelming majority of MDL plaintiffs (seventy per-
cent) diagnosed with a manganese-induced neurological disorder had not
seen a doctor about their symptoms either before or after their screening
diagnosis. 48 1 Indeed, Dr. Nausieda, who diagnosed the vast majority of
477. The listing of "symptoms" replicates the process used by the law firm of Baron &
Budd in preparing asbestos claimants to testify at deposition. The firm prepared a memo
containing a list of "symptoms" clients could choose including shortness of breath; trouble
sleeping; hiring help with household chores and repairs; cutting back on sports, activities,
and hobbies; short-temper with grandchildren; less enjoyable sex life; depression; and fear
of cancer. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 144-45 for a longer list of
"symptoms." For examples of attorney websites with lists of symptoms, see supra note 344.
478. Plaintiffs' co-lead counsel Don Barrett explained this tactic to the court in a Febru-
ary 2006 hearing in the Welding Fume MDL: "Some lawyers go get clients and sit on them
in a case, a mass tort . . . and they know they are not going to have to try their cases....
[They wait until other cases have been tried and] a trend is established ... then, bingo,
there they are, and they say, 'Pay me, too."' Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 122. Barrett
admitted he does not expect or have the time to try all 1,345 cases he has filed. Id. at 123.
"[I]t has been my experience and the experience of other lawyers ... that are involved in
mass torts that after a certain amount of time, there is a resolution of the cases either by
some class remedy or ... a grid formula .... " Id.
479. Based on the fact sheets submitted by plaintiffs in the MDL as part of the discov-
ery process, defense attorneys estimated that forty-five percent of plaintiffs had never re-
ceived a diagnosis from either a doctor or through a screening process. Id. at 30-31. The
plaintiffs' attorneys argued that many of the filings were made to meet state statutory limi-
tations on filing claims based on the date of last exposure rather than diagnosis of the
disease. Id. at 111. By filing the claims, they preserved their client's ability to sue when a
diagnosis was received. Id. However, an earlier agreement in the MDL allowed for the
statute of limitations in such cases to be tolled at the plaintiffs' request in order to limit
cases to those that were already cognizable. See discussion supra note 378. Most of the
3,100 cases dismissed in the MDL in 2006 and 2007 were dismissed for this lack of diagno-
ses. AUGUST 2007 STATUS REPORT, supra note 389, at 1-2.
480. Hearing Tr., supra note 305, at 31, 35.
481. Id. at 40.
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the welders involved in the MDL screening, included a letter for the
welder to take to his own doctor stating, inter alia, that the person had
been seen at a "union-backed" or "union-supported" screening. 482 This
peculiar "medical" communication appears to be a signal to the litigant's
family or treating physician to appropriately discount the diagnosis.
Most importantly, plaintiffs' counsels have essentially voted "no confi-
dence" in the screenings that they have sponsored. In August 2004, Judge
O'Malley established a process for selecting candidates for bellwether tri-
als with a focus on "providing opportunities for educating the Court and
the parties regarding the science and other issues that are likely to recur
in litigating individual cases."' 483 Ultimately, plaintiffs were solely re-
sponsible for choosing the second and fourth bellwether trial cases while
they had to select the plaintiff for the third trial from a list of seven to ten
representative candidates submitted by defendants.484 The intent of the
parties was to try three bellwether cases involving plaintiffs with obvious
movement disorders and a fourth with only subclinical neuropsychiatric
symptoms. 485
Given the opportunity to choose their strongest cases to establish
precedents that would shape all subsequent litigation and the damages
awarded, plaintiffs' lawyers ignored the vast majority of claimants (more
than ninety percent) diagnosed at screenings, 486 and chose plaintiffs with
diagnoses from treating doctors instead.487 For example, neither of the
plaintiffs' initial choices for the second and fourth MDL trials-Dewey
Morgan and Darwin Peabody-were originally identified at a screen-
ing.4 88 But plaintiffs ultimately had to dismiss both claims before trial
after Morgan was videotaped engaging in activities he claimed he could
482. Nausieda Deposition 10/10/07, supra note 466, at 164.
483. See Second Amended Supplemental Case Management Order at $$ IV.1-2, In re
Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03 CV 17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 9,
2003).
484. Fourth Case Management Order $1 1.1-3, In re Welding Rod Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:03 CV 17000 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2005); see also Solis v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 05-
17363, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3869, at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2006). As noted, the first
bellwether plaintiff was Charles Ruth, who settled his case before trial. See supra note 418.
485. Peabody Order, supra note 476, at 2.
486. Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 3. As of October 2007, seventy
percent of the plaintiffs who remained in the MDL and who had submitted Notices of
Diagnosis required by the court, see discussion supra notes 379-383 and accompanying text,
had been diagnosed by Dr. Nausieda and another twenty percent by Drs. Sanchez-Ramos
and Widnell. Id. It is unclear how many of the remaining ten percent had been diagnosed
in the screenings involving Dr. Swash.
487. Id. at 3-5.
488. Id. at 4. Peabody received his diagnosis from Dr. Kenneth Katz of the University
of Pittsburgh Medical Center. Id. Katz later recanted his diagnosis under oath. Transcript
of the Deposition of Dr. Kenneth D. Katz at 25, Peabody v. AIRCO, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-
17678 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2006). Although Morgan had a diagnosis from a treating doctor,
he was also examined by Dr. Nausieda who gave him a diagnosis of manganism. Hearing
Tr., supra note 305, at 535; Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 4. The first
bellwether plaintiff, Charles Ruth, whose case settled, had also been diagnosed by his own
doctors, not at a litigation screening. See supra note 358.
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no longer do,489 and it was discovered that Peabody lied about past drug
use.490 Likewise, for the fifth MDL trial, plaintiffs' counsels again steered
clear of any of the screening-diagnosed claimants in the MDL pool.49 1
They selected Robert Jowers and Jeff Tamraz, both of whom prevailed at
trial.492 Once again, however, neither of these plaintiffs was diagnosed at
a screening. 493
Even in the single instance when plaintiffs' lawyers selected a small
group of screening-diagnosed claimants for a proposed consolidated trial
in the MDL, 494 they chose welders diagnosed in the smaller screenings
conducted by Dr. Michael Swash on behalf of the Motley Rice law firm,
not litigants identified in the much larger screenings involving Dr.
Nausieda. 495 Ultimately, because the plaintiffs were bringing suit under
489. Morgan was videotaped riding a tractor, gardening, carrying groceries, and walk-
ing without assistance-all activities he had claimed he was incapable of performing. April
2006 Order, supra note 377, at *2; Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Fees, Sanctions and Remedial Relief at 1, 18-19, In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1:03 CV 17000 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.weldinginfonetwork.
com/litigation/index.html [hereinafter Defendants' Motion of 12/6/05]. In addition, Mor-
gan's doctors had previously diagnosed him with essential tremor (a hereditary condition
unrelated to manganese exposure), a disabling back injury, and depression. Id. at 12-13.
Many of the symptoms he later claimed to be the result of his exposure to welding fumes-
severe hand tremors, anxiety, depression, and sleep problems-were also attributable to
these pre-existing conditions. See, e.g., Mayo Clinic Staff, Essential Tremor, http://www.
mayoclinic.com/health/essential-tremor/DS00367 (last visited Oct. 24, 2008) (noting that
hand tremors are the most common symptom of essential tremor). Morgan filed suit on
March 23, 2004, and soon after was examined by Dr. Nausieda who diagnosed him with
manganism. Defendants' Motion of 12/6/05, supra, at 14. Before Morgan's deceptions
were exposed, Dr. Nausieda testified at deposition that Morgan's tremors were increas-
ingly debilitating and that he had great difficulty getting out of his chair. Id. at 15 (citing
testimony Dr. Nausieda gave at his October 28, 2005 deposition). The previous month,
however, two leading neurologists hired as defense experts, Drs. C. Warren Olanow and
Anthony Lang, had examined Morgan and concluded that his symptoms were psychogenic,
not based on a physical cause. Id. at 16. They noted that his tremor was variable and
diminished when he was distracted and that other symptoms worsened after he was ques-
tioned about them. Id.
490. Peabody did not report his past illicit drug use to the doctors who examined him in
preparation for his lawsuit. Defendants' Motion for Order to Reopen Discovery at 6, In re
Welding Fume Prods. Liability Litig., No. 1:05-CV-17678 (N.D. Ohio June 19, 2006) (relat-
ing to Peabody v. AIRCO, Inc.). However, medical records discovered by the defense
showed that Peabody had undergone treatment at a substance abuse clinic following "a
long history of alcohol and drug problems." Id. at 4. While there, Peabody had com-
plained of memory problems, irritability, and depression, as well as changes in sleep pat-
terns, violent behavior, social interactions, and suicidal thoughts-symptoms that are the
same as or similar to the ones he attributed to welding fume exposure-more than a year
before he had started welding. Id. at 5-6. See also FEBRUARY 2007 STATUS REPORT, supra
note 389, at 3; Industry Defendants Accuse Welding Bellwether Plaintiff Of Concealing
Health Evidence, 3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: WELDING RODs 6 (2006).
491. Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 5.
492. See supra note 413.
493. Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 5.
494. Plaintiffs' counsel originally proposed seven litigants for the consolidated trial but
eventually cut the list down to five. Memorandum and Order at 2, In re Welding Fume
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-CV-17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2006). The cases
became known as the "Duke Power Cases" because all five plaintiffs had worked for the
Duke Power Company in the Carolinas. Id.
495. Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 5.
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the laws of more than one state, Judge O'Malley chose to consolidate
only two of the cases, 496 holding the other three over until a later date.
Defendants prevailed in the consolidated proceedings,497 and the remain-
ing three plaintiffs moved to dismiss their claims in April 2008.498
Indeed, the only case to go to trial with a plaintiff originally diagnosed
at a Nausieda, Sanchez-Ramos, or Widnell screening, was the case chosen
from the list of seven candidates proposed by defendants. Because the
defendants' list was made up entirely of screening-generated cases, plain-
tiffs' counsel had no option except to choose a screening case for that
trial.499 Plaintiffs' first selection, Scott Landry, was diagnosed by Dr.
Nausieda at a litigation screening.500 However, plaintiffs declined to go
forward with his case after discovery revealed his extensive history of
drug use and a dishonorable discharge from the military.50 Plaintiffs
then chose Ernesto Solis from the candidates remaining on the defend-
ants' list.502 The jury unanimously rejected his claims.503 Of the five
other screening-generated cases submitted by the defense, the plaintiffs
have voluntarily dismissed four. As of July 2008, Solis remains the only
person initially diagnosed at a screening conducted by Dr. Nausieda, Dr.
Sanchez-Ramos or Dr. Widnell whose case has been tried in the MDL.
Plaintiffs' counsels' extreme reluctance to proceed to trial in cases
where Dr. Nausieda and a few other litigation doctors have provided di-
agnoses thus appears well founded.
The Scruggs/Barrett screenings appear to have attempted to avoid the
worst abuses of previous litigation screenings. Nonetheless, many of the
same fundamental flaws that have been identified in other litigation
screenings as perverting both science and the civil justice system appear
to be present in welding fume screenings as well.
496. Memorandum and Order at 1, In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:03-
CV-17000, MDL No. 1535 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2006) (referring to Quinn v. Lincoln Elec.
Co., No. 1:06-CV-17217 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Goforth v. Lincoln Elec. Co., No. 1:06-CV-
17218 (N.D. Ohio 2006)).
497. The jury found for the manufacturers because Duke Power was a sophisticated
user who had the duty to warn its employees of any dangers inherent in the use of welding
rods. MDL 1535 Jury Returns Verdict For Manufacturer Defendants; Sophisticated User
Defense Wins, 3 MEALEY'S LrrG. REP.: WELDING RODS 1 (2006). The jury did find that
the defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of Goforth's "injury," but not Quinn's.
Id.
498. See Remaining Duke Power Plaintiffs Seek Dismissal Of Claims Against Welding
Manufacturer Defendants, 5 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: WELDING RODS 2 (2008).
499. Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 4.
500. Defendants' Motion of 12/6/05, supra note 489, at 20. See also April 2006 Order,
supra note 377, at *5 (noting that the only diagnosis of Landry on the record is Dr.
Nausieda's diagnosis of manganese-induced parkinsonism).
501. Defendants' Motion of 10/3/07, supra note 339, at 4.
502. Id. at 4-5.
503. Id.
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VIII. THE FAILURES OF THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS TO DETER OR SANCTION
LITIGATION SCREENING FRAUD
Approximately 1,500,000 potential litigants have participated in litiga-
tion screenings undertaken in the five mass tort litigations considered in
this Article. A comparative handful of litigation doctors used in each of
these five litigations found that a total of approximately 1,000,000 of
those screened had the requisite condition conferring a right of compen-
sation, whether asbestosis, silicosis, an autoimmune disease, moderate
mitral or aortic valve regurgitation, or a neurological disorder. On the
basis of the evidence I have examined, I estimate that approximately
900,000 of these claims were based on diagnoses that were "manufactured
for money." I further estimate that the settlement value of these "manu-
factured for money" claims is in the range of thirty-five to forty billion
dollars and that the resulting contingency fees are in the range of thirteen
to fourteen billion dollars. Finally, I estimate that the litigation doctors
who produced the medical reports for the screened litigants and the
screening companies that they worked for have been paid well in excess
of $250 million.
Despite the considerable evidence reviewed in this Article that much
of the medical evidence produced in the course of litigation screenings is
at least specious, if not simply manufactured for money, both the civil and
criminal justice systems have not only largely failed to deter this conduct
but have, in fact, facilitated it.
Judge Jack's one-of-a-kind decision aside,50 4 there is no effective mech-
anism in the civil justice system for reliably detecting and deterring the
kind of specious claim generation that is endemic in most litigation
screenings. An even more compelling indictment of the civil justice sys-
tem are the significant impediments posed by the system to even exposing
the specious claim generation methods used in litigation screenings. 50 5
Furthermore, bankruptcy courts adjudicating asbestos-related bankrupt-
cies have effectively legitimized the use of litigation screenings to gener-
ate huge numbers of specious, if not fraudulent, claims. They have done
so by adopting procedures for estimating current and future
nonmalignant claim liability advanced by professional experts retained by
the tort claimants which ignore the issue of liability in the quest to maxi-
mize the liability of the debtor and its insurers. In addition, the criminal
justice system has failed to sanction either the screening companies or the
doctors who manufacture diagnoses for money on a mass scale, let alone
504. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at n.4 for commentary on Judge Jack's
unprecedented use of a Daubert hearing to find that the litigation doctors' diagnoses to
prove specific causation were unreliable.
505. Cf. John L. Watts, 7b Tell The Truth: A Qui Tam Action for Perjury in a Civil
Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Justice System, 79 TEMP. L. REV.
773, 778 (2006) (discussing what the author calls an epidemic of perjury in high stakes civil
litigation and the "shortcomings of the judicial system's traditional tools employed to com-
bat perjury" including the lawyer disciplinary process and criminal prosecution).
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the lawyers who hire them for precisely this reason. Finally, lawyer disci-
plinary systems also appear disinterested in prosecuting ethical violations
endemic to litigation screenings, let alone litigation screening fraud.
506
506. A reference by U.S. District Court Judge Harvey Bartle III to New York discipli-
nary authorities of his findings that a law firm in the fen-phen litigation had a "highly
questionable practice" that created a financial incentive for one of the cardiologists it hired
who read thousands of echocardiograms to find compensable injury, see supra notes 170-
174 and accompanying text, resulted in a finding "that there was no breach of the [New
York] Code of Professional Responsibility" and the dismissal of the complaint. See Trust
Amends Suit Against New York Doctor, Adding RICO Claims, 7 MEALEY'S LrnG. REP.:
FEN-PHEN/REDUX 9 (2004).
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld a trial court's refusal to sanction the law firm of
Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis and Dove, P.C. ("CCHDD") for bringing over 4,200
lawsuits against 131 unrelated defendants for alleged injuries caused by exposure to silica.
See Choctaw, Inc. v. Campbell-Cherry-Harrison-Davis and Dove, 965 So. 2d 1041 (Miss.
2007). These lawsuits brought in Mississippi state court were removed to U.S. District
Court and became part of MDL 1553. Id. at 1043. It was these and other suits in the MDL
that Judge Jack proclaimed were generated by a scheme hatched by doctors, lawyers, and
screening companies to manufacture diagnoses for money. After Judge Jack determined
that she lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the cases were remanded to Mississippi state
court, the defendants moved for sanctions alleging that CCHDD had filed frivolous suits
because the firm did not have valid diagnoses to sustain their claims of silica-related dis-
ease. Id. After reviewing the standard for a finding a matter "frivolous," the Mississippi
Supreme Court found that the cases were not frivolous because the plaintiffs had some
hope of success when the claims were filed. Id. at 1044.
Looking at the screening process that CCHDD used to generate silica litigants and not-
ing that the firm had no direct contact with Dr. Ray Harron (who diagnosed ninety-nine
percent of those whose files he reviewed as having asbestosis and whose testimony raised
"red flags of fraud" for Judge Jack) because the N&M screening company, which hired Dr.
Harron, was a barrier between the firm and Dr. Harron, the court sustained the lower
court's conclusion that the lawsuits were not brought without substantial justification and
therefore, were not "frivolous." Id. at 1046-47. The court also sustained the ruling denying
defendants additional discovery that they sought to buttress their allegations. Id. at 1049-
50.
The Mississippi Supreme Court's determination that the cases were not frivolous since
the plaintiffs had some hope of success when the claims were filed is empirically supporta-
ble. The more than 4,200 silica claims in the MDL brought by CCHDD, though specious
and very likely fraudulent, may well have been successful but for the highly improbable
intervention of U.S. District Court Judge Janis Jack. See Brickman, Silica/Asbestos Litiga-
tion, supra note 40, at 311-12; Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 516-17 n.4 (discuss-
ing the improbability of Judge Jack's decision).
Specious, if not fraudulent, asbestos claims have proved immensely profitable. Hun-
dreds of thousands of such claims have generated billions of dollars in settlements. In the
silica MDL, one of the plaintiff's lawyers made a demand for a one billion dollar settle-
ment, pointing out that this represented a substantial discount from the actual settlement
value of the cases in the tort system. See Letter from Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle to defense
counsel (Apr. 16, 2004) (on file with the author). Thus, there was more than a mere hope
of success that the specious and likely fraudulent claims would be successful. And as the
court essentially declared, how ever likely the cases are to be specious, if not fraudulent,
the likelihood of success meant that they were not frivolous by Mississippi standards.
A second sanctions motion also met the same fate from this court. Though U.S. District
Court Judge Janis Jack sanctioned the law firm of O'Quinn, Laminack & Pirtle for filing an
original jurisdiction case in the silica MDL that Judge Jack concluded was groundless, the
Mississippi Supreme Court agreed that Judge Jack's finding was not binding on the state
court and refused to sanction the firm for this conduct. Clark Sales & Rental, Inc. v.
Braxton, No. 2006-CA-01577-SCT (2008); Miss. High Court Again Backs Decision Not to
Sanction Silica Counsel (Miss. Mar. 27, 2008). See HARRISMARTIN-SILICA, Apr. 3, 2008.
These holdings by the Mississippi Supreme Court are consistent with previous decisions
of that court essentially excluding asbestos litigation from the purview of the court's ethical
rules regulating lawyers. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 21, at 72 n.109.
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As a consequence, these actors are essentially immune from prosecution
for fraud under the civil and criminal justice systems. 50 7 These systemic
failures of both the civil and criminal justice systems require a variety of
corrective mechanisms.
A. THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE:
A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
1. The "Expert" Status of Testifying Doctors
Since doctors are licensed professionals, when testifying on specific
causation and rendering diagnoses in their specialty, they are, by defini-
tion, medical experts, and therefore, qualified to wear the mantle of "ex-
pert" when they testify.50 8 In theory, a doctor's expert status may be
challenged on the grounds of lack of reliability by a motion in limine in a
Daubert50 9 proceeding. In mass tort litigations, however, even though a
comparative handful of litigation doctors510 account for hundreds or
thousands of medical reports generated during the course of litigation
screenings, defendants lack an effective means of challenging those doc-
tors' reliability. This is because courts do not allow discovery of the data
that would enable the most effective challenges to be made. One such set
of data that likely would be discovered-if discovery were allowed-is
data demonstrating that a litigation doctor who had provided medical re-
ports for hundreds or thousands of screened litigants frequently failed to
comply with established medical protocols for diagnosing the condition in
question. Examples of such protocols include performing a thorough
physical examination, taking a detailed occupational and exposure history
(rather than relying on a history taken by a nonmedically trained person
who is directly or indirectly employed by the lawyer sponsoring the
screening), and undertaking a differential diagnosis to eliminate other
possible causes of the diagnosed disease.511 Another potentially effective
basis for challenge would be to show that the percentage of all of those
that the litigation doctor diagnosed with the signature disease is far
507. See generally Lester Brickman, DOJ's Free Pass For Tort Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec.
26, 2007, at All.
508. A degree and license in medicine clearly meets the standard of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which requires an expert to be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education." FED. R. EVID. 702. The standard is liberally applied. See In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 753-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding abuse of discretion
for precluding a trained internist, now primarily occupied as a litigation consultant who is
well versed in medical literature, despite her lack of board certification in internal
medicine or toxicology). See generally 4 WEINSTEIN's FED. EVID. § 702.04 (2007).
509. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 515-16 n.3.
510. See supra note 15.
511. For an example of such a challenge which sought to exclude the expert testimony
of Dr. Jay T. Segarra, one of the most prolific of the asbestos litigation doctors, on the
grounds that Dr. Segarra's medical reports and diagnoses do not follow standard diagnostic
protocols for diagnosing occupational diseases, see Certain Defendants Combined Motion
and Brief To Exclude Expert Testimony by Dr. Jay T. Segarra and to Dismiss the Claims of
Plaintiffs Relying on Same, In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL No. 875 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 7, 2007).
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higher than what clinical studies or other medical literature would indi-
cate. Further, according to other evidence introduced (such as a review
by neutral medical experts of a randomized sample of those diagnoses),
the doctor's diagnoses have a very high error rate. To raise a challenge
based on these arguments, defendants need to have access to the records
of the hundreds or thousands of other similar claimants diagnosed by that
litigation doctor who are not litigants in that case. This access is precisely
what defendants are denied. To be sure, during the trial, defendants can
put on their own medical experts to testify that the litigant does not have
the disease alleged or that exposure to the defendant's product was not a
substantial factor in causing the disease-a traditional "battle of the ex-
perts." But the effectiveness of this "retail" case-by-case response pales
in comparison to the effect of the "wholesale" production of thousands of
medical reports by a handful of doctors to support claims generated by
litigation screenings. The strategy of massing large numbers of claims
generated by screenings has been effective in compelling defendants to
enter into large-scale settlements of specious, if not fraudulent, claims.
512
This strategy has been successful at least in part because tort lawyers
have succeeded in effectively precluding a Daubert challenge to litigation
doctors' testimony by limiting discovery to only the cases before the
court. This is why the practice of using a comparative handful of doctors
to generate literally thousands and tens of thousands of medical reports
has become standard in certain mass tort litigations such as those dis-
cussed in this Article.
2. Litigation Doctors' Immunity from Challenge to their Expert Status
Litigation doctors who are properly credentialed are usually effectively
immune from challenge to their status as a testifying expert 513 on specific
causation. In asbestos litigation, this is so because the scope of discovery
in a deposition is usually limited to the medical report in the single case
before the court; if a number of cases have been joined, then discovery
and cross examination are limited to those cases in which the doctor has
provided medical reports which are the basis for their diagnoses. Thus,
litigation doctors are not subject to challenge as to their reliability even if
there is a considerable body of evidence that could be discovered-if dis-
covery were allowed-indicating that these doctors manufactured
thousands of similar diagnoses for money rather than engaging in good
512. As noted by Judge Jack in the silica MDL proceeding, the use of litigation screen-
ings as an "entrepreneurial" means of claim generation is a strategy that seeks "to inflate
the number of Plaintiffs and claims in order to overwhelm the Defendants and the judicial
system. This is apparently done in hopes of extracting mass nuisance-value settlements
because [they] are financially incapable of examining the merits of each individual claim in
the usual manner." In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676 (S.D. Tex.
2005).
513. A testifying expert is "[a]n expert who is identified by a party as a potential wit-
ness at trial" whereas a non-testifying or consulting expert is one "who, though retained by
a party, is not expected to be called as a witness at trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 619
(8th ed. 2004).
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faith medical practice. In particular, the inability to discover these
records effectively prevents defendants from determining the doctors' to-
tal number of positive and negative medical reports,514 which in turn pre-
vents calculation of each doctor's percentages of positive diagnoses. This
percentage is a critical factor if the reliability of a litigation doctor's diag-
noses is to be placed at issue. While litigation doctors largely refuse to
answer questions with respect to their percentages of positive diagno-
ses-claiming that they simply do not know the percentages, on the few
occasions when they have responded to such questions in depositions,
they have mostly maintained that their positive X-ray readings are in the
ten to thirty percent range.515 However, in fact, their actual percentages
of positive X-ray readings are far higher-at least in the fifty to ninety
percent range.516 In addition, litigation doctors diagnose eighty to ninety
percent or more of those with a positive X-ray reading as having asbesto-
sis.517 These high percentages of positive findings exceed the results of
clinical studies of occupationally-exposed workers by a margin of more
than ten to one 518 and are thus strong evidence that the X-ray readings
and diagnoses are "manufactured for money." Even plaintiffs' lawyers
acknowledge that the validity of a litigation doctor's findings may be de-
pendent on the number of negative reports issued by that doctor. 51 9 The
refusal of litigation doctors, as well as the lawyers who hire them, to pro-
vide the information that would allow calculation of their percentage of
positive X-ray readings or diagnoses,520 is intended to and does serve to
514. By positive medical report, I mean in the context of asbestos litigation that the
litigation doctor has either read an X-ray as indicating fibrosis using the ILO scale, see
supra note 49, or has made a diagnosis of asbestosis or both. By negative medical report, I
mean that the X-ray was either not read as indicating fibrosis or the litigant was not diag-
nosed with a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. See Brickman, Silica/Asbestos Litiga-
tion, supra note 40, at 302, for a discussion of the "smoking gun" significance of being able
to determine the percentage of those screened that the litigation doctor found positive for
disease.
515. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 529.
516. Id. at 529-30.
517. Id. at 529, 531.
518. Id. at 589.
519. See Letter from Weitz & Luxenberg to Hon. Helen E. Freedman, New York Su-
preme Court, re FIFO Trial Plan, at 4 (Sept. 25, 2007) (defending the integrity of the medi-
cal reports of several litigation doctors including Dr. Richard Levine, stating that "[t]he
validity of Dr. Levine's positive findings is supported by the fact that he also provided large
numbers of negative reports for participants in screenings in which Weitz & Luxenberg was
involved ....") (on file with author). Dr. Levine is an asbestos litigation doctor who has
provided thousands of medical reports. See CRMC Response, supra note 17, at Exs. B, C,
and D (indicating that Dr. Levine was the sixth most prolific litigation doctor in authoring
B-reads submitted to the Manville Trust). It is notable that despite the fact that thousands
of Dr. Levine's X-ray readings were relied upon by plaintiffs' lawyers as the equivalent of a
diagnosis and million of dollars have been paid to claimants on the basis of Dr. Levine's
medical reports, Dr. Levine has repudiated any use of his X-ray readings as diagnoses,
stating that his X-ray readings were not diagnoses and that he never rendered a single
diagnosis of asbestosis. See Transcript of Trial at 61-65, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 305 B.R.
175 (Bankr., D. Del. 2004) (No. 01-1139).
520. See Response and Brief in Support of Response of Jay Segarra, M.D., to Defen-
dant's Combined Motion and Brief to Compel Response to Subpoena to Jay Segarra, M.D.
and Combined Motion and Brief in Support of Motion of Jay Segarra, M.D., to Quash or,
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insulate these doctors from a challenge to their reliability.
3. The Changing Role of Discovery In Asbestos Litigation
Judge Jack's finding of pervasive litigation screening fraud in the silica
MDL, even though largely advisory in nature because Judge Jack deter-
mined that she lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 52 1 has changed the legal
landscape with regard to discovery in asbestos litigation. Whereas prior
to Judge Jack's decision there were few attempts to seek to compel pro-
duction of a substantial portion of the medical reports of the litigation
doctors and near uniform rejection of whatever attempts were made, 522
defendants in asbestos and silica litigations are now aggressively seeking
broad ranging discovery of the medical evidence produced for the plain-
tiffs and of the plaintiffs' medical experts. 523 In response, judges, whose
consciousness of possible litigation screening fraud has been raised by
Judge Jack's opinion, are beginning to permit defendants in asbestos liti-
gation to conduct broader discovery of the B Readers and diagnosing
doctors who were used in the screenings that generated the cases before
the court. An indication of the near sea change wrought by Judge Jack 52
4
can be seen in the evolution of the positions taken by U.S. District Court
Judge James T. Giles, who succeeded the late Judge Charles Weiner in
presiding over the asbestos MDL. 525 In January 2007, Judge Giles re-
sponded to defendants, who were seeking wide ranging discovery of the
litigation doctors' records, that his "Court is . . .not an investigating
Grand Jury. That information which is likely to be useful in a trial is the
kind of information that will be the subject of discovery ... I do not
presume that there is fraud in mass tort litigation. '526 After being ex-
in the Alternative, Modify Subpoena to Jay Segarra, M.D., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI) (J.P.M.L. 1991) (MDL No. 875) [hereinafter Segarra Response] ("The one
thing that the defendants do not have are [sic] copies of Dr. Segarra's negative reports
.... .Id. at 4.
521. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
522. See infra note 533.
523. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 5-7, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No.
VI) (J.P.M.L. 1991) (MDL 875) (Mary Croft, of the defense firm Forman, Perry, Watkins,
Krutz & Tardy, LLP, stated:
[As part of] our continuing investigation into fraudulently diagnosed asbes-
tos plaintiffs pending before this Court in MDL 875 ... we have issue[d] over
40 subpoenas to screening doctors and screening companies . . .[wie have
had to file six motions to compel. Four... have been resolved.. . [w]e asked
... every screening doctor and screening company ... [for] the records that
related to their business of screening and diagnosing plaintiffs in anticipation
of asbestos litigation. So [far] . . . every ... doctor and screening company
that we [subpoenaed except Dr. Segarra and the OMR screening company]
has produced these documents.).
524. See Brickman, Silica/Asbestos Litigation, supra note 40, at 311-314 (discussing the
effect of Judge Jack's ruling on mass tort litigation); see also Transcript of Telephone Con-
ference Before the Honorable James T. Giles, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 01-
MD-00875 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Transcript of Telephone Conference].
525. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 01-MD-00875-5G (E.D. Pa. 1991).
526. Transcript of Motions Hearing Before The Honorable James T. Giles at 60, In re
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2007) (MDL No.
875) [hereinafter Transcript of Motions Hearing (Statement of Judge Giles)].
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posed to the products of the discovery that he allowed in the proceed-
ing-decisions about the scope of discovery 527  which were likely
influenced by Judge Jack's findings-Judge Giles, four months later,
found that the medical reports generated by asbestos litigation screenings
"lack reliability and accountability" and are "inherent[ly] suspiciou[s] as
to their reliability." 528
Because there are tens of thousands of cases in MDL 875,529 Judge
Giles's orders allowing discovery of the medical records produced by liti-
gation doctors and screening companies have generated a considerable
volume of data which is being processed by defendants. 530 Nonetheless,
for the reasons set forth below, defendants remain stymied when attempt-
ing to elicit or use this data in individual litigations.
4. Issues Arising From the Demand for Discovery in Asbestos
Litigation
Typically, when a nonmalignant asbestos claim is filed in a court, a de-
fendant who does not agree to settle the claim will, in preparation for
trial, seek to depose the doctor who is going to testify that the litigant has
an asbestos-related disease caused by exposure to the defendant's prod-
ucts. If the testifying expert is a litigation doctor, defendants will likely
subpoena that doctor requiring, inter alia, that he bring to the deposition
copies of all relevant materials, including records of all reports that the
doctor prepared not just in that case or cases but for all other asbestos
litigants generated by screenings. 531 At the deposition, defendant's coun-
sel will ask the doctor to produce the material described in the subpoena.
The doctor will typically provide a copy of his CV, information about
527. See, e.g., Order, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) MDL No. 875 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 12, 2007) (overruling objections of Drs. Alvin Schonfeld based on HIPAA to the Sub-
poenas Duces Tecum seeking production of screening records).
528. Administrative Order No. 12, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) MDL No.
875 (J.P.M.L. May 31, 2007).
529. Initially in 1991, when the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized all
pending actions involving allegations of personal injury or wrongful death caused by asbes-
tos in a single forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the number of plaintiffs was 26,639. See
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. at 416. However, by 2007, the number of claims
pending in MDL 875 had grown to approximately 99,000 plaintiffs. See Transcript of Mo-
tions Hearings, supra note 526, at 10.
530. See supra note 523.
531. See, e.g., Subpoena served on N&M, Inc., In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (MDL No. 1553) (seeking all records of testing and screening
of approximately 9,474 plaintiffs listed in Exhibit C of the subpoena, including pulmonary
function tests, X-ray readings, physical exams, electronic files, medical histories, notes, di-
agnostic reports, invoices, and documents reflecting payments for services rendered in con-
nection with any of the plaintiffs); Subpoena served on Healthscreen, In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, (J.P.M.L. Nov. 2, 2005) (MDL 875); Subpoena
served on Dr. Alvin Schonfeld, M.D., In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI),
MDL 875 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 11, 2005). See also infra note 533 for orders denying motions to
compel production of medical records subpoenaed by defendants. In some jurisdictions,
case management orders stipulate specific information that each side must provide to the
other. None of these orders require that the defendant be provided with the plaintiff's




prior deposition testimony, copies of some billing records, and copies of
the plaintiff's medical reports prepared by that doctor. The litigation
doctor will not, however, bring or provide copies of X-ray readings or
diagnoses in his possession that he prepared for the hundreds or
thousands of other screened litigants for whom he prepared medical
reports.
Defendants may also seek discovery of a litigation doctor who has not
been designated as a testifying expert in the case before the court, but
who provided an X-ray reading or a diagnosis of the litigant in that case
and who thus claims the mantle of consulting expert. 532 That medical
report has likely been used to obtain compensation from various asbestos
bankruptcy trusts and perhaps from other defendants but is not being
relied on by the plaintiff in the matter before the court. Once again, de-
fendants' ability to attempt to show that the litigation screening that gen-
erated the claimant who is now before the court was part of a scheme to
manufacture diagnoses for money depends on obtaining discovery of, and
testimony from, that litigation doctor with regard to the totality of X-ray
readings and diagnoses he provided in the course of multiple litigation
screenings.
Courts limit the production of testifying expert's medical records to
those prepared for parties in that litigation and sustain objections to pro-
ducing the totality of a litigation doctor's medical reports, irrespective of
whether he is a testifying or consulting expert.5 33 Production of a litiga-
532. A consulting expert is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. See supra
note 513 for definitions of testifying and consulting experts. See infra Section VIII.A.5 for
an explanation of why the nontestifying litigation doctor is not a consulting expert for
purposes of insulating him from discovery.
533. See, e.g., Special Master's Report and Recommendation at 4, Johnson v. Am.
Optical Corp., No. 2002-0030 (Miss. Cir. Ct., Copiah County May 27, 2003). Defendants
sought the medical reports produced for the N&M screening company by litigation doc-
tors. In response to Defendants' Motion to Compel and N&M, Inc.'s Opposition to Mo-
tion to Compel and Motions to Quash and for Protective Order, the Special Master
recommended that N&M be required to submit to a deposition and respond to questions
about its "normal testing or screening procedures, the specific testing or screening proce-
dures used with the named plaintiffs in this matter and any and all test results and docu-
mentation related to these tests .... " Id at 2. But "[t]o the extent that Defendants seek
personal information regarding clients or patients of N&M, Inc., who are not parties to this
litigation.., this information is protected and not subject to discovery." Id. at 4 (empha-
sis added); Order, Underwood v. Am. Optical Corp., No. 2002-0027 (Miss. Cir. Ct., Copiah
County June 6, 2003) (adopting the Special Master's Recommendation, supra); Order, In
re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553 (Miss. Jan. 10, 2005) (modifying subpoena for
N&M's records in MDL 1553 in response to N&M's motion for a protective order, to
provide that "all identifying information regarding individuals who are not plaintiffs in
MDL 1553 shall be redacted by N & M prior to production of the documents"); see also
Order Denying Motion by Defendants to Compel Discovery, Morton County Asbestos
Docket Sets E and G, (N.D. Dist. Ct., Morton County, Dec. 17, 2002) (Nos. 00-C-1298, 00-
C-1299, 00-C-1300, 00-C-1301, 00-C-1302, 00-C-1303, 00-C-1304, 00-C-1305, 00-C-1306, 00-
C-13-07, 00-C-1285, 00-C-1286, 00-C-12887, 00-C-1288) [hereinafter Order Denying Mo-
tion] (the defendants had argued that the plaintiffs provided no meaningful information in
their responses to the screening discovery, did not produce any documents, and did not
respond to the question of whether they attended any asbestos screenings and, if so, seek-
ing copies of all records produced by those screenings or medical records resulting from
the screenings); see also Defendants' Memorandum of Law In Support of Their Motion To
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tion doctor's medical reports if he is only a consulting expert is even more
limited. 534 Objections raised by the litigation doctors and plaintiffs'
counsels to discovery include (1) the records sought are medical records
and therefore protected from disclosure by HIPAA;535 (2) the records
sought are not relevant to the litigation; (3) producing the records would
amount to an "undue burden;" 536 (4) the medical reports are "work prod-
uct" and therefore not subject to discovery; (5) if the litigation doctor has
not been designated as a testifying expert, the records are not subject to
discovery because of the "consulting expert" privilege; and (6) the medi-
cal expert was only informally consulted in preparation for trial but was
never specially employed as a consultant.
Courts have emphatically rejected the HIPAA argument5 37 which, in
any event, is largely pretextual.5
38
Compel, Morton County Asbestos Dockets E and G, (N.D. Dist. Ct., Morton County, Nov.
12, 2002) (Nos. 00-C-1298, 00-C-1299, 00-C-1300, 00-C-1301, 00-C-1302, 00-C-1303, 00-C-
1304, 00-C-1305, 00-C-1306, 00-C-13-07, 00-C-1285, 00-C-1286, 00-C-12887, 00-C-1288).
The court held that while "defendants are entitled to all available medical records concern-
ing each of the individual plaintiffs, together with all medical services, medical history, and
current diagnosis. . .[it denied] the defendants' motion to compel discovery so as to cause
the plaintiffs to identify each individual plaintiff and each individual screening to which a
plaintiff may have been subjected [as well as the location and service provider or entity
responsible for such screening."] Order Denying Motion, supra.
534. See infra notes 566-620 and accompanying text for discussion of the consulting
expert privilege.
535. See, e.g., Segarra Response, supra note 520, at 12 (Dr. Jay Segarra argued that "[i]f
[he was] 'practicing medicine' . . . then HIPAA ... appl[ies], and [he] is not at liberty to
produce any documents other than those pertaining to named plaintiffs in [the] lawsuit, as
they are the only ones who have waived their medical privilege as to the issues raised in
[the] proceeding.").
536. See, e.g., Motion to Quash Subpoena, Fairley, Jr. v. Pulmosan Safety Equip., Civ.
Action No. CI-2004-001-SI (Miss. Cir. Ct., Jackson County, July 5, 2005).
537. See, e.g., Order at 2, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) MDL No. 875
(J.P.M.L. Feb. 2, 2007) (stating:
The Court has previously considered the applicability of the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act [hereinafter, "HIPAA"] to the docu-
ments, materials, and items subpoenaed by Certain Defendants from various
screening companies and screening doctors. The Court found that these sub-
poenaed entities were engaged in the business of screening individuals for
pneumoconiosis for litigation rather than medical purposes. Given the na-
ture of the litigation screening industry and the nature of the records utilized
and generated in same, the Court previously found that the documents,
materials, and items sought by Certain Defendants did not fall within the
scope of HIPAA. Similarly, the Court finds that [certain doctors and a
screening company]... were also engaged in the business of evaluating indi-
viduals for pneumoconiosis for litigation rather than medical purposes and
that the documents, materials, and items sought by the subpoenas at issue do
not fall within the scope of HIPAA.).
538. All of the litigation doctors, including those who cite HIPAA as the basis for not
producing these records, consistently maintain that the services they are rendering are not
"medical" and that no doctor-patient relationship exists between them and the litigants for
whom they have provided supporting evidence. See, e.g., Letter from Leo J. Castiglioni,
M.D., to N&M, Inc. (May 29, 1998) (finding a diagnosis "consistent with asbestosis" but
stating: "I am not practicing medicine on the above named individual [George Maye], and
I am not functioning as his or her doctor. He or she and I do not have a patient-doctor
relationship and there is no confidentiality relative to this relationship.") (on file with au-
thor). For another example, see medical file compiled by Dr. Ray Harron for an asbestos
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The relevance argument is that the subpoena for a litigation doctor's
medical reports prepared for litigants in other proceedings is overly
broad in that the documents being sought are not relevant to that court
proceeding. 539 While some courts have denied enforcement of subpoenas
to obtain the medical records of asbestos litigation doctors prepared for
persons who are not parties to the litigation on this basis,540 these deci-
sions are not in accord with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or state
adaptations of those Rules. The Federal Rules allow for discovery by a
party of "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense."'541 The matter itself need not be admissible at trial as long as its
discovery is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. ' 542 Furthermore, a court may for good cause expand discovery
beyond material related to claims or defenses to encompass the "relevant
subject matter of the action, ' 543 if there is "any possibility" of it leading
to a relevant subject matter.544 Thus, a federal court has held that discov-
litigant, including a statement signed on September 4, 2003 by an MDL 1553 plaintiff,
acknowledging that no doctor/patient relationship has been created ("I understand and
acknowledge that Ray A. Harron M.D .... [is] not my doctor[ ] and we have no doctor/
patient relationship ... [he is] functioning as an expert medical witness ... and ... not
practicing medicine on me.") (on file with author).
539. See, e.g., Non-Party Witness Alvin Schonfeld, D.O., F.C.C.P.'s Objections to Sub-
poena for Records, In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875 (N.D. Ohio, Dec.
27, 2005), in which Dr. Alvin Schonfeld objected to the subpoena for his litigation screen-
ing records because "the subpoena seeks records belonging to Dr. Schonfeld's patients
other than the parties to the above-referenced action on the grounds that production of
such non-party records is not relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence in this action .... " Id. at 4.
540. See supra note 533.
541. "Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order dis-
covery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant infor-
mation need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations
imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
542. Id.
543. Id. The limitation of party-discoverable material to that which is relevant to a
"claim or defense" is a result of the 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules. See 6
MOORE's FED. PRAC. § 26.43 (3d ed. 2007) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory com-
mittee's notes). This limitation was written to give courts more control over the discovery
process. Discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject matter of the action," the former
standard, is still allowed on a showing of good cause. Thus, even if the requested records
are not deemed to be relevant to a claim or defense, it is still possible to show good cause
and have discovery expanded to matters "relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See Martinez v. Schock Transfer & Warehouse Co., 789
F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Control of discovery is entrusted to the sound discretion of
the trial courts .... ") (citing Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 794 (10th Cir. 1980)).
544. EEOC v. Electro-Term, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Mass. 1996) ("[R]elevancy
must be broadly construed at the discovery stage such that information is discoverable if
there is any possibility it might be relevant to the subject matter of the action.") (emphasis
added). See also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1976)
("'[R]elevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action'-has been construed
broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other
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ery of a doctor's examination records of patients other than those in-
volved in the matter before the court is proper if it is necessary to
establish a claim of bad faith and because it might lead to relevant
evidence. 545
There are at least four circumstances where the relevance of the medi-
cal records prepared by the litigation doctors in support of thousands or
tens of thousands of claims generated by screenings is apparent. First, if a
litigation doctor is to testify as an expert witness on specific causation,
producing these medical records would allow defendants to determine
that doctor's percentage of positive reports, which could then be the basis
for mounting a Daubert challenge on the grounds of lack of reliability.
Second, even if a Daubert challenge is not mounted, the totality of the
medical records can be used to attack the validity of a diagnosis on the
basis of the doctor's methodologies and failure to follow medical proto-
cols. A perfect illustration of the relevance of the totality of a litigation
doctor's medical reports is provided by a current proceeding in a Wayne
County, Michigan Circuit Court. Approximately ninety percent of about
1,800 X-ray readings by Dr. R. Michael Kelly are refuted by hospital radi-
ologists who initially read the identical X-rays in the ordinary course of
administering the X-rays. However, the court has limited discovery of
Dr. Kelly's records to the seventy of eighty-three asbestos cases in a sin-
gle trial group in that court in which Dr. Kelly is a testifying expert.546
This limitation precludes defendants from showing that Dr. Kelly finds
radiographic evidence of interstitial fibrosis ten times more frequently
than is present.
A third circumstance in which relevance is apparent is when the litiga-
tion doctor does not testify but the testifying doctor relied on the litiga-
tion doctor's X-ray reading as a basis for his diagnosis. Here, the
defendants would be able to challenge the validity of the diagnosis if they
had access to all of the litigation doctor's X-ray readings for similarly
screened litigants. These X-ray readings are often highly subjective, and
the evidence I have compiled indicates that the percentage of X-rays read
as positive for fibrosis by litigation doctors is largely a function of finan-
cial incentives. 547 Having access to the totality of that litigation doctor's
X-ray readings could enable the defendant to show, for example, that his
percentage of positive X-ray readings far exceeds any medically plausible
matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.") (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).
545. Small v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 98-2934, 1999 WL 1128945, at
**5-6 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In Small, the court denied a party's request to quash a subpoena for
broad discovery of a doctor over challenges to relevance. Id. at *6. In order to establish a
claim of bad faith, records of the doctor's examination of other patients were necessary to
show a biased pattern towards insurance companies. See generally Caban v. 600 E. 21st St.
Co., 200 F.R.D. 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (compelling in camera review of the academic records
of non-party siblings of infant plaintiff in a toxic tort case on the grounds that "[w]hatever
their admissibility at trial, the possibility remains that the ... [requested discovery] might
lead to evidence related to plaintiff's cause of action." (internal citations omitted)).
546. See infra notes 598-611.
547. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 524-30.
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percentage as indicated by clinical studies. Fourth, even if the testifying
doctor did not rely on any of the medical records produced by the litiga-
tion doctor who had read the litigant's X-ray at a screening, obtaining the
full panoply of that litigation doctor's screening records could enable de-
fendants to make a credible if not compelling case that the claim before
the court is, to use the words of Judge Janis Jack, one of thousands gener-
ated by "lawyers, doctors and screening companies who were all willing
participants" in a scheme to "manufacture ... [diagnoses] for money. 548
The gist of the "undue burden" argument is that because of the broad
scope of the requests, production of the documents would subject the
plaintiffs to an undue burden or hardship.549 This argument is unsustain-
able since the Federal Rules provide that a party seeking discovery of the
other party's experts must pay that expert for his time and expense in
complying with the request. That payment largely alleviates the bur-
den.550 Furthermore, the court has discretion to protect against unduly
burdensome requests by issuing a protective order.
551
The "work product" privilege argument is based on Federal Rule
26(b)(3) which limits discovery of documents in the possession of agents
of the other party to where there is a "substantial need" of the materials
and the party seeking discovery will face undue hardship to obtain
equivalent documents elsewhere.5 5 2 This work product privilege, which
applies to documents and other tangible things prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial, "shelters the mental processes of the attorney,
providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his
client's case."' 553 The argument is that the medical reports of a litigation
doctor, which were prepared for litigants who are not plaintiffs in that
individual litigation, are work product prepared at the request of counsel
548. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
549. See, e.g., Segarra Response, supra note 520, at 6 ("Compliance with the terms of
the subpoena would also be unduly burdensome and Dr. Segarra anticipates it would take
at least two (2) months to comply with the requests in the subpoena.").
550. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i) (requiring that the party seeking discovery "pay the
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery."). In rejecting a claim of
undue burden in the Silica MDL, Judge Jack relied on this exact argument and noted that
"any burden imposed on the doctors should be mitigated by the requirement of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(C)." Order No. 17, In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F.
Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2004) (MDL 1553) [hereinafter Order No. 17].
551. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c)(1) ("The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense ....").
552. Subject to the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discov-
ery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 26 and "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer,
or agent)" only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has "substantial need for
the materials" in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable, without
undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
553. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661-662 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.l (1975)).
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and are therefore protected from discovery in that case. 554 Accordingly,
these reports are afforded "near absolute protection from discovery, '555
which can only be overcome by a showing of "rare and exceptional
circumstances. 556
The medical reports prepared by litigation doctors, however, do not
reflect or reveal counsels' mental processes and are arguably, therefore,
not work product. Even if the reports are deemed work product, defend-
ants have a "substantial need" for the reports and "are unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent . . . by other
means."5 57 This argument is further developed in the paragraphs that
follow.
The "consulting expert" privilege claim, a kissing cousin of the work
product argument, is based upon Federal Civil Procedure Rule
26(b)(4)(B), which requires a showing of "exceptional circumstances" for
a party to obtain discovery of a consulting expert, that is, an expert re-
tained by another party in anticipation of litigation but who is not ex-
pected to be called to testify.5 5 8 Litigation doctors who have provided
medical reports for plaintiffs in that case but who are not going to be
called to testify559 argue that they are merely consulting experts and that
no "exceptional circumstances" exist because the defendants seeking dis-
covery can have their own experts analyze a plaintiff's medical record or
injuries and thereby at least adequately defend each individual claim.560
554. For example, in the Silica MDL, N&M, a screening company that had generated
most of the claims in the MDL, argued inter alia, with regard to producing records of all
medical testing performed by N&M for plaintiffs in the MDL, that plaintiffs' counsel had
instructed N&M not to produce the records because they were protected by the work
product doctrine, since the work N&M did was at the request of counsel in preparation for
litigation. See Motion for Protective Order, In re Silica Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1553
(S.D. Miss. Oct. 8, 2004).
555. In re Cendant Corp., 343 F.3d at 663 (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 962
n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)).
556. Id. at 663.
557. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See also supra note 554.
558. A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, "discover facts known or
opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party
in anticipation of litigation" or preparation for trial and "who is not expected to be called
as a witness at trial" only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of "exceptional
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party" seeking discovery "to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
559. The principal reason why litigation doctors, in recent times, are rarely used as testi-
fying experts is precisely because of the concern that that may open the door to discovery
of that doctor's X-ray readings done in the course of screenings and diagnoses of other
screened litigants. See, e.g., Special Master's Report No. 13 at 6, Fairley v. Pulmosan
Safety Equip. Co., No. CI-2004-001-SI (Miss. Cir. Ct., Jackson County, Dec. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter Special Master's Report]. Because many of the litigation doctors' thousands
of X-ray readings have gained a reputation for being suspect at best, plaintiffs' lawyers
seeking to maintain the financial viability of these claims hire another doctor, as yet un-
tainted, to re-read the X-ray as positive for fibrosis and thus resuscitate the case. Not
surprisingly, a comparative handful of doctors are regularly used for the large majority of
these re-readings.
560. As argued by Dr. Segarra in a motion to quash a subpoena for his medical records
in screened cases: "There is nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any other
authority that would permit ... [the defendants] access to such information, and to order
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A fortiori, they argue that the medical reports they prepared for litigants
in other proceedings are not discoverable.
The "consulting expert" privilege argument has been held to effectively
insulate from discovery a litigation doctor's medical reports of litigants
that are not named in that proceeding. 561 The "consulting expert" privi-
lege is less effective, however, in insulating from discovery medical re-
ports of litigants who are part of an aggregated proceeding such as an
MDL.562 This is so because, depending upon the luck of the draw, the
cases in the MDL may include several hundred and even several thou-
sand plaintiffs for whom medical reports were provided by one of the
litigation doctors. United States District Court Judge Janis Jack rejected
the "consulting expert" privilege argument in MDL 1553 with respect to
these medical reports but on limited grounds.563 She held that even
though plaintiffs' lawyers identified those doctors as non-testifying ex-
perts, since the plaintiffs had listed the litigation doctors' reports in re-
sponse to her order that each plaintiff produce a diagnosis of a silica-
related disease, that was the equivalent of testimony and thus the litiga-
tion doctors were not limited to being consulting experts with regard to
claims in that MDL.564
By analogy, this argument can be extended to apply to individually liti-
gated cases where the litigation doctor is again not designated as a testify-
ing expert but where his reports were the basis for filing claims for that
litigant with asbestos bankruptcy trusts. Indeed, it is a virtual certainty
that litigation doctors' medical reports were mostly the basis for the sev-
eral million claims filed with asbestos bankruptcy trusts. According to
Judge Jack, that is the substantial equivalent of testimony.565 Thus, those
Dr. Segarra to produce this information would be to ignore the clear language of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure." Segarra Response, supra note 520, at 9.
561. See, e.g., Special Master's Report, supra note 559, 6.
562. Order No. 17, supra note 550, at 2-3.
563. Id.
564. See id. The Order noted that ten motions to quash subpoenas for the records of
litigation doctors, who provided medical reports for the approximately 10,000 plaintiffs in
the MDL, had been filed and rejected the arguments advanced that the subpoenas sub-
jected the doctors to an undue burden, violated HIPAA, and were inappropriate requests
to "consulting-only experts." Id. at 1. With respect to the latter, Judge Jack stated:
Finally, Plaintiffs' argument that the subpoenas are inappropriate requests to
"consulting-only experts" is grounded on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b) (4) (B)'s [sic] admonition that discovery may not proceed against non-
testifying experts "retained ... by another party" without a showing of "ex-
ceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means."
However, plaintiffs have failed to establish the prerequisites for the applica-
tion of this rule ... [m]ore importantly, Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways:
they cannot present these [litigation] doctors as the sole physicians diagnos-
ing the injuries that form the bases of these suits while simultaneously claim-
ing that they are merely non-testifying experts. In other words, so long as
Plaintiffs are proffering the doctors and their diagnoses to fulfill this Court's
requirement under Order No. 6 that Plaintiffs produce diagnoses of silica-
related disease, Plaintiffs cannot claim the doctors are non-testifying.
Id. at 3.
565. Id. at 2-3.
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non-testifying litigation doctors should be subject to discovery in a case
filed in the tort system where the plaintiff had previously submitted
claims to a bankruptcy trust supported by that litigation doctor's medical
reports.
Alternatively, the fact that a doctor, who is not named as a testifying
expert, has read a litigant's X-ray or rendered a diagnosis of asbestosis
and this was the basis for filing claims for that litigant with asbestos bank-
ruptcy trusts, should be regarded as an "exceptional circumstance" under
Rule 26(b)(4)(B), thus allowing for his discovery by defendants. 566 This
issue was posed squarely in the asbestos MDL. Defendants had noticed
the deposition of Dr. James C. Krainson, a litigation doctor who issued a
diagnosis for one of the litigants in the MDL but who was not designated
as a testifying expert.567 The importance of the deposition of Dr. Krain-
son, whom defense counsel charged "was involved in a significant amount
of fraudulent screening, '568 is manifested by the fact that the plaintiffs
offered to dismiss those defendants seeking to depose Dr. Krainson "with
prejudice" rather than go forward with the deposition.569 Plaintiffs
moved to quash the deposition of Dr. Krainson on the basis that he was a
non-testifying expert and there had been no showing of exceptional cir-
cumstances as mandated by Rule 26(b)(4)(B).5 70 Defense counsel re-
sponded that Dr. Krainson's reports were the basis for filing a claim with
the Manville Trust 571 and that documentary evidence produced by Dr.
Krainson in response to a subpoena "show[ed] that he had fraudulent and
suspect activity throughout the United States in several cases including
... [plaintiffs] that are before this Court. '572 Judge James T. Giles, pre-
siding over the asbestos MDL, found "that there are exceptional circum-
stances," including the fact that the plaintiff had relied on Dr. Krainson's
diagnosis in making a claim against the Manville Trust.573 Judge Giles
added: "[T]his court has jurisdiction to make sure that all claims that are
filed against defendant's asbestos claims are legitimate. '574
The next step in this progression is to seek discovery of a non-testifying
litigation doctor's medical reports prepared for screened litigants not
before the court where that doctor read the X-ray or rendered a diagnosis
of the litigant before the court but is not designated as a testifying expert.
Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s policy basis for precluding unreasonable access to an
opposing party's trial preparation 575 does not support precluding access
566. Id. at 17.
567. See Transcript of Telephone Conference, supra note 524, at 7.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 6.
570. Id. at 5, 9.
571. Id. at 10.
572. Id. at 11.
573. Id. at 17.
574. Id.
575. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2032 (3d ed. 2004). A party expecting to call an expert witness to testify is subject to
various disclosure and discovery rules by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); see also supra notes 539-548 and accompanying text (discussing the role
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to a litigation doctor's reports for other screened litigants where that ex-
pert has unique knowledge that the defendant is unable to otherwise ac-
quire the litigation doctors' percentages of positive X-ray readings and
diagnoses. A case in point is Dr. Jay T. Segarra, one of the most prolific
of the X-ray readers and diagnosing doctors in asbestos litigation.5 76 Dr.
Segarra's response (via counsel) to a demand for the totality of his
screening reports effectively demonstrates both the unique knowledge
that he has that the defendants are unable to otherwise acquire and why
that qualifies as an exceptional circumstance under Rule 26: "The one
thing the Defendants do not have [and cannot have] are copies of Dr.
Segarra's negative reports. ' 577 Access to these reports would permit cal-
culation of Dr. Segarra's or other litigation doctors' percentages of posi-
tive diagnoses. This information could be the basis for (1) filing a motion
in limine to exclude that doctor as a testifying expert witness because his
diagnoses are unreliable; (2) impeaching that doctor's testimony by show-
ing that his percentage of positive diagnoses varies substantially from that
indicated by clinical studies of that occupational group and, if applicable,
the considerable variance between the percentage of positive diagnoses
that the doctor has previously claimed and the much higher percentage
that access to his records could show;5 78 (3) impeaching the plaintiff's
testifying medical expert if he is not one of the litigation doctors but has
based his diagnosis on that litigation doctor's B reading;579 and (4) mak-
ing a credible if not compelling case that the claim before the court is one
generated by lawyers, doctors, and screening companies as part of a
scheme to "manufacture . . . [diagnoses] for money. ' 580 Dr. Segarra's
candid proclamation attests to the importance of this information and
thus, demonstrates why it should be held to qualify as an "exceptional
circumstance" exception to Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s limitation on discovery. 581
The importance of this information is further made manifest by the
of determinations of relevance in limiting the discovery of expert witnesses to the single
case before the court). In contrast, a non-testifying or consulting expert is an expert that is
retained in anticipation of litigation by a party for consultation but is not expected to tes-
tify at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (b)(4). These experts are excepted from the discovery
requirements in order to prevent parties from unfairly availing themselves of their oppo-
nents' trial preparation. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Pure Air on the Lake Ltd., 154
F.R.D. 202, 210 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that allowing discovery of a non-testifying expert
report "is contrary to the intent of the Rule which is to prevent 'one party from having a
free ride at the expense of the other party."') (quoting In re Shell Oil Refinery, 132 F.R.D.
437, 443 (E.D. La. 1990)).
576. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 526-29 n.35 for a description of Dr.
Segarra's role in litigation screenings.
577. Segarra Response, supra note 520, at 4.
578. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 526-29 n.35 (listing multiple reasons to
question Dr. Segarra's probity).
579. Cf. id. at 587 n.257.
580. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
581. See Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 236 (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing discovery of
plaintiff's non-testifying experts' negative test results in a products liability suit for asbestos
in cigarette filters because it would be impossible to find whether there were fibers in the
samples tested by plaintiffs testifying expert otherwise).
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results of the discovery allowed by Judge Jack in MDL 1553.582 Without
this discovery, Judge Jack could not have found that certain litigation doc-
tors' diagnoses of thousands of plaintiffs in the MDL were unreliable be-
cause they were "manufactured for money." 583
A sixth argument that can be advanced by plaintiffs' counsel in support
of their opposition to discovery of the litigation doctor's records is that
the doctor was informally consulted in preparation for a trial but was
never retained or specially employed and will not be a trial witness.
Therefore, under Federal Rule 26(b)(4), neither the names of such per-
sons nor their information is subject to discovery. 58 4
This argument, however, has no applicability to litigation doctors'
records. This is so because either the law firm sponsoring the screenings
or the screening company hired by the lawyer has retained the litigation
doctors to read X-rays, supervise the administration of pulmonary func-
tion tests, and conduct physical examinations of potential litigants, albeit
very brief ones. For these services, litigation doctors have been paid well
in excess of $100 million. Accordingly, these doctors were retained and
specially employed and, therefore, are not immune from identification or
discovery on the basis of Federal Rule 26(b)(4).
5. Litigation Doctors As Percipient Witnesses
Another counter to the argument that a nontestifying litigation doctor
is a consulting expert and therefore protected by the work product privi-
lege is that the litigation doctor is, instead, a "percipient witness." A doc-
tor who has read an X-ray or examined an allegedly injured party who is
a litigant is a "percipient witness" because he has observed facts; that is,
he is "[a] witness who has perceiveed the things about which he or she
testifies. ' 585 A typical example of a doctor who is a percipient (fact) wit-
ness is a treating doctor.5 86 These services were not rendered for the pur-
poses of litigation and thus do not fall under Federal Rule 26(b)(4) which
"places limits on discovery of those insights only where they are devel-
oped for litigation .... ",587 The treating doctor, therefore, is subject to
wide ranging examination with regard to his services and his observa-
tions.5 88 Even if the litigation is a malpractice action against a hospital
582. See supra note 564.
583. See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 635 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
584. See Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 502
(10th Cir. 1980) ("If the expert is considered to have been only informally consulted in
anticipation of litigation, discovery is barred."); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184
F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Utah 1999); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2033 (3d ed. 2004).
585. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 771 (8th ed. 2004).
586. Quarantillo v. Consol. Rail Corp., 106 F.R.D. 435, 436-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); Keith
v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 86 F.R.D. 458, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
587. WRIGHT, supra note 575, at § 2033.
588. See Baker v. Taco Bell Corp., 163 F.R.D. 348, 349 (D. Colo. 1995). According to
the opinion, the treating physicians
are witnesses testifying to the facts of their examination, diagnosis and treat-
ment of a patient. It does not mean that the treating physicians do not have
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and its professional agents, those agents of the named defendant who for-
mulated professional opinions and made professional judgments in pro-
viding care to the plaintiff are subject to discovery as fact witnesses.589
Unlike treating doctors, litigation doctors are not hired to perform
medical services. Rather, they are hired by lawyers or their agents to
participate in screenings of potential litigants and produce reports to sup-
port litigation claims. Judge Giles in the asbestos MDL concluded that
the screening work done for plaintiffs by Dr. James C. Krainson, a non-
testifying litigation doctor, was not the practice of medicine. 590 This is
consistent with the position that all litigation doctors maintain: no doctor/
patient relationship is created when they read an X-ray or render a diag-
nosis. They further stoutly maintain that they are providing litigation ser-
vices, not medical services. Therefore, Judge Giles concluded that the
doctor was not a medical expert for purposes of the litigation before the
court and therefore, could be required to provide testimony.591
Judge Giles' ruling cuts right to the chase. A nontestifying litigation
doctor has observed facts which are relevant to the case before the court.
An examination of the role of litigation doctors in screenings further
demonstrates why they are percipient witnesses, not consulting experts.
Litigation screenings are conducted solely for the purpose of generating
medical and occupational exposure information and documentation
which are provided to diagnosing physicians (who may also be litigation
doctors). At screenings, litigants disclose their medical histories which
may be recorded by screening company personnel or by an on-site litiga-
tion doctor and later provided to a diagnosing physician. The screening
companies administer chest X-rays, and on many occasions perform pul-
monary function tests ("PFFs"). The X-ray films, PFTs, and physical ex-
aminations provide one-time snapshots of litigants' then-existing medical
conditions. The screening companies may have an on-site litigation doc-
tor interpret chest X-rays and PF-Is, conduct physical examinations, eval-
uate the exposure and medical histories, and make diagnoses.
Alternatively, the screener may mail the chest X-rays, the collected medi-
cal and exposure history information, the PFT reports, and physical ex-
amination reports to the litigation doctor to review and render diagnoses.
Some screening companies use a combination of these two procedures by
taking X-rays and having doctors conduct PFTs and physical examina-
an opinion as to the cause of an injury based upon their examination of the
patient or to the degree of injury in the future. These opinions are a neces-
sary part of the treatment of the patient. Such opinions do not make the
treating physicians experts as defined by Rule 26(b)(4)(C).
Id.
589. Matzkevich v. Waterbury Hosp. Health Ctr., 576 A.2d 1320, 1321 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1990).
590. Transcript of Telephone Conference, supra note 524, at 17.
591. Id. at 13, 17-18 (In denying motion to quash the deposition of a litigation doctor,
the Court found that "if what [the doctor] did was screening, he's not really a medical
expert ... [a] plaintiff relied upon by him for making a claim ... [the doctor] appears not
to have been engaged in anything other than a screening as a non-medical person since he
apparently was not holding himself out as a licensed practitioner.").
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tions on-site, but then forward their impressions and results to a diagnos-
ing doctor for the actual diagnosis. These on-site doctors are percipient
witnesses in these circumstances.
The information, documentation, medical interpretations, reports, and
diagnoses generated by screenings are often the sole basis for claims
against a host of potential defendants and asbestos bankruptcy trusts.
These medical records are relevant to a variety of issues in these lawsuits,
including (1) the accuracy of the diagnoses made; (2) the qualifications of
the screening personnel and doctors; (3) the reliability of the litigation
doctors' methodology and the opinions they produce; (4) the reliability of
the equipment and methodologies of screening companies; (5) the thor-
oughness and quality of the screening process; (6) the measurement of
the extent of the alleged disease; (7) the progression of the alleged dis-
ease; (8) the accuracy of litigants' alleged impairment and related issues
about prognoses based on pulmonary function testing; and (9) the accu-
racy of alleged damages and disability.
A chest X-ray is, literally, a snapshot of an individual's lungs at the
time the X-ray is taken. This creates a record of a one-time event show-
ing the then-existing radiological status of pulmonary health of the indi-
vidual. Such records can never be duplicated. Moreover, even if
subsequent X-rays are administered, prior X-rays are relevant to show
the progression, or lack of progression, of any alleged disease over time.
Because chest X-rays are generally required to make a diagnosis of asbes-
tosis, a progressive lung disease, X-rays taken by screening companies are
necessarily relied upon by doctors making the diagnoses. The relevance
of chest X-rays is thus patent. Defendants are entitled to the X-rays and
records relating to the interpretation of those X-rays, as well as the iden-
tity of the screening entities administering the X-rays and the identity of
the doctors interpreting the X-rays in order to assess (1) the quality of the
X-rays; (2) the reliability of the X-ray equipment and the procedures em-
ployed in shooting the X-rays; (3) the accuracy of the X-ray interpreta-
tions; (4) the qualifications of the technicians shooting the X-rays and the
doctors interpreting the X-rays; and (5) the reliability of the methodology
of the screening process, X-ray interpretations, and the reasonableness of
the diagnoses.
Similarly, a PFF measuring lung function provides a snapshot of a
plaintiff's lung function and any impairment at a given time. As with X-
rays, PFTs cannot be later duplicated to show the medical condition of
the litigants at the moment of the previous administration. Plaintiffs sub-
mit PFTs to support their allegations of impairment and as a measure-
ment of the degree of injury suffered and, therefore, the amount of
compensation sought. Similarly, PETF results and records, as well as the
identity of the screening entity, the methods employed during testing, the
PFT records, including all values and graphs, and the doctors' interpreta-
tions of the PFT results are relevant to litigants' claims and may provide
2008] 1331
SMU LAW REVIEW
information that leads to reasonable alternative explanations of litigants'
medical conditions.
While it is clear that attorneys hire these screening companies and liti-
gation doctors (or other physicians interpreting screening-generated
materials) to make diagnoses of asbestosis as the basis for asserting
claims in the tort system, that fact alone is not determinative of whether
the records generated pursuant to that arrangement are protected as at-
torney work product. The purpose of the attorney work product privilege
is to "shelter the mental processes, conclusions, and legal theories of the
attorney, providing a privileged area within which the lawyer can analyze
and prepare his or her case. ' 592 The protection afforded by attorney
work product, however, "does not extend to facts of the case the attorney
may acquire. '593
The medical facts recorded in the documents generated by screenings
do not contain mental processes, conclusions, or legal theories of the at-
torneys. This is because the litigation doctors were not hired for consulta-
tion purposes; they were hired to provide diagnoses. The screening
generated documents are simply records that record the physical condi-
tions and/or statements of litigants about their medical condition and ex-
posure, which include X-rays, PFTs, X-ray readings, and diagnoses. The
consulting-only expert and attorney work product claim therefore does
not shelter the litigation doctors or the requested information from
discovery.594
As noted, this argument was successfully advanced before U.S. District
Court Judge James T. Giles in the asbestos MDL in response to the mo-
tion to quash the deposition of Dr. James C. Krainson.5 95 Dr. Krainson
had issued medical reports for the litigant but was not designated as a
testifying witness.5 96 Counsel for the defendant successfully argued that
the deposition should be allowed to go forward because Dr. Krainson is
a fact witness in this case. He was there when [plaintiff's] claim was
created. He was there when [plaintiffs] went through these screen-
ings, he was there to see the procedure ... [h]e knows how [plain-
tiff's] claim was created from beginning to end. There's nobody else
who can testify to that, he's the only one.597
The final step in the discovery process is to allow a defendant to dis-
cover a nontestifying litigation doctor's medical reports in cases not
before the court. The fact that the litigation doctor diagnosed a substan-
592. Gen Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 924 S.W.2d 222,229 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, writ denied) (emphasis added) (quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Caldwell,
818 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. 1991)).
593. Id. at 229 (citing Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d at 750 n.2).
594. See Teran v. Longoria, 703 S.W.2d 300, 300 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no
writ) ("[I]f a medical expert is hired for a purpose other than as a trial consultant, such as
for examination and treatment, or for consultation in connection with improving the health
of the person, his or her identity and records are not protected from discovery.").
595. See supra note 591.
596. Transcript of Telephone Conference, supra note 567, at 7.
597. Id. at 12.
1332 [Vol. 61
Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts
tial percentage of screened litigants with asbestosis, for example, can be
relevant to the veracity of the records he caused to be created with regard
to the individual litigant or litigants before the court. The relevance-
indeed the immense importance-of such discovery is fully revealed in
litigation ongoing in Wayne County, Michigan.598 Dr. R. Michael Kelly is
a testifying expert who rendered diagnoses in seventy of the eighty-three
asbestos cases that made up the May 2008 trial group.599 The defendant
moved to compel Dr. Kelly to respond to questions about diagnoses of
asbestosis that he rendered for over 4,000 other litigants that he screened
who were not part of the eighty-three cases that were in the trial group.
600
Prior to March 2006, Dr. Kelly obtained X-rays for asbestos screenings
from Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, Michigan where he was employed. 60 1
Each set of chest X-rays that Dr. Kelly ordered was read by a hospital
radiologist and these reports were provided to Dr. Kelly along with the
X-ray.602 The defendant reviewed 1,795 cases where there was both an
X-ray interpretation of the same film by Dr. Kelly and one of the fifty
different hospital radiologists who read the 1,795 films. 60 3 This review
indicated that in eighty-nine percent of the cases where Dr. Kelly found
evidence of asbestos-related disease, the hospital radiologists made no
such findings.604
A side-by-side comparison of one set of X-ray reports indicates the
following: Dr. Kelly: "the chest X-ray is reviewed from films taken on 05/
03/05. There are bilateral increased interstitial markings. The ILO read-
ing is 1/1 with s and t-sized irregular opacities in both lower lung fields.
There is pleural plaquing bilaterally, grade B3."'605 The hospital radiolo-
gist report for the same X-ray states: "The lungs are clear ... No pleural
abnormality is demonstrated. '606
Only in five percent of the cases where Dr. Kelly found asbestos-re-
lated disease on an X-ray (interstitial fibrosis and/or pleural plaques or
thickening) did any of the fifty hospital radiologists, who had interpreted
the same X-ray films, find evidence of interstitial fibrosis. 607 Of the sev-
enty of eighty-three cases in the trial group where he is serving as plain-
tiffs' expert, there are fifty-eight cases where Dr. Kelly and a hospital
598. Garza et al. v. Sure Seal Prods. Co., No. 07-702927 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne
County Feb. 1, 2007).
599. Brief in Support of Motion to Compel the Completion of Dr. R. Michael Kelly's
Deposition and for Court's Ruling on Objections Made at Deposition at 9, No. 07-702927
NP, 2008, Garza v. Sure Seal Prods. Co. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Apr. 30, 2008)




603. Id. at 10-11.
604. Id. at 11.
605. See Report of Dr. Kelly to the Goldberg, Persky & White Law Firm (July 18, 2005)
(discussing a patient named Richard M.) (on file with the author).
606. See Hospital radiologist report on Richard M. (May 3, 2005) (on file with the
author).
607. Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 599, at 11.
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radiologist each reviewed the same X-ray. In fifty-three of these fifty-
eight cases, the hospital radiologist found no evidence of the asbestos-
related disease that Dr. Kelly found.60 8 Dr. Kelly testified that the differ-
ences resulted because he used the NIOSH B Reader 60 9 format whereas
the hospital radiologists did not.610 Dr. Kelly, however, is not a NIOSH
certified B Reader, having failed the exam the only time he sat for it
following a two-day class that he attended in 1989.611 Moreover, the ILO
system that Dr. Kelly referred to is a method of classifying lung opacities.
Whether or not the ILO classification system is used should have no bear-
ing on whether or not a radiologist finds interstitial fibrosis.
It should also be pointed out that a hospital radiologist's finding of
radiographic evidence of interstitial fibrosis is not a diagnosis of asbesto-
sis. There are more than a hundred different causes of interstitial fibrosis
besides asbestos exposure, including aging, smoking, obesity, and the use
of certain medications. 612 Clinical studies indicate that approximately
twenty-five percent of those occupationally exposed to asbestos who have
interstial fibrosis may properly be diagnosed with asbestosis. 613
Dr. Kelly has refused to answer questions about any of his diagnoses
beyond the seventy in the trial group. 614 When the defendant sought to
compel a response, Judge Robert J. Columbo ruled that Dr. Kelly cannot
be questioned about any cases beyond the seventy where he was serving
as plaintiffs' expert.615
While Dr. Kelly was a testifying expert, the same facts and conclusions
to be drawn from the case facts would be present if Dr. Kelly was not
designated as the plaintiffs' testifying expert but had provided medical
reports for any of the litigants.
Judge Columbo's rulings may on discovery of Dr. Kelly's diagnosis in
cases not before the court be incompatible with the goal of preserving the
integrity of the civil justice system. One effect of courts' refusals to allow
discovery of a litigation doctor's records of screened litigants who are not
parties in that proceeding may be to envelope a scheme to generate spe-
cious, if not fraudulent, claims in procedural protections. If that were the
608. Id. at 9.
609. See supra notes 46-47.
610. Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 599, at 10.
611. Id.
612. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 564-65.
613. Id. at 564.
614. Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, supra note 599, at 5.
615. See Transcript of Motion via Telephone Conference at 15, Garza v. Sure Seal
Prods. Co., No. 07-702927-NP (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, May 8, 2008). Defendants
have moved to exclude Dr. Kelly's diagnostic options as "scientifically unreliable." See
Motion to Exclude Diagnostic Opinions of R. Michael Kelly, M.D. as Scientifically Unreli-
able, Hatcher v. Sure Seal Prods., Co., No. 04-431471-NP (3d Jud. Cir., Wayne County,
Mich. Sept. 26, 2008). On November 19, 2008, Judge Columbo ruled that Dr. Kelly did not
meet the Daubert standard of reliability and excluded his testimony in the pending cases.
See Transcript of Motion Hearing, Miles v. Sure Seal Prods. Co., No. 04-434 812-NP (3d
Jud. Cir., Wayne County, Mich. Nov. 19, 2008); see also Michigan Malpractice, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 2008, at A18; Megha Satyanrayana, Wayne County Judge's Ruling Jeopardizes
Asbestos Case, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 20, 2008, at 3B.
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case here, then the effect of Judge Columbo's rulings may be to keep
from public disclosure the very evidence that Judge Jack compelled to be
produced-evidence that was the basis for her conclusion that the civil
justice system had been corrupted.
B. THE ROLE OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS IN LEGITIMIZING
LITIGATION SCREENINGS
One consequence of the failure of the civil justice system to permit
mass tort defendants to expose the specious claim generation, if not out-
right fraud, that permeates litigation screenings is the ineluctable bank-
ruptcy of most of the companies named as defendants by the lawyers
representing the hundreds of thousands of claimants generated by the
screenings. How ever unintentional, bankruptcy courts have effectively
legitimated the use of litigation screenings in a variety of ways. For exam-
ple, these courts have inhibited debtors' and commercial creditors' ability
to contest the basis for the mass tort litigation by precluding or inhibiting
a trial on general causation. A second form of legitimation is these
courts' refusals to permit or order a formal review of a sample of the
medical records of pending claimants that would be needed to show that
the medical reports were unreliable and had been "manufactured for
money."
A related issue is the reluctance of the bankruptcy courts to allow the
debtor, at the outset of the bankruptcy proceeding, to contest general
causation when the tort system has simply gone off the tracks, as occurred
in the silicone breast implant litigation. As discussed in section VI of this
Article, after a 4.2 billion dollar class action settlement was reached, 616
lawyers instituted litigation screenings that ballooned the number of
claimants by over 400,000, to a total of 440,000.617 With the settlement
about to implode, Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy, apparently with the
hope that the bankruptcy proceeding would enable it to get a quick up-
or-down ruling on the issue of general causation based on epidemiologi-
cal data that had been developed indicating that silicone breast implants
did not cause autoimmune disease.618 The bankruptcy court, however,
declined to permit a general causation trial at the outset. 619 Had it done
so, and had it approved appointment of an independent panel of experts
under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to advise the court on
the scientific validity of the plaintiffs' experts' theories on general causa-
tion-as did U.S. District Court Judge Robert E. Jones62 0-and on that
basis excluded plaintiffs' experts in a Daubert proceeding because the
theories they advanced lacked scientific credibility-then Dow Corning
would have almost certainly prevailed. Instead, the outcome enriched
616. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, MDL
No. 926, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
617. In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 485, 486 n.2 (6th Cir. 1996).
618. See NAGAREDA, supra note 1, at 35-36.
619. In re Dow Corning, 86 F.3d at 485.
620. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392-93 n.8 (D. Or. 1996).
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the plaintiffs' lawyers who undertook the screenings by hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, in addition to the hundreds of millions of dollars they
received from the other settling defendants.
Undoubtedly the highest rewards approved or facilitated by bank-
ruptcy courts for specious claims generated by litigation screenings have
occurred in asbestos-related bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, litigation
screenings have played a prominent role in most of the eighty bankruptcy
filings of companies that had been involved in asbestos litigation.621 At
the time of each bankruptcy, large numbers of asbestos injury claims were
pending, mostly generated by screenings. Frequently, plaintiffs' lawyers
entered into settlements of these pending cases either immediately before
the bankruptcy filing or shortly thereafter, which provided for preferen-
tial treatment of their pending cases. In an indication that some bank-
ruptcy judges are departing from the "business as usual" approach to
asbestos bankruptcies, Bankruptcy Judge Kathryn C. Ferguson recently
refused to confirm a plan of reorganization in the Congoleum bank-
ruptcy, which had this feature, because it violated the bedrock principle
of equality of distribution.622
In an asbestos bankruptcy, the assets from which pending and future
claims will be paid are transferred to a trust set up under Section 524(g)
of the Bankruptcy Code.623 The amount set by the bankruptcy court that
will need to be transferred to the trust is determined in the course of an
estimation proceeding624 largely on the basis of testimony by a small co-
terie of professional experts who regularly appear in asbestos bankrupt-
cies and provide "cookie cutter" reports and testimony on behalf of the
current and future asbestos tort claimants. These professional experts'
expertise is in asbestos settlement behavior. They use pre-bankruptcy
settlements as dispositive evidence of the debtor's liability for pending
and future claims. Notably missing from their expertise and testimony is
how exposure to asbestos causes disease, the level of exposure needed to
cause disease, and the density and duration of exposure experienced by
pending claimants and others who used the debtor's products. Most
bankruptcy courts have approved this method by which the liability of the
debtor for pending and future claims is simply assumed based on histori-
621. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 44, at 152-53 tbl.D.1 (listing bankruptcies through
summer of 2004). See also Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Change, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 526 (2007).
622. Opinion Resolving Motions and Cross Motions for Summary Judgment on Confir-
mation of Joint Plan of Reorganization Dated as of February 5, 2008 at 5, 21, In re Con-
goleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 5, 2008).
623. See Brickman, Ethical Issues In Asbestos Litigation, supra note 45, at 862-63. In
some asbestos related bankruptcies, pending claims are settled on the eve of a "prepack-
aged" bankruptcy filing. Id. at 874.
624. "If contingent claims are to be treated and discharged in bankruptcy, somehow
their value must be estimated and they must be included in and provided for in the bank-
ruptcy plan." DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., 3 BANKRUPTCY § 11-5 (1992). Section 502(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code allows the Court to estimate "for purpose of allowance . . . any
contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be.,
would unduly delay the administration of the case .... 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(c) (2000).
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cal settlement practices, sometimes with some adjustments, rather than
requiring that the estimation be based on the intrinsic nature of the
debtor's products, the levels of exposure of users of the product, and
other criteria related to disease causation. 62 5
This method allows the professional experts and the court to dispense
with the issue of causation, including whether a pending claimant was
actually exposed to the debtor's products, whether these products con-
tained a respirable form of asbestos, whether the exposure was of suffi-
cient density and duration to have caused the diagnosed disease, whether
the claimant had an asbestos related disease diagnosed by a doctor using
reliable methods, and whether the occupational and medical history re-
lied on by the diagnosing doctors was taken by that doctor or even by a
medically trained person who was not in the direct or indirect employ of
the lawyers. Instead, this estimation procedure simply assumes for pur-
poses of valuing pending and future claims, that if a pre-bankruptcy claim
had been settled, then that indicates that there was causation irrespective
of (1) whether the elements of causation, as listed above, were present;
(2) whether a substantial portion of settled claims were specious, if not
fraudulent; and even of (3) whether the medical reports to support these
claims were generated by some litigation doctors who, along with some
screening company principals, have subsequently refused to testify about
how diagnoses were produced, citing their Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination. 626
This estimation method is inconsistent with Section 502 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code which provides that state law governs the substance and va-
lidity of claims,627 but that claims that are "unenforceable against the
debtor and property of the debtor under ... applicable law" 628 must be
disallowed. Bankruptcy courts have effectively held that if specious, if
not fraudulent, claims were settled, even en masse, then pending and fu-
ture specious, if not fraudulent, claims are in accord with state law.629 No
625. See, e.g., In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 111, 124 (D. Del 2006); In re
Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 330 B.R. 133, 134-135 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005); Owens Corning
v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 322 B.R. 719, 721-22 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005); In re Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 189 B.R. 681, 683 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995).
626. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 586 n.256.
627. "The claims being valued arise under state law, hence state law determines their
validity and value. 'The "basic federal rule" in bankruptcy is that state law governs the
substance of claims, Congress having "generally left the determination of property rights in
the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law."' The same principle applies to estimation
proceedings under § 502(c)" of the Bankruptcy Code. See Owens Corning, 322 B.R. at 721-
22 (citing Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 13, 20 (2000)). "If claims are substan-
tively valid under state law they may not be effectively denied by indefinite postponement
without violating the rule of Erie." In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 237 F. Supp.
2d 297, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). "An unbroken line of authority holds that state law claims
remain governed by state law, even after the debtor invokes federal bankruptcy protec-
tion." See In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. 223, 225 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
628. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2000).
629. See, e.g., Owens Corning, 322 B.R. at 722, 724 (Having established that the validity
of the projections provided is to be determined in accordance with state law and "on the
basis of what would have been a fair resolution of the claims [in the state tort law system]
in the absence of bankruptcy," Judge Fullam refused to discount the estimation provided
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state statute or decisional law, however, provides that a tort claim is valid
in the absence of proof of the elements of causation as listed above. By
validating the use of retained experts' reliance on past settlements rather
than any assessment of disease and causation to establish both liability
and the value of claims, bankruptcy courts have effectively endorsed the
litigation screenings that generated the large majority of the pending
claims despite the considerable evidence reviewed here that most of these
claims of a nonmalignant disease are meritless and the product of a
scheme to manufacture them for money.
To estimate future claims, these professional experts project the num-
ber of future mesothelioma claims, based largely on epidemiological data,
and then determine from historical evidence the propensity of those
stricken with that disease to sue the debtor.630 These estimations tend to
conflate other cancer claims, including lung cancer, with the projection of
mesothelioma claims.631 This same process, however, cannot be used to
project nonmalignant claims, mostly asbestosis, because there is no epide-
miological basis for doing so.632 To overcome this hurdle, the profes-
sional experts invariably base their projections of the future number of
asbestosis claims on the past ratios of asbestosis claims to mesothelioma
claims filed against the debtor or on ratios of nonmalignant to malignant
claims, adjusted for a variety of projected conditions-not on the disease
criteria discussed above. 633 Here, too, these experts assume that the pre-
bankruptcy settlements entered into by the debtor of nonmalignant
claims are proof that the elements of causation listed above were met
even though there is considerable evidence that these claims were not
settled on the basis of their merits but rather were the product of mass
filings.634 Nonetheless, based on historical settlement patterns, these ex-
perts calculate a ratio referred to as the "nonmalignant multiplier" which
is the ratio of nonmalignant to malignant clams that they project would
by the tort claimants' lawyers' experts despite the fact "that, in the past, non-meritorious
claims may have been generated as a result of intensive 'marketing' efforts by law firms.");
In re USG Corp., 290 B.R. 223, 225 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (stating that the court lacks
discretion "[a]s to the application of federal or state substantive law to the merits of the
claims themselves" and therefore in accordance with "[a]n unbroken line of authority...
state law claims remain governed by state law, even after the debtor invokes federal bank-
ruptcy protection.").
630. "Several epidemiological studies aimed at projecting total [incidence of mesothe-
lioma] in the United States were conducted in the late 1970s and 1980s. Each of these
studies predicted the number of [mesothelioma] cases or deaths expected to occur in the
future among persons occupationally exposed to asbestos over the previous several de-
cades. Litigators still use the study by Nicholson et al. (1982) [W.J. Nicholson, C. Perkel &
T.J. Selikoff, Occupational Exposure to Asbestos: Population at Risk and Projected Mortal-
ity-1980-2030, AM. J. INDUs. MED., 259-311 (1982)] as the standard reference on occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos." CARROLL ET AL., supra note 44, at 15 (internal citations
omitted).
631. Id.
632. Expert Report of Dr. Mark A. Peterson at 6.3.4, In re Fed. Mogul Global, Inc.,
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be the case if the debtor had remained in the tort system.6 35 Separating
out the mesothelioma claims from the lung cancer and "other cancer"
claims in these calculations, and also separating out asbestosis claims
from other nonmalignant claims, mostly pleural plaque claims, yields a
ratio/projection by these experts of approximately ten times as many as-
bestosis claims as mesothelioma claims.636 This method of claim projec-
tion is used to generate the highest possible numbers of asbestosis claims
and, therefore, the highest possible transfers of assets into the ensuing
asbestos bankruptcy trusts for distribution to pending and future claim-
ants and their lawyers.
The work of these professional experts who rely on settlement prac-
tices to project disease is belied by recently compiled data on the inci-
dence of asbestosis. To counter the professional experts' reliance on a so-
called nonmalignant multiplier as a substitute for an epidemiological ba-
sis for projecting asbestosis, the debtor in the W.R. Grace Co. bankruptcy
retained an expert, Dr. Howard Ory, to conduct an epidemiological study
635. Id.
636. Id. (Dr. Peterson explained in his expert report that he generated the
nonmalignant multiplier by calculating the ratio of nonmalignant claim filings to cancer
claim filings during a given year. The results of this calculation provided him with a ratio
of 10.19 nonmalignancy claims filed for every cancer claim. He then estimated the number
of nonmalignancy claims that will be filed in a future year by multiplying the already estab-
lished projection of future cancer claims for that year by the nonmalignant multiplier. Sup-
plemental Expert Report of Dr. Robin A. Cantor at 26, Official Comm. of Asbestos
Claimants v. Asbestos Prop. Damage Comm., No. 05-59 JHR, 2005 WL 2898173 (D. Del.
Apr. 26, 2005) (reporting that the weighted average of nonmalignant to malignant claims in
the 1998-2001 period was 12.9:1); Report on Opinions and Support for Opinions of Mark
A. Peterson, Re: Asbestos Liabilities of Babcock and Wilcox on June 30, 1998 and March
31, 1999 at 20 (indicating that the nonmalignant to malignant multiplier for Babcock v.
Wilcox for the 1992-1994 period was 12.376 and for 1995-1997 it was 14.245) (on file with
author); Mark A. Peterson, Findings Re: Liability of H.K. Porter for Future Asbestos Per-
sonal Injury Claims at 4 (Jan. 6, 1994) (stating "that across time and for every asbestos
defendant the number of nonmalignancy claims is a fairly stable multiplier of the number
of cancer claims: approximately 7 nonmalignancy claims for every cancer claim." See also
Email from Claim Resolution Management Corp. to Professor Brickman ("CRSC"),
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Breakdown of Claim Filings for Selected Dis-
eases (Primary Disease Only) (Dec. 12, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter CRMC
Data] (according to data provided by the CRMC, the total number of nonmalignant claims
filed with the Manville Trust during the 1988-2002 period was 480,140 compared to 93,977
malignant claims, a ratio of approximately 5:1. During that period, 380,515 asbestosis
claims were filed with the Manville Trust, compared to 23,812 mesothelioma claims, a ratio
of approximately 16:1); CARROLL ET AL., supra note 44, at 71 tbl.4.1. RAND reports that
for the period 1988-2002, there were a total of 567,507 nonmalignant claim filings and
67,828 malignant claim filings (of which 21,323 were for mesothelioma), a ratio of approxi-
mately 8.4:1 of nonmalignant to malignant claims. RAND does not break out the number
of asbestosis claims from the nonmalignant total. However, Manville Trust data indicates
that approximately eighty percent of nonmalignant claims that were filed with the Trust
were for asbestosis. See infra note 643. Applying that percentage to the RAND data indi-
cates that of the 567,507 nonmalignant claims filed in the 1988-2002 period, approximately
454,000 were for asbestosis. Thus, the ratio of asbestosis to mesothelioma in the 1988-2002
period, on the basis of RAND data, was 21:3:1. While there is considerable variability in
the ratios used for projection purposes in various expert reports of nonmalignant to malig-
nant claims and asbestosis to mesothelioma claims, a 10:1 ratio of asbestosis to mesothe-
lioma claims appears to be as close to a consensus ratio used in plaintiffs' experts'
projections as can be obtained.
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of the incidence of asbestosis. 637 Using the General Practice Research
Database ("GPRD"),638 which is collected from information in the
United Kingdom and includes actual medical data on the diagnosis of
disease, Dr. Ory concluded that the actual diagnosis-based asbestosis to
mesothelioma ratio is 0.95:1; that is, in the period from 1989 to 2005, for
every one hundred men diagnosed with mesothelioma, there were ninety-
five men diagnosed with asbestosis.639 Based upon several U.S.
databases, Dr. Ory determined that there were approximately 28,961
cases of men diagnosed with mesothelioma that occurred in the U.S. in
the period of 1989 through 2001.640 In that 1989-2001 period, RAND
reports that there were approximately 493,000 claims filed for
nonmalignant asbestos-related conditions. 641 Using W.R. Grace data to
calculate the breakdown of nonmalignant claims into asbestosis and pleu-
ral plaques, Dr. Ory estimated that approximately eighty-one percent of
these claims, 399,000, alleged asbestosis. 642 On the basis of Dr. Ory's epi-
demiological study, this result is fourteen times greater than the number
of medically plausible cases of asbestosis. 643 Dr. Ory cites to additional
evidence in support of his epidemiologically-based ratio calculation, in-
cluding the scientific implausibility of the substantial rise in the number
of asbestosis claims filed against defendants and asbestos bankruptcy
trusts in the 1989-2001 period 644 at a time when the overall incidence
rates of mesothelioma had peaked and began to fall within that period.
645
637. See generally Rebuttal Report of Dr. Howard William Ory, M.D., M.S.C. to the
Expert Reports of Laura Welch, M.D. and Mark A. Peterson, J.D., Ph.D., In re W.R.
Grace & Co., No. 01-1139 (JFK), (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Ory Report].
638. The database, initially created in 1989, encompasses 3,000,000 people who are en-
rolled with selected general practitioners. For the period examined, 1989 through mid-
2005, there were thus 30,000,000 person-years of epidemiologic observation. Id. at 11. The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration has noted that "GPRD is the largest
pharmacoepidemiologic database in the world with the highest quality data . . . [t]his
database resource is superior in many ways to any US-based database." Id.
639. Id. at 15. Dr. Ory also concludes that the mesothelioma rate in England is twice
the rate of that in the United States. Id. at 35. Therefore, his calculated 0.95:1 ratio of
asbestosis to mesothelioma overstates the number of medically plausible claims of asbesto-
sis in the United States. Id.
640. Id. at 17.
641. Id. at 21 (citing CARROLL ET AL., supra note 44, at 71 tbl.4.1.
642. This is virtually identical to the Manville Trust data. See supra note 657.
643. Ory Report, supra note 637, at 21, 23. Using Manville Trust data yields similar
percentages in the 1988 to September 30, 2007 period; of the total 589,867 nonmalignant
claims filed during that time, 472,870 or 80.17% claimed asbestosis. See CRMC Data, supra
note 636.
644. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 44, at 71 tbl.4.1 (showing a rise in the number of
nonmalignant claims filed in the period between 1989-2001. According to the data pro-
vided by RAND, the number of nonmalignant filings in 1989 were 45,151 and by 2001, the
number had grown significantly to 89,308); see also CRMC Data, supra note 636 (provid-
ing data that from 1988-2003, the number of nonmalignant claims filed rose from approxi-
mately 28,239 to 78,376).
645. See NAT'L CANCER INST., SURVEILLANCE, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND END RESULTS
(SEER) CANCER STATISTICS REVIEW 1975-2003 fig.IVII-1 (L. Clegg et al. eds., 2006),
available at http://www.seer.cancer.gov/css/1975-2003/ (showing a decline in the mesothe-
lioma incidence rate). "[B]ased on SEER [Surveillance, Epidemiology & End Results
Database of the National Cancer Institute] data, of the annual percentage change of
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Based on the 0:95:1 disease ratio, Dr. Ory concluded that there were
27,970 men in the United States who could plausibly have developed as-
bestosis during the years 1989-2001.646 As noted, however, there were
approximately 399,000 asbestosis claims in that period.647 Assuming,
conservatively, that each claim generated approximately $50,000 in settle-
ments,64 8 then over $18.5 billion have been paid out for 70,000 specious
asbestosis claims in the period 1989-2001. This estimate does not include
the asbestosis claims filed in 2002-2005, nor the billions of dollars trans-
ferred to asbestos bankruptcy trusts as a consequence of estimation pro-
ceedings which based the projection of future asbestosis claims on a 10:1
ratio to future mesothelioma claims.64 9 The 2002-2005 data adds approxi-
mately $2.7 billion to this computation, for a total of $21.2 billion as the
value of specious asbestosis claims.650 Taking into account the approxi-
mately thirty billion dollars that has been sequestered in asbestos bank-
ruptcy trusts for payment of claims,65 1 the total payout for specious
asbestosis claims may exceed twenty-five billion dollars.
Lung cancer projections are also subject to substantial overstatement in
the estimation process. The large majority of lung cancers in the United
States are attributable to smoking.652 Substantial occupational exposure
of smokers to asbestos significantly increases the risk of lung cancer.653
mesothelioma incidence rates," Dr. Ory concludes that there is a striking "improbability
that the number of cases of asbestosis would rise as ... the incidence rate of mesothelioma
has been steadily declining since 1989." Ory further suggests that "[g]iven the declining
consumption of, and exposure to, asbestos since 1950," "the rate of decline of asbestosis
incidence rate should be steeper than that for mesothelioma [because] ... a greater level of
exposure [to asbestos] is required for a person to develop asbestosis than for a person to
develop mesothelioma." Ory Report, supra note 637, at 27-31.
646. Id. at 40.
647. See supra text accompanying note 644.
648. In the period from 1999 to 2000, an unimpaired nonmalignant asbestos claim was
worth $60,000-$100,000. See Thomas Korosec, Enough To Make You Sick, DALLAS OB-
SERVER, Sept. 26, 2002, available at http://www.dallasobserver.comcontent/printVersion/
280599.
649. See supra text accompanying notes 623-26, 632-38.
650. Using Manville Trust data as a proxy for the total number of asbestosis claims
filings in order to update RAND data, there were approximately 147,243 non-malignant
claims filed in the 2002-2005 period. CRMC Data, supra note 636. Applying Dr. Ory's
eighty-one percent estimation to this total indicates that approximately 119,266 of the
147,243 nonmalignant claims filed during the 2002-2005 period alleged asbestosis. During
that same period, the CRMC reports approximately 12,294 claims of mesothelioma were
filed with the Manville Trust. Id. Accordingly, applying Dr. Ory's 0:95:1 ratio, the number
of medically plausible asbestosis claims filed in the 2002-2005 period was 11,679. Thus, the
excess, medically implausible number of asbestosis claims filed in that period was approxi-
mately 107,587. For the 2002-2005 period, I am using an estimated value for asbestosis
claims of $10,000-$50,000 with a $25,000 average.
651. See Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, supra note 45, at 868 n.141.
652. "Cigarette smoking is by far the largest cause of lung cancer, and the worldwide
epidemic of lung cancer is attributable largely to smoking." CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 43 (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/sgr/sgr-2004/index.htm.
653. See Heather H. Nelson & Karl T. Kelsey, The Molecular Epidemiology of Asbestos
and Tobacco in Lung Cancer, 21 ONCOGENE 7284, 7284 (2002) (citing I. Selikoff, Asbestos
Exposure, Smoking and Neoplasia, 204 JAMA 106 (1968)) ("[A]sbestos exposure alone is
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However, for the increased risk of lung cancer to be multiplicative, the
medical literature indicates that the density and duration of a smoker's
asbestos exposure must have been sufficient to have caused underlying
asbestosis. 654 When asbestos defendants prevail in lung cancer litigation
brought by or on behalf of a smoker, it is usually because the plaintiff is
unable to prove that there was sufficient exposure to defendant's product
to have constituted that exposure as a substantial factor in addition to
smoking in causing the lung cancer.
A study of male lung cancer deaths in England in the period 1980-2000
(excluding 1981) concluded that two to three percent were attributable to
asbestos exposure. 655 The study also found that the ratio of asbestos-re-
lated lung cancer to mesothelioma deaths during the time period was be-
tween two-thirds and one. Applying a one-to-one ratio of lung cancer
claims to mesothelioma claims 656 to Manville Trust data indicates that
approximately twenty-five percent of the 47,582 lung cancer claims filed
with the Manville Trust in the period from 1988 to 2006, that is, 12,300
lung cancer claims, are not properly attributable to asbestos exposure.
657
associated with an approximate fivefold increase in lung cancer risk ... smoking alone with
about a 10-fold risk and in workers with both exposures risk has been estimated at about
50-fold above that for the unexposed."). The studies concluding that smokers with asbes-
tos exposure face a multiplicative risk of lung cancer rely on the epidemiological studies
conducted by Dr. Irving Selikoff or on reports that rely on these early studies. However,
these early studies by Dr. Selikoff were based on much higher asbestos exposure levels
than occur today and in the recent past. See Brickman, Disparities, supra note 11, at 533-
38. The Selikoff studies have also been criticized because they did not adequately account
or control for disease risk factors, including smoking. See Solving the Asbestos Litigation
Crisis: S. 1125, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Crapo Testimony] (written testi-
mony of Dr. James D. Crapo, Professor of Med., Nat'l Jewish Ctr. and Univ. of Colo.
Health Scis. Ctr.). Moreover lung cancer risk attributable to asbestos cannot be accurately
established because of the lack of adequate exposure data and problems of confounding
and therefore current estimates may be biased upward. Robert W. Morgan, Attitudes
About Asbestos and Lung Cancer, 22 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 437, 439 (1992). In addition, the
evidence that asbestos exposure alone can cause lung cancer is weak. Id. at 437.
654. See William Weiss, Asbestosis: A Marker for the Increased Risk of Lung Cancer
Among Workers Exposed to Asbestos, 115 CHEST 536 (1999) and sources cited therein. See
also, Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 155 (2003) (quoting from A. CHURG & F.
GREEN, PATHOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE 343 (2d ed. 1998) ("[S]tudies pro-
vide strong support for the notion that asbestosis is crucial to the development of asbestos-
associated lung cancers."); Crapo Testimony, supra note 653, at 310. But see Victor L.
Roggli et al., Does Asbestos or Asbestosis Cause Carcinoma of the Lung?, 26 AM. J. IND.
MED. 835 (1994).
655. See Andrew J. Darnton et al., Estimating The Number of Asbestos-Related Lung
Cancer Deaths in Great Britain from 1980 to 2000, 50 ANN. OccuP. HYGIENE 29, 34 (2006).
The study acknowledged that other studies of Western European populations had found
somewhat higher percentages, in the 5.7% to 19% range. Id. at 33.
656. While mesotheliomas are virtually always fatal, lung cancer mortality is more
mixed. For purposes of this comparison, however, that variance will be ignored.
657. The number of mesothelioma claims filed with the Manville Trust in the period
1988 to June 30, 2006 was 35,293, while the number of lung cancer claims filed was 47,582.
CRMC Data, supra note 636. Thus, approximately 12,300 lung cancer claims were "ex-
cess" on the basis of the Darnton Study. It is not clear whether there are significant varia-
tions between occupational exposures in England and the United States which could
account for some of the "excess" lung cancer claims. See American Lung Association,
Lung Cancer Fact Sheet (October 2007) http://www.lungusa.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c
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Accordingly, lung cancer claim projections based on previous filings are
likely to overestimate the actual number of lung cancers where asbestos
exposure is a substantial causal or contributing factor by a similar margin.
C. THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE: PROPOSED REMEDIES
The failures of the civil justice system to cope with specious, if not
fraudulent, claim generation by litigation screenings requires a multiplic-
ity of approaches, some fairly simple but involving resolute actions by
courts and others more complex.
Perhaps the simplest resolution is for trial (and appellate) courts to
allow defendants to discover all of the medical reports prepared by a liti-
gation doctor for other screened claimants if that doctor prepared a medi-
cal report for a litigant before the court irrespective of whether that the
litigation doctor is an testifying or consulting expert. As argued above,
not allowing this discovery violates Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and state equivalents of that Rule. 658
A second resolution is for bankruptcy courts to require that for pend-
ing and future claims to be valid, all of the essential elements of causation
required to maintain a cause of action under state law have to be met. As
part of the process, bankruptcy courts should allow debtors or commer-
cial creditors to subject a stratified random sample of pending claims to
medical review by unaligned medical experts in order to test the reliabil-
ity of the medical reports prepared to support these claims.659 The out-
comes of these inquiries should then be incorporated into the process of
claim estimation to replace the use of experts' reliance on historic settle-
ment values and ratios, which serves to promote the generation of spe-
cious, if not fraudulent, claims.
To this point, resolution of some of the failures of the civil justice sys-
tem are attainable by corrective actions of judges. However, an addi-
tional response prompted by defendants' use of an MDL strategy and
Judge Jack's historic expos6 of litigation screening fraud by allowing dis-
covery of all of the medical reports of litigants in MDL 1553 is a neces-
sary adjunct of civil justice reform.
1. The MDL Strategy For Overcoming the Barriers to Discovery
Defendants in MDL 1553 finessed the barrier to discovery of the total-
ity of litigation doctors' reports by adopting a strategy to create an MDL
proceeding with a sufficient number of claims 660 so that some of the doc-
=dvLUK900E&b=2060245&contentid=%7BBD3F3387-3AA3-4660-9EF7-3F5BD8B6D
251%7D&notoc=l ("The number of deaths due to lung cancer has increased approxi-
mately 4 percent between 1999 and 2004 from 152,156 to 158,009.").
658. See supra text accompanying notes 541-547.
659. Cf. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 699 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that data
collected from a random sample of pending Dalkon Shield claims ordered by the court
enabled experts to weed out claims where there was no valid medical proof of the use of
the product).
660. In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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tors who had rendered thousands of the diagnoses for claims in the MDL
could be cross examined about all of those medical reports. To get to the
critical mass, defendants removed thousands of claims, filed mostly in
state courts in Mississippi, to federal courts where they were then aggre-
gated into an MDL proceeding. 661 All plaintiffs raised jurisdictional ob-
jections, asserting that the cases had been improperly removed. 662 Upon
initial review, Judge Jack expressed the concern that she lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the removals from state court were im-
proper.663 Though plaintiffs' counsels had been opposed to the MDL,
once it was convened, they saw a benefit to be obtained and requested
the court to defer ruling on the pending remand motions so that they
could take advantage of the MDL proceeding by conducting discovery of
the defendants. 664
This proved to be a strategic blunder. Per their request, Judge Jack
deferred ruling on jurisdiction. 665 But Judge Jack also allowed defend-
ants to take some initial discovery of plaintiffs relating to the claims and
jurisdiction.666 That discovery quickly led to the unraveling of the
scheme to "manufacture diagnoses for money.
667
The success of the defendants' MDL strategy rested on Judge Jack's
willingness to allow discovery before making the determination that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for most of the claimants. Most
federal judges, however, instead of permitting, let alone personally di-
recting, discovery would likely have dismissed most of the claims on juris-
dictional grounds at the outset.668 However improbable, Judge Jack did
not do so. She went ahead even though she knew that the court lacked
jurisdiction and that her opinion was mostly advisory in nature. 669 In-
deed, in remanding the cases back to state court, she stated: "In spite of
this, the Court has included its findings concerning all of the testimony it
received, in hopes that the state courts that ultimately must shepherd
these cases to their conclusion will not have to re-hear Daubert-type chal-
lenges to these doctors and their diagnoses.
'670
But for the confluence of the factors that led to MDL 1553, including
the improper removals and Judge Jack's willingness to continue with dis-
covery despite being aware of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
MDL 1553 would not have proceeded, and the fact that thousands of di-
agnoses had been "manufactured for money" would never have come to
light in any authoritative manner. Nor would Judge Jack's extensive and
detailed findings on the use of an "assembly line" method of generating
661. Id. at 573-74.
662. Id. at 574.
663. Id. at 574-75.
664. Id. at 575, 666.
665. Id. at 666.
666. Id. at 575-76.
667. Id. at 635.
668. Id. at 579, 637.
669. Id. at 639.
670. Id. at 633.
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claims in which she observed that lawyers were making medical judg-
ments and doctors were making legal judgments. 671
MDL 1553 thus not only provides the most important insight of the
judicial literature into the mass production of specious medical evidence
in litigation screenings, it also points towards a legislative strategy that
would provide defendants with the means of dealing with the illegitimate
aspects of litigation screenings in the absence of an MDL.
I propose that in a mass tort litigation where litigation screenings are
used and large numbers of cases are filed in various state courts, defend-
ants should be empowered to remove those cases which meet minimal
diversity standards under the Constitution to federal courts,67 2 where
they would then be aggregated into an MDL proceeding for pre-trial pur-
poses. In such a proceeding, litigation doctors and other medical person-
nel who have provided large numbers of medical reports in support of the
claims may have their reliability tested in a Daubert challenge. 673 In such
a proceeding, defendants would be allowed to subpoena and examine,
subject to confidentiality protections, all of the records of that doctor or
medical technician that were produced to support identical or similar
claims of injury for those litigants who were recruited to attend litigation
screenings.
Under this proposed legislation, where at least 1,000 plaintiffs have
brought tort actions in one or more state courts, each alleging the identi-
cal or similar injuries caused by one or more defendants, and where there
is commonality of law and fact, and the claims have been generated by a
litigation screening, 674 then any defendant may remove all such claims
that meet the minimum diversity standard to a federal court designated
671. Id. at 635. Judge Jack stated: "In the majority of cases, these diagnoses are more
the creation of lawyers than of doctors.... [At the same time,] the challenged diagnosing
doctors seemed to be under the impression they were practicing law rather than medicine."
672. Article III of the Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend ...
to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Al-
though Justice Marshall announced a rule of "complete diversity" in the early case of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, requiring that all parties in a multi-party suit must be diverse from
all opposing parties, the requirement has been held to be merely statutory. Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
531-32 (1967) (reading Strawbridge as limited to interpretation of the First Judiciary Act as
opposed to a statement of the Constitutional limitations on diversity jurisdiction). Thus,
under the Constitution, Congress could grant jurisdiction to courts over cases in which the
parties are minimally diverse (that is, at least one of the parties on one side is a citizen of a
different state than the opposing parties) as opposed to completely diverse. 13B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3605 (2007) (discussing
minimal diversity and Congress's ability to "authorize[ ] something less than complete di-
versity."). The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") relies on the constitutional
standard of minimal diversity to support its provision granting federal district courts origi-
nal jurisdiction in class actions and mass actions in which the amount in controversy ex-
ceeds $5,000,000 and "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different
from any defendant." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(2) (Supp. V 2005). See also the discussion of
CAFA, infra notes 676-680 and accompanying text.
673. See, e.g., In re Silica Prods., Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 620-22 (S.D. Tex.
2005).
674. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 216-217.
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by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation under 28 U.S.C. Section
1407(a) irrespective of the jurisdictional amount. 675 Findings of the fed-
eral court designated by the Panel with regard to the admissibility of evi-
dence of causation and the reliability of medical and scientific experts
used to establish both general and specific causation shall be binding on
all state and federal courts to which the cases are transferred after the
completion of the MDL proceeding.
For purposes of determining whether the requisite number of cases
have been filed in state courts to permit removal to federal court under
this provision, cases that have been joined together or consolidated for
trial shall be counted according to the number of individual plaintiffs that
have been joined together or consolidated for trial.
The proposal bears some resemblance to the "mass action" provision
found in Section 4 of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").
6 7 6
This Section expands the class action treatment of 28 U.S.C. Section 1332
to permit removal of actions by a large number of plaintiffs (over 100)
which though not certified as a class action, 677 may be "class actions in
disguise." 678 Specifically, it allows the removal to federal court of a req-
uisite number of individual actions which are to be adjudicated in one
combined trial in a state court. This would have particular application to
the mass consolidations that are authorized by statute and which have
675. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
676. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (amending
28 U.S.C. § 1332 by adding (d)(11), which addresses mass actions). The Act primarily does
three things: (1) amends the federal diversity statute by relaxing the absolute diversity and
amount in controversy requirements; (2) allows for broader removal of state class actions
by defendants; and (3) provides a consumer class "bill of rights" by allowing further judi-
cial oversight of class action settlements. See generally Paul S. Wallace, Jr., CRS REP. FOR
CONGRESS: CLASS ACrIONS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 109TH CONGRESS:
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (2005) (describing the various provisions and his-
tory of the Act); S. Rvr. No. 109-14 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3; S. Amy
Spencer, Once More into the Breach, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1067 (2006).
Various incarnations of CAFA had been introduced numerous times in the House and
Senate, as early as the 105th Congress. Class Action Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2083, 105th
Cong. § 4 (1998). Treatment of mass actions, however, did not enter the bill until it was
reintroduced in the 107th Congress, which allowed "a civil action that is not otherwise a
class action" to be "deemed a class action." Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, S. 1712,
107th Cong. § 4 (2001) (addressing mass actions in the contexts of named plaintiffs who are
not an attorneys general purporting to act for the general public and general claims for
monetary relief by 100 or more persons, proposed to be tried jointly because of common
questions of law or fact). The term "mass action" was first introduced in the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2003, which excepted "private attorney general" claims by plaintiffs claim-
ing to represent the general public under a state statute authorizing such actions from mass
action treatment. Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. 1751, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003) (de-
fining civil actions involving the claims of 100 or more plaintiffs for monetary relief "pro-
posed to be tried jointly in any respect on the ground that the claims involve common
questions of law or fact" to be "mass actions" deemed to be class actions).
677. Under the statute, a "mass action" is defined as "any civil action (except a civil
action within the scope of section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more
persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve
common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plain-
tiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under [28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)]." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(l1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 2005).
678. 151 CONG. REC. H732 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrener).
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taken place in Mississippi and West Virginia. 679
This proposal would allow mass tort defendants who are being sued by
claimants generated by litigation screenings to use discovery to determine
whether the medical reports generated by the screenings were "manufac-
tured for money. '68 0
D. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE:
A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Undoubtedly the greatest threat to the continuation of "en-
trepreneurial" litigation screenings has been the ongoing investigations of
silica and asbestos litigation by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, 681 and of the fen-phen litigation by the U.S. Attorney
in Philadelphia.682 Neither investigation has resulted in indictments, and
given the length of time that has elapsed since these investigations began
and other considerations, it appears highly unlikely that indictments will
be forthcoming. 68 3
These failures to indict the doctors or lawyers involved in the schemes
to manufacture diagnoses for money highlights a critical defect in the
criminal justice system. The inescapable conclusion from the evidence is
that "manufacturing diagnoses for money" works.
Settlements and judgments resulting from the evidence and testimony
in the five mass tort litigations discussed in this Article amount to many
679. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 (West 2008); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 20 (West 2007).
680. Though based in some measure on CAFA, the proposal set forth in this Article
differs in material ways from the "mass action" provision in CAFA. CAFA has carved out
four exceptions to the mass action treatment: (1) actions in which all the claims arise from
an accident within a state and the alleged injuries were caused in the state or contiguous
states; (2) the claims are joined by the defendant; (3) the claims are asserted on behalf of
the general public pursuant to a state statute authorizing such "private attorney general"
actions; and (4) claims that have been consolidated solely for pretrial proceedings. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2005). The first and third exceptions specifically seek
to keep cases involving uniquely state issues out of the federal courts. See S. REP. No. 108-
123, at 42-43 (2003) (suggesting that removing sudden major accident cases may in fact
lessen the efficiencies generally sought by the statute). Of the four exceptions, the one
most at odds with the proposed legislative strategy is the second which precludes the de-
fendant from joining state court claims in order to remove them to federal court for treat-
ment as a class action. It provides that "the term 'mass action' shall not include any civil
action in which .. . the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I1) (Supp. 2007). See also, S. REP. No. 108-123, at 43 (2003) ("This
provision will prevent defendants from moving to federal courts claims that do not other-
wise qualify for federal jurisdiction-something the original ... mass actions provision was
never intended to do."). The resistance to expansion of the mass action removal is further
affirmed by an ultimately rejected amendment that would have also exempted claims
"joined by the court sua sponte" and those joined solely for pretrial proceedings. 151
CONG. REC. S1142, 1142 (proposed amendment to bill 5.5), 151 CONG. REc. S1076 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lott) (expressing his disapproval of an amendment
which would "open the door for lawyers to make an end run around what we are trying to
do with class actions in this bill").
681. See Brickman, Silica/Asbestos Litigation, supra note 40, at 314.
682. Gold Rush, supra note 107, at 92.
683. Brickman, DOJ's Free Pass for Tort Fraud, supra note 507.
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billions of dollars.684 Medical and scientific experts in these litigations
have been paid at least one hundred million dollars in fees for their diag-
noses and testimony. 685 Virtually none have been sanctioned for their
conduct.686 Indeed, as one journalist noted, "[m]isconduct has not been
punished, but rewarded. '687 The failure of the civil justice system to pro-
vide a mechanism for testing the reliability of hundreds of thousands of
screening-generated medical reports is matched by the inability of the
criminal justice system to sanction the medical and scientific experts who
provide evidence that is not a product of good faith medical or scientific
practice and, at worst, shows compelling evidence of fraud.
It would appear that a principal reason why prosecutors are reticent to
prosecute the litigation doctors, even though they were, in Judge Jack's
words, part of a scheme to manufacture diagnoses for money and to pros-
ecute, as well, scientific experts is that the proof of fraud can be adduced
only by (1) a videotape, phone recording, or other direct evidence of a
transaction in which the doctor or other expert acknowledges that he or
she is committing fraud; (2) testimony to that effect by another partici-
pant in the transaction; or (3) testimony of other experts. The first two
types of evidence appear unobtainable. The third type, reliance on testi-
mony of other experts, is problematic from the perspective of
prosecutors.
An apt illustration is provided by asbestos screenings. In any given
case or few hundred cases involving the X-ray detection of mild asbesto-
sis, medical experts can and do differ in their interpretations of the X-
rays. The phenomenon is known as "inter-reader variability." 688 In the
aggregate, however, when a litigation doctor has read tens of thousands
of X-rays, the possibility that huge and consistent discrepancies between
the interpretations of neutral X-ray readers not seeking a future flow of
revenue and the X-ray readers regularly selected by plaintiffs' lawyers
who realize tens of millions of dollars in repeat business from finding
evidence of asbestosis689 can be explained as "inter-reader variability"
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. See infra note 693.
687. Alison Frankel, Still Ticking, supra note 140.
688. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
APPLYING THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE (ILO) INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION
OF RADIOGRAPHS OF PNEUMOCONIOSIS IN MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS, RESEARCH AND POPULA-
TION SURVEILLANCE, WORKER HEALTH MONITORING, GOVERNMENT PROGRAM ELIGIBIL-
ITY, AND COMPENSATION SETTINGS 5 (2005) (draft for comment), available at http://www.
cdc.gov/niosh/topics/chestradiography/pdfs/recommendations.pdf.
689. See, e.g., Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of "B" Readers' Interpretations of
Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes," 2004 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 843 (finding
upon re-reading by a distinguished panel that only 4.5% of 492 X-rays read by B Readers
selected by plaintiffs' lawyers as ninety-six percent positive for asbestosis, were in fact posi-
tive and that based on a statistical analysis, there was a probability of less than 1 in 10,000
"that the differences noted between initial and consultant readers are due to chance
alone." Id. at 850.). The Gitlin Study is described at supra notes 70-71; the Henry Report
confirmed the results of the Gitlin Study, finding that the error rate of the litigation doctors
was over ninety percent. See supra notes 72-76.
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recedes to near zero.
Nonetheless, prosecutors are apparently concerned that "reasonable
doubt" is virtually inherent in a process which relies on a "battle of the
experts" for evidence of fraud.690 Moreover, absolute witness immunity
for experts testifying in litigations and similar prohibitions in many states
protect the expert against sanctions for anything short of perjury.691 The
effect of prosecutors' failure to indict litigation doctors has been to confer
on these doctors (and the lawyers who hire them) a special dispensation
to "manufacture diagnoses for money." Doctors and scientists are obvi-
ously well aware of their effective immunity from prosecution and act
accordingly. That immunity extends to medical licensing boards and pro-
fessional associations. What doctors testify to in their role as expert wit-
nesses is, for the most part, invisible to the expert's professional
community. Even when their testimony is flagged by other doctors or
otherwise becomes known, licensing boards, for the most part, do not
consider the acts of doctors who provide specious X-ray readings and di-
agnoses, even by the thousands, to be within their purview. 692
It would therefore appear that state and federal legislation is needed to
empower prosecutors to pierce doctors' and scientific experts' effective
690. A "battle of the experts" was used by federal prosecutors to obtain a conviction of
Dr. Michael A. Rosin for defrauding the government by performing hundreds of unneces-
sary surgeries on elderly Medicare patients. United States v. Rosin, 263 F. App'x 16, 21(11th Cir. 2008). A random sample of surgical slides prepared by Dr. Rosin was reviewed
by two doctors who were experts for the government. They testified at trial as to their own
surgical policies, rates of cancer diagnoses, and the percentage of slides that resulted in
surgery. Those results were then compared to Dr. Rosin's results to show that Dr. Rosin
had performed unnecessary surgery. Id.
691. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 345 (1983).
692. For example, a report that two asbestos litigation doctors would only "face public
reprimands but keep their licenses after the Mississippi Board of Medical Licensure deter-
mined they violated the physician's code of conduct by signing or stamping their signatures
on documents involving 700 silicosis claims when they had not actually made diagnoses."
Jimmie Galer, Two Doctors Found Guilty for False Diagnosis Will Keep Licenses, CLAR-
ION-LEDGER, Sept. 21, 2007, at 1A. "In courts around the nation, countless asbestosis and
silicosis suits remain open on the strength of diagnoses from a dozen doctors [Judge] Jack
exposed. All have escaped accountability except [Dr.] Ray Harron," who entered into an
agreement with the Texas Board of Medical Licensure in which he agreed to cease practic-
ing medicine until the expiration of his license and further agreed not to seek renewal of
his license. Steve Karis, Judge Jack's Fury Over Asbestos Fraud Ignored by State Courts,
SE. TEX. REC., Oct. 4, 2007. Dr. Harron accounted for over 80,000 medical reports filed
with the Manville Trust and was the most prolific of the asbestos litigation doctors. See
CRMC Response, supra note 17, at Ex. D. A few recent cases indicate that some volun-
tary professional organizations have attempted to sanction experts who provide specious
testimony by suspending or expelling them from the organization. See, e.g., Austin v. Am.
Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir. 2001); Budwin v. Am. Psycho-
logical Ass'n, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). Reportedly the American
Association of Neurological Surgeons has disciplined ten of its members over the past fif-
teen years. See Jennifer A. Turner, Going After the 'Hired Guns': Is Improper Expert Wit-
ness Testimony Unprofessional Conduct or the Negligent Practice of Medicine?, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 275, 282 (2006). In a small number of recent cases, professional licensing boards have
sanctioned experts who provided misleading testimony. See, e.g., Deatherage v. Examining
Bd. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828, 829 (Wash. 1997); cf. Huhta v. State Bd. of Med., 706




immunity from criminal prosecution. Drafting such legislation to distin-
guish between legitimately disputed diagnoses or theories of causation
and manufacturing medical or scientific evidence for money, however,
will be a daunting task and not one that I am attempting in this Article.
IX. CONCLUSION
The evidence considered in this Article leads to the ineluctable conclu-
sion that mass tort litigation screenings almost invariably involve the
mass production of medical reports which are manufactured for money
and not the product of good faith medical practice. These practices flour-
ish because (1) they are very lucrative; (2) courts insulate the litigation
doctors and their records from the extensive discovery that Judge Jack
allowed; and (3) bankruptcy courts allow the testimony of professional
experts to substitute for proof of causation in estimation proceedings.
Litigation screenings have also flourished because of the failures of the
civil and criminal justice systems to allow detection of specious, if not
fraudulent, claim generation, let alone to sanction this conduct. Instead,
these institutions have effectively granted litigation doctors immunity
from prosecution no matter how blatant their practices. Unless judges
and legislatures change practices, rulings, and statutes, the wholesale
manufacture of claims in litigation screenings will continue to flourish.
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APPENDIX
Mold Litigation
Mold litigation is an example of an entrepreneurial general causation
theory being advanced to generate substantial fees for the experts. The
litigation has proceeded because a small number of experts, paid millions
of dollars in fees for advancing theories rejected by medical science,693
regularly testify that mold causes "a terrifying array of diseases from lung
cancer, to cirrhosis of the liver."'694
Mold is a fungus which is alleged to cause a wide variety of diseases
and disabilities. After a groundbreaking thirty-two million dollar verdict
in Texas,695 followed by a number of successful lawsuits, 6 9 6 "mold is gold"
became a byword of lawyers who anticipated a big pay day: tens of
thousands of lawsuits generating hundreds of millions of dollars in contin-
693. One doctor, Gary Ordog, M.D., who had testified in hundreds of lawsuits alleging
injury from mold and mycotoxins, received his medical training in emergency medicine.
His fees were $10,000 a day for testimony and travel time. Daniel Fisher, Dr. Mold,
FORBES, Apr. 11, 2005, at 100. Dr. Ordog, one of the very few doctors disciplined for
improper diagnostic practices in mass tort litigation, was disciplined for his practices in
diagnosing and treating mold patients and other alleged toxic tort patients. The Medical
Board of California suspended his medical license and prohibited him from engaging in
"medical-legal or forensic practices." The Board found by clear and convincing evidence
that he had made some diagnoses that were "not sufficiently supported by the evidence,"
and that his care and treatment of patients fell short of the standard of practice because of
his "unbridled zeal to accomplish a legal result rather than a medical result." In re Ordog,
No. 05-2001-124743, at 40, 43, 47, 53-54 (Med. Bd. of Cal. May 26, 2006) (decision) (on file
with author). Another rare subject of disciplinary action is Dr. William Campbell. The
staff of the State Medical Board of Texas have brought a disciplinary action against Dr.
Andrew William Campbell, which is currently awaiting a final decision. Second Amended
Complaint at IV(A), In re Campbell, SOAH Docket No. 503-04-5717 (Tex. Med. Bd. Feb.
10, 2006). The administrative law judges at the State Office of Administrative Hearings
have filed a Proposal for Decision dated October 10, 2006, in which they find that Dr.
Campbell has violated provisions of law by, among others, "failing to practice medicine in
an acceptable manner consistent with public health and welfare," and committing "unpro-
fessional or dishonorable conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or injure the public." These
conclusions were based on many findings of fact, including that Dr. Campbell's diagnosis
of "mold exposure condition" is not supported by scientific evidence. Tex. Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs v. Campbell, SOAH Docket No. 503-04-5717 (Tex. Office of Admin. Hearings
Oct. 10, 2006) (proposal for decision).
694. Fisher, supra note 693, at 100.
695. Ballard v. Fire Ins. Exch., No. 99-05252, 2001 WL 883550 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Travis
County, Aug. 1, 2001).
696. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous (Los Angeles Co., Simi Co., Cal. 1999), as
reported in 2000 Verdictum Juris Press, No. SOO-12-13 ($350,000 settlement; negligent fail-
ure to maintain common area leafing to toxic mold); D'Alleva v. Woll, No. 99-018775-CK
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Oakland County, Nov. 28, 2000), as reported in JAS Publications, MICH.
TRIAL REP., No. 4, 11 (2001) ($250,000 partial settlement; claims against seller went to
arbitration; toxic fungi contamination not detected by defendant home inspectors); Deboer
v. Griffin Envtl. Servs., Inc., No. 97-03620-CE (Mich., Cir. Ct., Kent County, Mar. 7, 2000),
as reported in JAS Publications, MICH. TRIAL REP., No. 12, 12 (2000) ($200,000 jury award,
reduced to $173,000; exterminator used too much pesticide and sprayed water in basement
making it permanently wet, three toxic molds later found); Zinn v. Janoff & Olshan, Inc.,
No. 110564/99 (N.Y. Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), as reported in Jury Verdict Review & Publi-
cations, Inc., 18 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REV. & ANALYSIS, Issue 12 (2001) ($250,000 settle-




gency fees. 697 While the lawsuits have been highly profitable 698-the In-
surance Information Institute estimates that three billion dollars in mold
claims were paid out in 2002 699-mold litigation has never fulfilled its
early promise of being "the next asbestos."
Mold litigation requires scientific and medical testimony that mold
causes a variety of illnesses including the ones alleged in the litigation.
The scientific evidence, however, does not support the conclusion that
mold causes significant injury to humans.700 According to the evidence-
based statement of the American College of Occupational and Environ-
mental Medicine ("ACOEM"),70' mold is a fungus which is ubiquitous in
the environment. Everyone is exposed to molds and other fungi both
indoor and outdoors. The only exception is where there is very stringent
air filtration and isolation and environmental sanitation measures are ob-
served, as in organ transplant isolation units.702 Molds and other fungi
generally are not pathogenic to healthy humans but may adversely affect
human health through three processes: 1) allergy, 2) infection, and 3)
toxicity.70 3
A. ALLERGY
Most allergic reactions are to molds found outdoors. Typically, these
symptoms are referred to as "hay fever. 70 4 While medical literature as-
sociates a variety of respiratory illnesses, such as asthma and cough, with
living in damp buildings, mold spores are not responsible for these in-
flammatory responses to a damp environment. 705 These responses are
usually caused by dust mite infections and bacterial growth which occurs
in damp environments. 70 6 In those who do develop an allergic reaction to
mold, the reactions are mostly limited to rhinitis ("runny nose") or
697. Stephanie F. Cahill, Texas Troubles Translate into Millions of Dollars for a Practice
that is Bound to Grow, 87 A.B.A. J. 22 (Dec. 2001).
698. Id.
699. Fisher, supra note 693.
700. In 2003, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention of the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services, requested the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to
convene a committee of experts and conduct a "comprehensive review of scientific litera-
ture regarding the relationship between damp or moldy indoor environments and the man-
ifestation of adverse health effects, particularly respiratory and allergic symptoms." IOM
found that there was no "sufficient evidence of a casual relationship" between the presence
of mold or other agents in damp indoor environments and such health outcomes as asthma
development, skin symptoms, gastrointestinal tract problems, fatigue, cancer, mucous
membrane irritation syndrome, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, rheumatologic and
other immune diseases, and inhalation fevers. COMM. ON DAMP INDOOR SPACE &
HEALTH, INST. OF MED., DAMP INDOOR SPACES AND HEALTH 10 (2004).
701. Am. Coll. of Occupational and Envtl. Med., Adverse Human Health Effects Asso-




704. Id. at 2.
705. Id. at 2.
706. Id.
1352 [Vol. 61
Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts
asthma.70 7 Other claims about allergic reactions to mold are discussed by
ACOEM:
Although it is not relevant to indoor mold exposure ... there is a
belief among some health practitioners and members of the public
regarding a vague relationship between mold colonization, molds in
foods, and a "generalized mold hypersensitivity state." The condi-
tion was originally proposed as the "Chronic Candida Syndrome" or
"Candida Hypersensitivity Syndrome," but now has been genera-
lized to other fungi. Adherents may claim that individuals are "colo-
nized" with the mold(s) to which they are sensitized and that they
react to these endogenous molds as well as to exposures in foods and
other materials that contain mold products .... The claim of mold
colonization is generally not supported with any evidence, e.g., cul-
tures or biopsies, to demonstrate the actual presence of fungi in or
on the subject. Instead, proponents often claim colonization or in-
fection based on the presence of a wide variety of nonspecific symp-
toms and antibodies detected in serologic tests that represent no
more than past exposure to normal environmental fungi. The exis-
tence of this disorder is not supported by reliable scientific data.70 8
B. INFECTION
Serious fungal infections occur primarily among those with severely
compromised immune systems, such as those with leukemia, cancer pa-
tients receiving chemotherapy, and those with organ transplants who are
on immunosuppressive drugs. 70 9 In contrast to serious internal infec-
tions, superficial fungal infections on the skin or mucosal surfaces are ex-
tremely common.7 10 Accordingly, "[o]nly individuals with the most
severe forms of immunocompromise need to be concerned about the po-
tential for opportunistic fungal infections.
71 1
C. TOXICITY
Some molds that propagate indoors may, under some conditions, pro-
duce mycotoxins. Some mycotoxins such as penicillin or cyclosporine are
of clinical value whereas others can be toxic. 712 Current scientific evi-
dence, however, does not support the proposition that inhaled mycotox-
ins produced by molds adversely affect human health.71 3
While most poisonings from molds involve eating moldy foods,7 14
"[t]he present alarm over human exposure to molds in the indoor envi-
707. Id. Another condition alleged to be caused by mold is hypersensitivity
pneumonitis ("HP")-"an intense local immune reaction." However, "most cases of HP
result from occupational exposures" and HP is not induced by normal or even modestly
elevated levels of mold spores." Id. at 2.
708. Id. at 3.
709. Id.
710. Id. at 4.
711. Id. at 5.
712. Id. at 6.
713. Id.
714. Id. at 5.
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ronment derives from a belief that inhalation exposures to mycotoxins
cause numerous and varied, but generally nonspecific, symptoms. '715
One of the claims made is that mold in buildings can cause disease. How-
ever, according to ACOEM:
"Sick building syndrome," or "non-specific building-related illness,"
represents a poorly defined set of symptoms (often sensory) that are
attributed to occupancy in a building. Investigation generally finds
no specific cause for the complaints, but they may be attributed to
fungal growth if it is found. The potential role of building-associated
exposure to molds and associated mycotoxins has been investigated
.... Often referred to in the lay press by the evocative, but mean-
ingless terms, "toxic mold" or "fatal fungus," [one type of mold]...
elicits great concern when found in homes, schools, or offices, al-
though it is by no means the only mold found indoors that is capable
of producing mycotoxins. Recent critical reviews of the literature
concluded that indoor airborne levels of microorganisms are only
weakly correlated with human disease or building-related symptoms
and that a casual relationship has not been established between these
complaints and indoor exposures to [mold]. 7 16
Mold spores are present in all indoor environments and cannot be
eliminated from them. Normal building materials and furnishing
provide ample nutrition for many species of molds, but they can
grow and amplify indoors only when there is an adequate supply of
moisture. Where mold grows indoors there is an inappropriate
source of water that must be corrected before remediation of the
mold colonization can succeed. Mold growth in the home, school, or
office environment should not be tolerated because mold physically
destroys the building materials on which it grows, mold growth is
unsightly and may produce offensive odors, and mold is likely to sen-
sitize and produce allergic responses in allergic individuals. Except
for persons with severely impaired immune systems, indoor mold is
not a source of fungal infections. Current scientific evidence does not
support the proposition that human health has been adversely affected
by inhaled mycotoxins in home, school, or office environments.717
715. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
716. Id. at 4.
717. Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).
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